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1
Introduction
Sisay Asefa
Wei-Chiao Huang
Western Michigan University

Governance is a multidimensional concept that involves the traditions and institutions under which political authority in a country
is exercised. Governance includes the process by which rulers are
selected, monitored, and replaced, and it entails the capacity of governments to effectively formulate and implement sound and inclusive
policies. Through these means, good governance fosters the ability of a
government to earn the respect of its citizens as well as the cooperation
of the institutions that determine its economic and social policies, which
inﬂuence interaction among citizens. Sustainable development requires
good governance that is predictable, open, enlightened, accountable,
inclusive of all citizens, and operates under the rule of law. Good governance is desirable as a goal in its own right, beyond being an important means of sustainable development. According to the World Bank,
good governance involves six aspects: 1) voice and accountability,
2) political stability and the absence of violence, 3) government effectiveness, 4) regulatory quality, 5) rule of law, and 6) control of corruption. The data the World Bank generates for indicators of governance
for all countries around the world are available at www.govindicators
.org. The criteria the World Bank uses include consideration of the
aforementioned processes in good governance (Kaufmann 2010).

CHAPTER HIGHLIGHTS
This introductory chapter outlines the general points of good governance and its challenges, which will be explored in further detail
throughout the book. Subsequent chapters consider how governance

1
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relates to performance management, the inﬂuence of political parties,
education and health issues in developing countries, and the effects of
climate on poverty. Key examples will be drawn from countries in eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa.
Chapter 2, titled “The Role of Performance Management in Good
Governance,” comes from Carolyn J. Heinrich, Sid Richardson Professor of Public Affairs and director of the Center for Health and Social
Policy at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University
of Texas at Austin. She deﬁnes “governance” as consisting of “regimes
of laws, rules, judicial decisions and administrative practices that constrain, prescribe and enable the provision of publicly supported goods
and services.” Her focus is on performance management originating
from public administration and policy.
Heinrich notes that the twenty-ﬁrst century is an era of governance
by performance management. This approach has long roots in economics
and business management, with a focus on four issues: 1) performance
management, its origin, and how it contributes to good governance;
2) the challenges and complexity of designing appropriate performance
management in a democracy; 3) application of agency theory, or the
notion that seeks to align citizens’ objectives with agent incentives to
achieve principled results; and 4) lessons that have been learned for
improving future performance management.
Agency theory, which is rooted in economics and management, is
difﬁcult to implement in practice because of the complexity of values
and goals among citizens and legislators. Heinrich gives the example
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (commonly
called the Affordable Care Act [ACA] or Obamacare), which has several goals and tries to achieve potentially conﬂicting objectives such as
affordable health care for all Americans, increased quality and efﬁciency
of providing health care, and improved access to innovative medical
therapies. But once the law has been fully implemented, it may have
unintended consequences that distort its performance. She gives another
example, from Michigan’s Wayne County (i.e., metro Detroit), of children’s service agencies that use performance-based contracts: children
in this system were less likely to be reunited with their families and
more likely to enter foster homes. The end result was that children and
families received fewer in-agency health services. Performance-based
contract agencies may also inﬂuence the way workers deliver services:
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rather than drawing motivation from an ethos of public service, workers may ﬁnd that their self-interest in such cases does not square with
the priorities of the services they are delivering. Conversely, employees
are more likely to take principled actions if they feel their agency and
employment goals are aligned with the best interests of the public.
In another example of the relation of performance management to
good governance in the United States, Heinrich asserts that poor-quality
public education can jeopardize economic progress, even in a developed
nation. Her case study of performance management in education, which
starts with the 1983 K–12 report titled “A Nation at Risk” and continues
to the present, shows that dropout rates remain high and achievement
has not kept pace with other nations. Neither the nearly $600 billion
spent annually on K–12 nor three decades of program reform have kept
the United States from lagging further behind, she notes.
The author questions how spending, research, and reform could fail
to improve education. She notes there are many factors contributing
to this, one of which is that there are too many cooks in the kitchen,
including the federal government, the statehouse, the local district,
the individual, and the school itself, and of course parents or guardians. National monitoring of education through testing and standards
has been controversial. The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), implemented by Congress in 2001, deﬁnes school success based on snapshots
of student proﬁciency through standardized tests. Many have called this
a factory-model approach, traced its roots to early twentieth-century
manufacturing policies, and criticized its lack of emphasis on overall
growth in student achievement. In fact, some argue that implementing such rigid deﬁnitions of accountability has backﬁred, in that it has
led to a narrow emphasis on test preparation at the expense of deeper
learning. Withdrawal and lower graduation rates leave behind some of
the neediest students the law was designed to help. More-value-added
models have since been proposed to account for factors outside the control of teachers and schools. Heinrich relates the experiments of others
who sought to improve performance management through the use of
multiple measures. These measures consist of diagnostic performance
tools in which resources and rewards follow improved incremental outcomes. One such tool would be to reward measured outcomes determined by clearly deﬁned learning goals tailored to the students’ current
performance and future employment needs.
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In summary, there is no magic bullet. Neither more monetary investment nor strict adherence to testing performance has cured the ailments
of the school systems in the United States. Heinrich notes the complexities of achieving a good performance outcome even in a wealthy nation,
and she cautions that better guidance through governing systems can
only be attained through confronting these complexities, with the goals
of achieving desired learning outcomes and teaching effectiveness.
In Chapter 3, “Political Parties, Democracy, and ‘Good Governance,’” by John Ishiyama, University Distinguished Research Professor of Political Science at the University of North Texas, Ishiyama
offers an analysis of the inﬂuence of political parties on democratization in developing countries. He begins by acknowledging the historically negative public sentiments directed toward the very existence of
political parties. He points out that none other than George Washington,
the nation’s ﬁrst president, considered political parties to be factions
motivated by self-promotion at the expense of the public good. However, most scholars have described political parties in a representative
democracy as a necessary feature of that system, since parties offer
political choices. On the other hand, a one-party state, while it cannot be
a democracy, may still have good governance in speciﬁc areas. China,
for example, succeeded in dramatically reducing poverty in the relatively short time span of about 30 years, or since reforms began in 1978.
Yet China’s one-party rule, and hence its lack of political competition,
has made it difﬁcult to solve problems in other areas, such as environmental maintenance, pollution control, and concern for human rights.
In Ishiyama’s view, political parties are necessary to perform vital
functions in the practice of democracy, such as interest articulation,
political communication, candidate nomination, and stimulation of
political participation. Encouraging these factors increases the potential for sustainable and accountable governments, including checks and
balances. However, political parties can be so divisive that good governance is compromised; in developing countries this may even lead
to violence. The shutdown of the U.S. federal government in 2013 by
Republicans in the House of Representatives in deﬁance of the Obama
administration is one example of political gridlock and extremism.
One-party dominance can cause an increase in corruption, since the
dominant party attempts to maintain power by distributing patronage
and using manipulation. Ishiyama holds that one can measure quality
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of governance, including levels of effectiveness and corruption. “Effectiveness” refers to the quality of public service and policy formation,
implementation, credibility, and legitimacy of governments, used to
promote inclusive polices. “Corruption” reﬂects the extent to which
political power is used for private gain. It comprises both petty and
grand corruption, as well as overall “capture” of the state by private
interests. Both “effectiveness” and “corruption” utilize a scale ranging from −2.5 to +2.5. The World Bank makes the data available for
parties in countries around the world, thus providing comparative data
on levels of corruption. Using the same scale, political stability is also
assessed. “Stability” is determined by the perception of the likelihood
that a government will be overthrown through violent or unconstitutional means.
A recent case of a political uprising occurred during the Arab Spring
of 2011, with the removal of President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt after
30 years of rule and the subsequent election of the Islamic Brotherhood
party, which put Mohamed Morsi in power as president. This was not
a stable environment, as demonstrated by Morsi’s subsequent ousting
by opposition leaders and the military because Egyptians perceived his
regime as being exclusive of other groups. Many Egyptians were upset
by his party’s undermining of the role of women in Egyptian society
as well as the injection of religion into politics. Egyptians may have
been afraid that Morsi would create a religious autocracy analogous to
the Iranian religious autocracy that emerged in 1979 when a popular
uprising removed the monarchial form of government headed by Shah
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.
Ishiyama discusses the use of an empirical study that takes into
account gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and ethnolinguistic
fractionalization (a measure of ethnic diversity). He employs several
measures—party fractionalization, number of parties, party volatility,
control variables such as GDP, and other aspects—to attempt to quantify an average for how well corruption is under control, especially as it
relates to political-party attributes.
The author stresses the importance of future research that explores
what party characteristics can be determined to promote better understanding of governance. He also cites the need for better use of panel
data, as well as improved model speciﬁcation, to create more effective
research assessments.
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While the research into how to measure the effects of political parties continues, it remains clear that those parties created along the lines
of ethnic and/or religious divisions cannot promote democratic good
governance. By failing to be inclusive, they highlight divisions, exacerbate ethnic and religious tensions, and risk continued political instability. A mature, liberal, pluralistic representative democracy that respects
individual human rights has the best chance of managing ethnic and
religious diversity, compared to an autocratic regime. Social science
studies of the relationship between governance and ethnic diversity
show that multiparty democracies outperform autocratic regimes in the
long run, especially in promoting citizens’ rights, human rights, and the
rights of minority groups.
Chapter 4, “Good Governance in Transition Economies: A Comparative Analysis,” comes from Susan J. Linz, professor of economics at Michigan State University. Her contribution looks at metrics
that draw a connection between governance and economic growth in
the transition economies that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1991. She discusses issues relating to the process of transition
and to the measures of governance. Linz compares central and eastern
European transition economies from the perspectives of both experts
and business ﬁrms. She views governance as the traditions and institutions by which authority is exercised at the local, regional, national, and
international levels. As such, she says, governance possesses political,
economic, and social dimensions.
According to Linz, a state with good governance is participatory,
consensus-oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, politically
stable, effective, efﬁcient, inclusive, and equitable. It also follows the
rule of law, controls corruption, enforces regulatory quality, and offers
its citizens not only a choice but a voice. Linz identiﬁes several measures of governance beyond the six indicators of the World Bank, such
as Freedom House’s country ratings of political rights and civil liberties, the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) produced by Transparency International, and the indicators of the Business Environment and
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS).
Linz considers these measures in comparing several factors that
have affected variation across former Soviet Union (FSU) and central
and eastern European (CEE) transition economies following the collapse of the former Soviet state in 1991.
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These variations include culture, kinship, path dependency, ﬁnancial and legal institutions, regulatory differences, and the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) on governance in each transition state. The
FSU countries studied comprised Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova,
Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan (15 states).
Among the CEE nations discussed were Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Kosovo, Macedonia,
Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia (14
states), for a total of 29 states. For those states, governance indicators
such as CPI and the Freedom House Index (FHI) were used to assess
political stability, accountability, and rule of law. From a business ﬁrm’s
perspective, she describes the inﬂuence of both macro- and microlevel
policies on corruption, state capture and intervention, bribery, and kickbacks. She further discusses the effects of what are called “time taxes,”
a term that refers to time costs spent on bureaucracy—for instance, the
amount of time that management personnel spend dealing with regulations, or, say, the average number of days it takes to complete business
services such as import licenses, electrical and water connections, operating licenses, or construction permits.
Linz’s general conclusions are that these transition states, with some
variation, are plagued by persistent bad governance and corruption at
levels from business ﬁrms to local and national governments. These
indicators of bad governance were higher for FSU countries than for
CEE countries. However, the perception of how many ﬁrms are tainted
by corruption is higher in CEE than in FSU countries, even though
transaction costs or time taxes are lower in CEE countries compared to
FSU countries.
Chapter 5, “Governance Challenges in Education and Health Care
in Developing Countries,” comes from Seema Jayachandran, associate professor of economics and director of the Center for the Study of
Development Economics at Northwestern University. Jayachandran’s
focus concerns the impact of governance on human capital in developing countries, with an emphasis on education and health issues. She
argues that good governance is more critical in developing states than in
mature democracies like the United States. For example, in Uganda, it is
estimated that ruling politicians steal 20 percent of the money intended
for education and health, which has a corresponding detrimental effect
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on the population. Teachers are compelled because of their low salaries
to extract bribes and other services in kind from students and parents. In
Bangalore, India, it is estimated that approximately 51 percent of community members have paid bribes, with some bribes for health services
amounting to as much as 89 percent of the nominal service costs for
hospitals and doctors. In addition, staff absenteeism in clinics and other
health facilities runs as high as 56 percent. Worse, she notes, about 82
percent of health care workers do not have the appropriate documented
training in the areas in which they serve.
The education sector makes up another area that does not offer
much hope for success in developing nations with poor governance.
In these nations, low-quality schools and universities abound. In some
cases, teachers may be present for teaching duties only about 45 percent
of the time. Eighteen percent of teachers are absent from class simply
because of a lack of monitoring and supervision. Perversely, the low
wages they are paid can provide teachers with an incentive to take on
tutoring jobs while neglecting their regular teaching duties. A combination of lack of effective management and low teacher salaries prevents
students in these areas from receiving the education the state claims to
provide. In short, the educational problems of poorly governed countries cannot be alleviated without addressing the limited resources of
local communities, insufﬁcient school infrastructure, and the large, illequipped classes that result.
Jayachandran concludes by offering general recommendations for
how to improve both health care and education. She proposes the following three remedies: 1) link pay and bonuses to real performance;
2) use digital technology such as cameras to monitor teaching and to
supervise staff, including using cell phones and radio to improve monitoring and supervision; 3) empower local citizens, especially women,
who are culturally more connected to children. Countries like Uganda
and Kenya can use positive incentives such as hiring teachers through
contracts that provide rewards and bonuses for positively monitored
performance.
Chapter 6 is titled “Governance Problems and Priorities for Local
Climate Adaptation and Poverty Alleviation”; its author, Stephen C.
Smith, is a professor of economics and international affairs and directs
the Research Program in Poverty, Development, and Globalization
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at George Washington University. Smith’s concern is the interaction
between poverty, the environment, and climate change.
Smith maintains that while there have been encouraging signs of
reduction in poverty globally, much work remains to be done. Although
improvements have been made, poverty traps persist, making it impossible to eliminate absolute and chronic poverty. He argues that climate
change has the potential to exacerbate some causes of poverty cycles
and that the negative consequences of climate change are carried disproportionately by the poorest two billion people on the global income
ladder. As natural resources such as land, forests, and access to water
become more scarce, the poor use more resources in an effort to survive.
In doing so they often increase degradation of the land, resources, and
soil, and they contribute to deforestation and water depletion. However,
it is possible to instill planned and autonomous adaptation in local communities to alleviate natural resource depletion. Smith asserts that good
governance can assist communities in climate adaptation and minimize
the risk of environmental decline as climate change continues to alter
weather cycles. Climate change is driven by both human and natural
factors, and the human factors stem in large part from policies of unsustainable development rooted in a lack of good governance. Moreover,
high-quality governance may prevent some climate-driven conﬂict that
arises in impoverished areas.
On a positive note, Smith does point to some recent progress being
made on poverty reduction. For example, since 1980, the fraction of the
population earning below $1 a day (adjusted to $1.25 a day for inﬂation)
has fallen from about 40 percent to just above 20 percent worldwide,
and the World Bank reports that the goal of halving overall poverty by
2015 is being met in some countries of Asia. Even in Africa, 6 of the 10
fastest-growing economies have experienced impressive improvement
in most health and education indicators, even though quality remains a
concern.
In addition, there has been progress in the spread of democracy and
transparency globally, even though all of the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) outlined by the United Nations may not have
been achieved. Unfortunately, climate change may jeopardize some of
this progress. Challenges remain, as there is a growing concentration
of poverty in fragile and failing states. These fragile economies tend
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to occur in environments where threats to the natural resource–based
livelihoods of the poor are most dire.
Smith quotes the former U.N. Secretary General Koﬁ Annan, who
characterized extreme poverty as “a poverty that kills.” While there has
been much progress, Annan says, the scale of preventable loss of human
life driven by human actions remains horrifying in some countries such
as Afghanistan, Chad, the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, and
Sierra Leone, where about one-ﬁfth of all children die before age ﬁve
from preventable causes.
Indeed, despite improvement in some measures of poverty, health
outcomes in impoverished nations continue to lag. At present, life
expectancy in sub-Saharan Africa is only 53 years. In South Asia, nearly
1 child in 12 dies before age ﬁve. In low-income countries, the underﬁve mortality rate is 118 per 1,000. In middle-income states, the rate is
51 per 1,000, while in high-income countries, the under-ﬁve mortality
rate is only 7 per 1,000 (Todaro and Smith 2014). Every day, nearly
21,000 children in developing countries die from preventable causes—
over seven million in 2013 alone. There are many other severe health
deprivations. Women with nutritional deﬁciencies are more likely to
deliver smaller babies at risk of poor growth and development. Malnutrition alone affects nearly two billion people. Many children face
lifelong disabilities. In many poor countries, parasites are pervasive and
a woman dies during childbirth nearly every minute. It has been estimated that nearly 3,000 children in Africa die from malaria each day.
Smith poses the question of why it is so difﬁcult for the poorest of the
poor to make further progress.
He determines that poverty traps, exacerbated by poor governance,
make it difﬁcult to break the cycle of poverty and hunger. Poverty traps
include malnutrition, poor health, inadequate housing, high fertility,
illiteracy, low skills, and low capital. Smith proposes further research
on multidimensional areas of good governance for reducing poverty and
promoting environmental progress.
Chapter 7, the ﬁnal chapter, titled “The Challenges of Good Governance and Leadership in Developing Countries: Cases from Africa
and China,” comes from my coeditor, Wei-Chiao Huang, and me, Sisay
Asefa; both of us are professors of economics at Western Michigan University. We explore the following ﬁve topics: 1) understanding and measuring good governance for sustainable development; 2) governance,
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development, and multidimensional poverty index (MPI) relationships;
3) the role of governance in sustainable development and poverty reduction; 4) methods of addressing poverty traps; and 5) poor governance
as the driver of conﬂict, poverty, and corruption traps. We also discuss
how regional and global engagement can assist states in achieving goals
through monetary policy, global investment, and foreign aid. By considering such policies, political and economic institutions can be encouraged to use good governance practices to ﬁght the effects of endemic
poverty.
We deﬁne sustainable development as a multidimensional process
of socioeconomic and political transformation aimed at enhancing
human progress in all its dimensions, including the freedom of political
and economic choice. We propose that a program on good governance,
peace, political education, and conﬂict transformation should be instituted across schools, colleges, and universities to teach citizenship, civil
society, and responsible ethical conduct. Without good governance and
its guiding principles, the well-being of a country’s citizens is at risk.
In the book, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and
Poverty, written by Massachusetts Institute of Technology economics
professors Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, the authors illustrate how exclusive political and economic institutions drive inequality
and conﬂict, leading to the failure of nations. For instance, although the
two Koreas contain populations, cultures, and environments that are
homogenous in many attributes, the people of North Korea experience
a very different governance outcome from those in South Korea.
The people of North Korea are among the poorest on earth, near
starvation, while South Korea is among the richest and most dynamic
states in Asia. On the one hand, South Korea forged a society that created positive incentives, rewarded effort and innovation, and allowed
freedom for its citizens to participate in economic opportunities. At the
same time, North Korea endured decades of famine under repressive
rulers from one family assisted by institutional repression, with no end
in sight (Acemoglu and Robinson 2011). Along with other such examples from history, the MIT authors’ research yields explanations for collapses of the Roman Empire, Ottoman Empire, Soviet Union, and other
historic empires. The book also offers insights as to why an African
state like Botswana can succeed while its neighbor Zimbabwe is failing.
For example, in the 1980s, a decade in which most African economies
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were failing, Botswana scored economic growth that surpassed Asian
tiger economies such as Hong Kong and Taiwan, while other African
states experienced negative growth.
Moving forward, policymakers can learn from historic and presentday examples both of nations with good governance and of those with
failed and failing states. With better institutional planning, as well as
more effective domestic and foreign relations, the implementation of
good governance can be encouraged worldwide.
For instance, the book imparts suggestions for the United States and
China on how to build sustainable, inclusive, more equitable and egalitarian political and economic institutions. This objective would also
have strong policy implications for Ethiopia and other African states
(Asefa 2013).
In this regard, Huang and I consider the case of China and reconcile
a puzzling contradiction between China’s impressive governance outcomes and its one-party authoritarian system, a mode of government
that seems to violate the commonly perceived recipe for good governance, especially in the areas of voice, accountability, and the rule of
law. But a closer examination of China’s governance model reveals that
China actually practices economic, political, and legal accountability
(and, to that extent, rule of law).
In addition, China’s neodemocratic centralism and collective
decision-making process may have some advantage in enhancing efﬁciency and good governance—as a case in point, there is the Third Plenum’s decision in 2013 to deepen reforms. However, it is important to
consider that China has a long history of civilization and a relatively
less diverse population ethnically and linguistically compared to African states, which comprise over a thousand languages and ethnic groups
scattered among 54 states. Most of these states were formed by European colonial powers, primarily Britain and France. The exceptions are
Ethiopia and Egypt, both of which, like China, have a long history of
civilization (Asefa 2013).
Economic development does not have a secret formula, Huang
and I posit: success in economic development requires only good and
accountable governance of a country’s citizens. Examples where good
governance leads to better outcomes for citizens include countries
in Europe, North America, East Asia, and a few in Africa. Nevertheless, many countries in Africa have failed to fully utilize their natural-
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resource and human potential. Most African states that suffer from poverty have made intended or unintended governance choices to continue
long-ruling repressive regimes and to prevent honest dialogue and freedom of expression, including peaceful constitutional transition of power.
They refuse to learn from positive lessons illustrated both from their
own past and from comparative experiences of well-governed countries
around the world. We conclude by expressing the hope that African
political leaders and governments will make a different, positive choice
toward building inclusive economic, political, and social institutions in
the twenty-ﬁrst century. This inclusive, democratic approach to good
governance can take Africa and other regions, such as the Middle East
and South Asia, out of poverty and conﬂict. Democratic good governance would positively affect all sectors of the economy and lead to
progress for the twenty-ﬁrst century.

CONCLUSION
In this volume, The Political Economy of Good Governance, the six
chapters that follow this introduction capture several of the key dimensions of good governance, as well as what deleterious and negative
consequences may arise in its absence. The authors draw analysis and
solutions from diverse sectors such as economics, public administration, management, and political science, in order to treat some of the
most pressing societal issues of our time. They connect the importance
of education, health, climate change, and poverty to address the challenges of creating a world where more countries embrace good governance policies to beneﬁt their peoples. We invite readers to further
explore the authors’ ideas in the following chapters.
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The Role of Performance
Management in Good Governance
Carolyn J. Heinrich
University of Texas at Austin
What the people want is less government and more governance.
—Harlan Cleveland.1
In the social sciences literature, the word “governance” has become
ubiquitous. Avinash Dixit (2002) describes an explosion of the term
“governance” in the economics literature based on his search of the
EconLit database, which showed just ﬁve occurrences of the word in
the 1970s, 112 references in the 1980s, 3,825 in the 1990s, and, in the
ﬁve years from 2000–2005, 7,948 instances.
In broad terms, Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2001, p. 7) have described
governance as “regimes of laws, rules, judicial decisions and administrative practices that constrain, prescribe and enable the provision of
publicly supported goods and services.” Ultimately, governance determines government performance. Correspondingly, the goal or role of
performance management is to determine how public sector regimes,
agencies, programs, and activities can be authorized, organized, and
managed to perform at the highest levels in achieving public purposes
and desired outcomes. Or, in the “reinventing government” conceptualization of it, performance management is one tool or means for bringing about more productive and efﬁcient allocations of public sector
resources (i.e., more efﬁcient, results-oriented, and responsive governance).
In The Dynamics of Performance Management, Donald Moynihan
(2008, pp. 4–5) describes the beginning of the twenty-ﬁrst century as
an “era of governance by performance management.” He asks, “How
important are performance management reforms to the actual management of government?” and answers his own question: “It is only a slight
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exaggeration to say that we are betting the future of governance on the
use of performance information.”
In fact, performance management may be one of the longestenduring reform movements in public administration, with origins that
go back to the nineteenth-century writings of Woodrow Wilson (1887).
Wilson proposed a “scientiﬁc” and more “business-like” approach to
public administration, which was later picked up and expanded in the
scientiﬁc management movement of the early 1900s. Scientiﬁc management promoted the careful analysis of workers’ tasks and work
arrangements, with the objective of maximizing efﬁciency by planning
work procedures according to a technical logic, setting standards, and
exercising controls to ensure conformity with standards (Taylor 1911).
Paul Light’s (1997) classic work The Tides of Reform: Making Government Work, 1945–1995 compared the philosophies, movements, and
other management strategies that come and go to tides which ebb and
ﬂow, overlapping as one comes in and another goes out—a conceptualization that aptly describes performance management since the late
1800s. Performance management has been coming in and going out
of fashion, or ebbing and ﬂowing, for more than a century, although
some suggest it returned in tidal-wave proportions in the late twentieth
century. Indeed, a mantra of the early 1990s, “reinventing government,”
proposed reforming government so that it would operate more like a
business—focused on efﬁciency and getting results.
This intensiﬁed focus on “getting results” motivates a central question of this chapter: how can performance management contribute to
good governance and improved government performance (as deﬁned
by public preferences for the means and ends of governance)? This
chapter will address four key issues concerning the role of performance
management in good governance:
1) Our history with performance management—the effort to
improve the efﬁciency and effective functioning of government—is long, and its origins in economics and business are
reﬂected in the design of our performance management systems today.
2) Even in fairly simple and amenable contexts, designing an
appropriate performance management system is challenging; the complexities of the public sector and our multilayered, representative government system greatly compound
the challenges.
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3) What is the result of applying a promising governance tool in
a rather blunt form that skirts the complexities of the public
sector?
4) If we are, in fact, betting the future of governance on performance management, what are the lessons that we have learned
to date that can be used to improve its effectiveness?

THE ORIGINS OF PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT
To understand how performance management is viewed and conducted today, it is helpful to look back at the origins of performance
management. It is largely recognized, in the works of political scientists
as well as economists, that the roots of performance management lie in
agency theory, as ﬁrst developed in economics and business management (Wood 2010). The typical early performance-measurement system
debuted in a factory production setting and was based largely on scientiﬁc management principles—i.e., its work processes were guided by
technical analysis, and it established production controls and standards
to maximize efﬁciency. In the agency-theory framework, the owner
hires managers and workers to generate proﬁts (with the owner or manager acting as principal, and the workers as agents). A key objective of
the principal is to then design a contract that aligns principal and agent
incentives and achieves the production objectives of the principal. This
is made challenging, however, by the fact that these relationships are
frequently typiﬁed by conﬂicts in goals and values, as well as privately
held information or information asymmetries.
It is here that a role for performance management enters in—both
in monitoring worker actions, outputs, and outcomes and in developing an incentive scheme with rewards or sanctions that align principal
and agent interests—in essence, a contractual relationship with performance expectations and credible provisions for enforcing them. However, even in a simple production system that assumes
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•

veriﬁable employee efforts,

•

the dominance of self-interest, and

•

a relatively small number of variables for managers to control,

an enforceable contract is difﬁcult to achieve. In fact, in economics and
business management, it has long been acknowledged that the richer
(more complex) “real world” circumstances hardly ever correspond to
the strict conditions of a simple linear incentive scheme (Holmstrom
and Milgrom 1987).
There are two main challenges presented by agency theory that
complicate efforts to establish viable performance-based contracts
(Holmstrom 1982). One is the well-known problem of adverse selection, where employees’ true motivations or capabilities for producing a desired outcome are unknown to employers (i.e., there is hidden
information). The second is moral hazard and unobservability, in which
employees’ efforts or actions are not observable or readily measured;
this creates conditions that can lead to shirking or distorted results.
Recent headlines reporting cheating scandals in K–12 schools—which
are under pressure to meet performance targets on standardized tests set
by the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act—have illuminated a textbook
case of how these problems can undermine performance management
efforts (Rich 2013).
Yet many contracts and performance management systems still
incorporate basic linear (or “straight-line”) incentive schemes, largely
because of their perceived simplicity and the signiﬁcant costs associated with establishing a more intricate contract or system of incentives for inducing work and responsible management. A straight-line
approach typically deﬁnes a required (linear) rate of performance
improvement from an initial score or target level, and it may also specify an ending value corresponding to a maximum performance level,
such as NCLB’s goal of 100 percent proﬁciency in mathematics for
public school students by 2014 (see Figure 2.1). No Child Left Behind
is also an example, however, of an important shortcoming of straightline models for establishing performance expectations: they are seldom
constructed using empirical data or other evidence that would generate
realistic expectations for performance (Koretz and Hamilton 2006). In
fact, the U.S. Department of Education has made it clear that it is aware
that the performance management system under NCLB is not working.
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Figure 2.1 Annual Expectations Set by the No Child Left Behind Act for
Increased Performance among Students in Grades K–8 Tested
in Math, 2002–2014 (% that must be met of students testing
at the “proﬁcient” level)
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NOTE: Figure shows the expected percentage of students each year that should achieve
a rating of “proﬁcient” in testing for math under the legislation. The bar for 2002, the
ﬁrst year the law was in effect, shows the actual percentage of students who tested as
proﬁcient in math that year, and no improvement was required for the ﬁrst year following that. But thereafter, increasing percentages of proﬁciency were set for each
year, culminating in 2014, when 100 percent of kindergarteners through eighth graders were expected to be proﬁcient in math. (The exception was 2006, when the expectations were not raised from 2005.)
SOURCE: Author’s compilation.

As Secretary of Education Arne Duncan testiﬁed before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions some two years
ago, “The closer we have gotten to 2014, the more NCLB has changed
from an instrument of reform into a barrier to reform. And, the kids who
have lost the most from that change are . . . students with disabilities,
low-income and minority students, and English learners” (U.S. Department of Education 2013, p. 1).
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ADDED COMPLEXITIES OF PERFORMANCE
MANAGEMENT IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
As a matter of fact, from the start, the application of agency theory
to the design of performance management systems in the public sector has been considerably more complex than many anticipated. First,
just who is the principal in a given governance setting? Governance
in the public sector is multilayered (or hierarchical) and dynamic. In
the “logic of governance” model that Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2001)
describe, actors can be identiﬁed as the principal in one relationship and
the agent in another (as shown by the repetition of the lettered categories in the progression below). Or, one might characterize a relationship
as having multiple principals, depending on the level of focus. Lynn,
Heinrich, and Hill’s model speciﬁes a hierarchy of governance relationships between
(a) citizen preferences and interests expressed politically and (b)
legislative choice,
(b) legislator preferences in enacted legislation and (c) formally
authorized structures and processes in public agencies,
(c) structure of formal authority and (d) de facto organization and
management of agencies and programs and their activities,
(d) organization and administration or management of agencies
and (e) primary work of public agencies,
(e) primary work of public agencies generates output or results that
are subject to (f) stakeholder/citizen assessments of public sector performance, and
(f) stakeholder/citizen assessments expressed politically and (g)
public and legislative interests and preferences.
In addition, consensus or clarity on goals is often lacking among
citizens, and sometimes in originating legislation as well. Consider,
for, example, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)
of 2010. There are nine titles or goals of the ACA, but discord at both
the federal and state levels since its passage reﬂects a lack of consensus
about how we will implement the law and simultaneously achieve a
number of its core goals, including
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•

affordable health care for all Americans,

•

increased quality and efﬁciency of health care, and

•

improved access to innovative medical therapies.

Furthermore, the implementation of the ACA is not only requiring
cooperation across multiple levels of governance, but also the creation
of new governing structures (e.g., health care insurance exchanges and
other new forms of public-private partnerships for health care administration) that may add new layers of governance relationships.
The public sector is also distinctive in that its primary work or production technologies typically involve complex, nonmanual work, characterized by multitasking and multilevel interactions and public-private
sector partnerships and coordination, such as in the delivery of publicly
funded health care, education, and social services. Nonstandardized
outputs make the accurate measurement of performance and the construction of performance benchmarks both more challenging and more
costly. In addition, in designing performance management systems and
incentives in new contexts, we often begin with an imperfect understanding of agents’ means for inﬂuencing performance and their likely
responses to incentives. The potential for unintended consequences
as performance management and the use of performance-based contracts expand into unchartered public-sector territory is high (Koning
and Heinrich 2013).
For example, market-based incentives were developed and
employed in child welfare agencies in Wayne County, Michigan (the
Detroit metropolitan area), with the objective of improving reuniﬁcation rates and other permanency outcomes for children in the child welfare system. The performance incentive system was designed to provide
a lower per-diem rate, with an initial lump sum payment to agencies
for the provision of services and ﬁnancial bonuses for the movement
of foster children into permanent placements (and for sustaining them).
McBeath and Meezan (2010) explain that it was expected that the performance bonuses would provide incentives to improve performance
and would generate costs savings along a number of dimensions,
including
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•

rates of recidivism upon exit from agency care, and

•

the number of youth in foster care.

In turn, the mechanisms by which managers might inﬂuence these child
welfare outcomes included the services provided to children and families in foster care and in moving children into permanent placements
(e.g., case management, supervised parent-child visits, and specialized services in the community), as well as the structural and technical
aspects of service provision, such as agency stafﬁng and caseloads per
worker, worker training, service coordination, and supervision.
In their empirical analysis, McBeath and Meezan (2010) ﬁnd that
children served by Wayne County agencies under performance-based
contracts were less likely to be reuniﬁed and were more likely to
enter kinship foster homes, and that these children and their families
received fewer in-agency therapeutic and nontherapeutic services and
community services. In other words, the performance-based contracting
system generated mostly unintended consequences. Although several
explanations are plausible, it appears that incentives to reduce service
costs and speed up the identiﬁcation of potential permanency options
for children dominated agency and worker responses, which led to
reductions in important within-agency services. These reductions may
have subsequently decreased performance on the desired outcomes.
Finally, the public sector is also distinct from the private sector in
the extent to which political inﬂuences may be brought to bear at many
different levels. Goals and priorities can change swiftly, and entire
agencies or authority structures can be reorganized, as well as the foci
of primary work.2 This ensures that any performance management or
incentive systems in public agencies will be dynamic. In addition, principals may also choose to change or replace performance measures over
time, as agents (employees) learn how to (strategically) manipulate
performance measures to increase measured performance in ways that
do not necessarily improve outcomes (Heinrich and Marschke 2010).
Widespread reports of teaching to the test, manipulating who takes
standardized tests, and other means for inﬂating test scores in K–12
public education are just one example of gaming the system in publicsector performance management, and one that is motivating debate
among education policymakers and spurring ongoing efforts to improve
education performance measures and accountability systems.
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APPLYING PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT
BLUNTLY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Having considered the role of performance management in good
governance from a more theoretical or abstract perspective, it is useful
to work through some of the challenges in greater depth with a concrete
policy application for an important, publicly provided service: K–12
public education. In 1983, an inﬂuential report, A Nation at Risk: The
Imperative for Educational Reform, ﬁrst warned that U.S. educational
institutions were losing sight of their basic goals and high expectations and putting the economic well-being and security of the nation in
jeopardy. The report set off alarm bells by pointing out that, when several educational measures were tallied among peer nations, the United
States came in seventh.
Today, we are spending close to $600 billion annually on our public
elementary and secondary school system, and the public is demanding
greater accountability and results. Yet 20 countries now have higher
graduation rates than the United States. Almost three decades of educational reform efforts appear to have left the country even further behind,
and dropout rates have remained stubbornly high. Furthermore, public
and private stakeholders in education are increasingly at odds over what
types of interventions and incentives are needed to turn these trends
around.
Indeed, public education today is characterized by elaborate but
chaotic governing structures, widely varying views on appropriate
means and ends for improving education and how trade-offs among
goals should be managed, an increasingly complex technology with
nonstandardized outputs (which we subject to standardized measures of
outcomes), and political inﬂuences that interject their agendas at many
levels. As Finn and Petrilli (2013) describe it, there are
too many cooks in the education kitchen and nobody really in
charge. We bow to the mantra of “local control” yet, in fact, nearly
every major decision affecting the education of our children is
shaped (and misshaped) by at least four separate levels of governance: Washington, the state capitol, the local district, and the individual school building itself. And that’s without even considering
intermediate units (such as the regional education-service centers
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seen in Texas, New York, Ohio, and elsewhere), the courts (which
exert enormous inﬂuence on our schools), or parents and guardians, and the degree to which all of their decisions inﬂuence the
nature and quality of a child’s schooling. (p. 21)

Drawing education governance into the “logic of governance”
model outlined earlier, the complexities of multiple layers of education
governance and the various actors (both principals and agents) at each
level are apparent, as shown below:
(a) citizen preferences and interests expressed politically and (b)
legislative choice (Elementary and Secondary Education Act
[ESEA] and pending reauthorization of the 2002 ESEA that
created No Child Left Behind);
(b) legislator preferences in enacted legislation and (c) formally
authorized structures and processes in public agencies (the U.S.
Department of Education and state and local educational agencies—SEAs and LEAs—with governing authority);
(c) structure of formal authority and (d) de facto organization
and management of agencies and programs and their activities (a complex division of responsibilities between SEAs and
LEAs, with the added challenge of constrained authority under
NCLB);
(d) organization and administration or management of agencies and
(e) the primary work of public agencies (the primary work of
education is changing—it is no longer just about giving classroom lessons; services provided in schools and needs for them
range widely and are compounded by unfunded mandates);
(e) the primary work of public agencies generates output or results
that are subject to (f) stakeholder/citizen assessments of public
sector performance (standardized achievement test scores are
limited measures, especially when used to determine whether
students have met proﬁciency standards under NCLB); and
(f) stakeholder/citizen assessments expressed politically and (g)
public and legislative interests and preferences (pending reauthorization of the ESEA and waivers granted to a majority of
states under NCLB).
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Our current governing structures in K–12 education consist of
deeply layered and overlapping levels of decision making, which open
more potential avenues for inﬂuence by different groups at varying levels and with differing ideas and interests. At the same time, the lack of
coherent management or clear lines of accountability is an ongoing,
central problem in public education. As Hill (2013, p. 332) describes it,
“Though every rule was made for a reason, no one carefully considered
whether individual rules conﬂict with one another.” Could the use of
performance management potentially bring some clarity and coherence
to K–12 education governance?
Despite the many complexities in this sector, we have, in fact, proceeded full speed ahead with regimes for performance management
and accountability in education that include strong incentives and highstakes consequences for many stakeholders. NCLB marked the beginning of an assertive federal role in directing state and local practices
to meet student performance standards. Unlike the ESEA’s ﬁrst-phase
focus on distributing resources to the targeted populations, the second phase sharpened the federal focus on student performance—what
Wong (2013) has described as the emergence of “performance-based
federalism.” The federal government holds states, districts, and schools
accountable for a comprehensive set of standards, including annual academic progress, teacher quality, and achievement gaps, and for developing assessments of student performance relative to those standards.
Still, NCLB deﬁnes educational success primarily based on standardized testing snapshots of students’ performance, rather than on
individual students’ growth, and current funding and accountability systems presume “same-age cohorts of students proceeding in lockstep,”
says Wilson (2013, p. 96). As is consistent with the origins of performance management discussed above, Linda Darling-Hammond (2002,
p. 6) of Stanford University describes how our test-based accountability
system reﬂects a “factory-model approach” to education (as developed
by early twentieth-century scientiﬁc managers such as Frederick Taylor
and Franklin Bobbit), in which schools are organized “to process large
batches of students in assembly-line fashion rather than to ensure that
students are well-known by their teachers and treated as serious learners.” She notes that urban high schools
typically hold at least 2,000 to 3,000 students, who may see six
or eight teachers each year for 45 minutes apiece. In cities such
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as Los Angeles, teachers daily see 180 to 200 students, who cycle
through the classroom to be stamped with a lesson as if they were
on a conveyer belt. Teachers are asked to individualize curriculum
for the needs of every learner when they have no way of coming
to know their students well. Furthermore, the group of learners
is much more diverse than at any other time in our history. Thus,
the conditions for achieving high standards are lacking in many
schools in the United States. (Darling-Hammond 2002, p. 6)

Recently, recognition of the limitations of proﬁciency measures
under NCLB has propelled alternative approaches to measuring educational performance, particularly value-added measures. A basic valueadded model compares the individual growth of a group of students
(e.g., in a given classroom or school) to average growth of the population of interest (e.g., growth among all students in the state). Some
value-added models are also constructed to account for factors outside the control of teachers or schools in estimating growth in student
achievement over time. Although these are (arguably) better measures
of performance than proﬁciency levels, should society be ratcheting up
the stakes that it attaches to them, as we have recently seen in some
large, urban school districts?
One of the most controversial recent developments in performance
management in education has been the high-proﬁle, public dissemination of value-added measures of teacher performance in large school
districts, including those in Los Angeles and New York. Calculated by
third parties (outside the district), the value-added measures associated with speciﬁc teachers were published in the Los Angeles Times
(latimes.com 2011a) and by the New York City Department of Education (Santos 2012). The objective was to get the performance information directly to the citizen (parent) stakeholders, who could use this
information and their political power to drive public-sector performance improvements.
However, in New York City, the margin of error in value-added
measures was so wide that the average conﬁdence interval around each
rating spanned 35 percentiles in math and 53 percentiles in English,
the city said. Some teachers were judged on as few as 10 students. In
publishing the Los Angeles numbers, the L.A. Times acknowledged that
value-added measures “do not capture everything about a teacher or
school’s performance.” The L.A. Times also published comments from
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teachers in response to the publication of their ratings. The following is
an example of a typical teacher comment (or protest) of the value-added
ratings:
Please note that these ratings are based on inaccurate data. During my time at Westwood Charter Elementary, I have only taught
Kindergarten (where students at that grade level do NOT take the
California Standards Test). I have also never taught 3rd Grade in
my teaching career. (latimes.com 2011b)

A study by Mathematica Policy Research (Schochet and Chiang
2010) found that the error rate for value-added scores (based on three
years of data) was 25 percent. Therefore, a three-year model would rate
one out of every four teachers incorrectly, and when only one year of
data was analyzed, the error rate jumped to 35 percent.
It is widely known that tests are limited measures of student knowledge and learning, and that there is inevitably human and statistical
error that enters into their administration. In addition, there are welldocumented negative, unintended consequences to high-stakes testing—overly narrow and excessive test preparation, gaming the system, reduced effort and withdrawal on the part of students, and lower
graduation rates—particularly for low-performing subgroups (National
Research Council 2011).
Thus, a major concern with the direction we are currently taking
with performance management in public education is that we appear to
be treating test-based accountability like a magic bullet. Education performance assessments (via student testing) are just one tool for improving governance and accountability to the public for outcomes, and such
testing will be a tool of limited use if we do not address the variety of
governance challenges that plague our K–12 education system.

LESSONS FOR IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN CONTRIBUTING
TO GOOD GOVERNANCE
Primarily, this chapter highlights one policy area (education) where
we have encountered challenges in designing performance manage-
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ment systems to improve governance and performance. The lessons
that follow—regarding what we have learned about the role of performance management in contributing to good governance and improving government outcomes—could be applied to workforce investment,
welfare-to-work programs, health care, child welfare systems, environmental protection, and other areas where we have ventured forth (and,
at times, retraced our steps) in performance management. What are
some of these common lessons?
First, the effective use of performance management demands not
only clarity of goals but also their translation into empirical measures
that accurately and adequately characterize our ends (or intended outcomes). Where we fail on either of these requisite components, the performance management system may risk doing more harm than good. In
many cases, the data available simply are not up to the task. We have
also learned that short-term, readily available performance measures
often do not correlate with longer-term impacts (Heckman, Heinrich,
and Smith 2002).
In light of these limitations, and recognizing that performance
management in the public sector often grapples with multiple goals
and complex production, we may be better off with multidimensional
(or multiple) measures of performance to guide core agency work. A
number of school districts and states are now developing these types of
multipurpose, multiple-indicator performance management systems for
K–12 education, including the New York City Department of Education,
which is using multiple indicators to measure student progress, student
performance, and the school environment (New York City Department
of Education 2014). A potential trade-off, of course, is that a more intricate or complicated system and set of incentives would likely place a
greater demand on public capacities for managing such a system.
A second lesson is that we often begin with imperfect measures
of performance and then learn about how employees or stakeholders
respond to them in implementation, including their weaknesses and
how they might be gamed. We may less often get a performance measure or incentive system “right” on the ﬁrst try (as occurred in the case
of child welfare agencies in Michigan), but that does not imply that
further efforts should be abandoned. For the many reasons highlighted
in this chapter, public sector performance management systems will
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necessarily be dynamic, and we should expect to replace performance
measures or revise system incentives and other features over time.
In addition, caution should also be exercised in attaching high stakes
(or serious consequences) to performance results, given the known
challenges and imperfections of our performance measures (such as the
teacher value-added measures that have recently been publicly disseminated). The awarding of performance bonuses, “naming and shaming”
(as in the publication of teacher value-added ratings), termination of
contracts, or retractions of program funding would best be backed or
veriﬁed by multiple sources of quantitative and qualitative evidence
before going forward. A counterargument frequently offered against
eliminating high stakes altogether is that the performance management
and incentive systems would lose their “teeth” and purpose. Evidence
to date, however, suggests that individuals and organizations are highly
responsive to performance standards, even when the rewards are minimal, such as peer recognition (Bevan and Hood 2006; Heinrich 2007).
Another important lesson that we are increasingly coming to understand is that performance management systems are likely to be more
effective tools of governance if we focus more on their use for diagnostic purposes. That is, resources and rewards should follow their effective
use in improving government and program outcomes, rather than for
hitting performance targets. In the public education example, schools or
teachers would be rewarded for using information on students’ performance to help increase their learning, ideally measured in terms of their
individual growth (i.e., not just based on test score levels or gains).
This would likely be a more appropriate outcome to report publicly (for
the sake of transparency), and, if measured sufﬁciently well, it would
also be rewarding the right types of efforts to increase performance
(i.e., not success in increasing test-taking skills but rather effective use
of performance information to help students succeed academically).
One well-known example of effective use of performance management information to diagnose and address performance problems is the
CompStat/CitiStat model, which has been widely used in policing, and
in other public service sectors as well. Four basic principles underlie
the model:
1) accurate, timely intelligence
2) rapid deployment
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3) effective tactics
4) relentless follow-up and assessment
CompStat starts with collecting data, analyzing them, and presenting them in visual form, but the key to the apparent success of this system is how those data or statistics are subsequently used. When the data
are presented in graphic form to organizational leaders and employees,
questions are raised and solutions are discussed. But it is not a onetime exercise—employees in the agencies or departments continually
return to the same indicators and reevaluate performance. They also
reﬂect on the decisions that they make based on the data, with the goal
of improving performance over time. To date, this CompStat approach
appears to have worked effectively for the “meat and potatoes” of government—e.g., refuse collection, ﬁlling potholes, police and emergency
response—but can it be expanded to more complex areas of government
intervention, such as improving health care and education outcomes or
reducing domestic violence?
And ﬁnally, why continue at all with performance management in
the public sector, given the signiﬁcant challenges, risks, costs, and the
politics and messiness of governance? That might be best answered
with another question: In its absence, how do we better guide our governing systems to perform at higher levels and more efﬁciently and
effectively achieve public purposes and desired outcomes?

Notes
1. Harlan Cleveland was the founding dean of the University of Minnesota’s Hubert
H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs in 1972. He also served as President
Lyndon Johnson’s U.S. ambassador to NATO from 1965 to 1969 and, earlier, as
U.S. assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs, from 1961
to 1965.
2. A well-known example of rapid agency restructuring occurred when President
Ronald Reagan appointed Anne Gorsuch to head the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) in 1981. Gorsuch came into her role with the view that the EPA
was overregulating business and that the agency was too large and inefﬁcient. As
she sharply shifted the agency’s mission, numerous career bureaucrats were reassigned, demoted, or pressured to resign, in an attempt to align employees with
the agency’s revised goals. However, EPA employees who identiﬁed with the former EPA goals, acting as “organizational stewards,” ultimately thwarted Gorsuch’s
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efforts, which they did not perceive to be in the best interests of the public, and she
departed from the agency after 22 months.
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3
Political Parties, Democracy,
and “Good Governance”
John Ishiyama
University of North Texas
What is the relationship between political parties and “good
governance”? The role that political parties have played is rather controversial in the literature. On the one hand, there are those who express
very negative sentiments with regard to political parties. Indeed, popular sentiment is often negative about parties and the role they play
in democracies. George Washington cautioned against parties as “factions” motivated by the “spirit of revenge” and by self promotion at
the expense of the public good. Currently, political parties are almost
universally viewed as the most corrupt of the political institutions in
modern democracies. Parties can participate in corrupt practices in various ways—by “buying” votes, receiving illegal donations, and “selling”
public decisions. The image of political parties as nests of corruption is
often connected to the low trust in parties as political institutions and
even to the low trust in democracy itself (Kopecký and Spirova 2011)
On the other hand, many scholars have argued that parties are indispensable to the operation of modern democracy. For instance, E. E.
Schattschneider, in his work Party Government, advanced the thesis
“that the political parties created democracy and that modern democracy
is unthinkable save in terms of parties” (Schattschneider 1942, p. 1).1
Although Schattschneider perhaps overstates the case, there is indeed
a general consensus in the scholarly literature that parties are essential
entities in the building and consolidation of competitive democracy. The
notion of the indispensability of parties is rooted in the idea that they perform essential democratic functions, and that while these functions may
not be the exclusive domain of political parties, they are thought to perform these functions better than any other type of organization (Dalton
and Wattenberg 2000; Diamond and Gunther 2001; Diamond and Linz
1989; Webb, Farrell, and Holliday 2002; Webb and White 2007).
35

Asefa & Huang.indb 35

5/21/2015 10:07:49 AM

36 Ishiyama

These functions essentially involve six primary political-party
functions. (That number is more or less consistent with other categorization schemes; see, for instance, Diamond and Gunther [2001] and
Webb [2007].) These functions are listed in Table 3.1, below.
However, much of the concern with political parties in systems
in transition is that they do not perform their ascribed functions very
well. Parties in new democracies often lack coherent ideological programs and are unable to offer voters clear sets of choices. The programs
that are offered are largely detached from citizens’ concerns (Ishiyama
and Shafqat 2000; Kitschelt and Smyth 2002), and corruption is seen
as widespread in such parties (Basedau, Erdmann, and Mehler 2007;
Holmes 2006; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Salih 2003). Parties in transitional
systems are also seen as not being sufﬁciently rooted in society, resulting
in high levels of electoral volatility as voters and politicians continually switch parties (Kuenzi and Lambright 2005; Mainwaring 1998;
Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Shabad and Slomczynski 2004; Thames
Table 3.1 Six Primary Party Functions
Interest articulation
Interest aggregation
Receiving and accepting public
demands and determining the
process of placing issues on the
political agenda

Aggregating demands into coherent
programmatic packages in democratic
contexts

Political communication

Stimulating political participation

Communicating political information,
including structuring choices among
competing groups along different
issue dimensions

Promoting political participation,
including party membership, but also
partisanship among voters, and the
political mobilization and electoral
activities of parties

Recruiting/nomination

Governance

Establishing the electoral rules of the Forming and sustaining accountable
game, especially the procedures for and effective governments
determining who gets nominated
SOURCE: Adapted from Gunther and Diamond (2003).
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2007a,b; Zielinski, Slomczynski, and Shabad 2005). Such parties have
also been unable to monopolize the channels of leadership recruitment;
hence they fail to perform the primary function of recruiting leaders
(Hale 2006; Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Leongómez 2006). In short, as
Thomas Carothers (2006, p. 66) laments, political parties in countries
in transition tend to be “top-down, leader-centric, organizationally thin,
corrupt, patrimonial, and ideologically vague.”
Furthermore, party systems in many new democratic systems are
one of two things: 1) They are either fractionalized, unstable systems,
where government is paralyzed by a highly fragmented composition, resulting in weak coalition governments (“feckless pluralism,”
as Carothers [2006], characterizes such systems), or 2) they emerge
as corrupt, patronage-based systems with a single or dominant party
(Kopecký and Sprirova 2011; Tanzi 1998).
Parties are also seen as not being sufﬁciently rooted in society,
resulting in high levels of electoral volatility as voters and politicians
continually switch parties. This leads to poor government effectiveness (Kuenzi and Lambright 2005; Mainwaring 1998; Mainwaring
and Scully 1995; Shabad and Slomczynski 2004; Thames 2007a,b;
Zielinski, Slomczynski, and Shabad 2005).
Thus it has been suggested in the literature that fractionalized and
volatile systems are “bad” for democracy. This is because such systems
are not really institutionalized. Institutionalized party systems are better
able to promote stable democracy than less institutionalized systems,
for a couple of reasons:
•

First, more-institutionalized party systems enjoy considerable
stability—generally, systems where the major parties appear
and disappear, or move from major parties to minor parties and
vice versa, are weakly institutionalized.

•

Second, institutionalized systems have strong roots in society
and bind parties and citizens together. In a less institutionalized
system there is less regularity for voters in the articulation and
aggregation of their interests, and hence parties are less able to
perform the aggregation function which is vital for the functioning of democracy.

Three aspects of party systems’ institutionalization are particularly
important for the purposes of this chapter. The ﬁrst is party fragmenta-
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tion. Indeed, party fragmentation makes effective governance quite difﬁcult (Duverger 1954). Many small parties in a system often create the
conditions for weak coalition governments, which are particularly problematic during times of political or economic duress or crisis (which is
often the case in the developing world). An often-cited example of the
negative effects of party system fragmentation is the Weimar Republic
in Germany in the 1920s, which had a highly fragmented (and ideologically polarized) party system.
Another aspect of party systems that is posited as having a negative
effect on governance is party system volatility. Party system volatility refers to the extent to which voters are lacking a stable set of party
competitors over time. Party systems that are characterized by many
changes in terms of vote share or composition are volatile systems. It
has been argued that volatile systems do not promote effective governance, for a variety of reasons. First, party system volatility reduces
accountability. When partisan actors come and go, it does not provide
the opportunity for voters to “throw the rascals out” in case they have
made poor policy choices, because the rascals no longer occupy ofﬁce
(Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Furthermore, volatility signiﬁcantly increases uncertainty, hampering the ability of politicians and voters to
engage in strategically driven coordination and formulate coherent policies. Finally, it raises the stakes of the electoral game. This may have
the consequence of weakening the democratic commitment of politicians, who may seek other ways to insure themselves against possible
political loss at the next election—such as through corrupt actions or,
even worse, vote-rigging and electoral violence.
A third pathology of party system development is the emergence
of a dominant party system. One-party dominance has not necessarily been associated with ineffective governance in the literature, but it
has been associated with the promotion of corruption. A major cause
of corruption is political parties seeking to gain political resources by
selling off access to ofﬁce to the highest bidder (Katz and Mair 1995).
One-party dominance leads to more corruption, as the dominant party
keeps power by distribution of patronage and other manipulations
(Tanzi 1998). Thus, one-party or dominant-party rule is seen as generally inimical to good governance, and it is especially associated with
higher levels of corruption than more competitive systems.
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Although the ills associated with party systems have often been suggested in the scholarly work, there has been remarkably little empirical
literature that directly assesses the relationship between characteristics
of the party system and levels of good governance. What are the effects of fragmentation, volatility, and one-party dominance on aspects
of good governance?
The above literature suggests the following three hypotheses:
•

Hypothesis 1: Party systems’ fragmentation is negatively related
to government effectiveness.

•

Hypothesis 2: Party volatility is negatively related to government effectiveness.

•

Hypothesis 3: One-party-dominant regimes are negatively
related to control of corruption (i.e., positively related to
corruption).

DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
The following analysis is a ﬁrst attempt at trying to assess the relationship between characteristics of party systems and good governance.
The sample of countries used in this study includes 92 developing states
that have had at least three “competitive” legislative elections during
the period 1975–2006 and that are also classiﬁed as middle- to lowincome countries by the World Bank. These countries were also not
completely controlled by the governing party (and so would qualify as
having a “party system,” which suggests the existence of more than one
party). In other words, countries entered the data set if the opposition
controlled at least some seats in the legislature. (Thus, countries like
North Korea are not included in the data set.) The time period covered begins with 1975, which coincides with what Samuel Huntington
(1991) labeled the beginning of the “third wave” of democratization,
and goes until 2006, the last year in which all data are available.
The dependent variables in this study include three of the World
Bank's six Worldwide Governance Indicators, all measured from 2003
to 2010. The argument here is that characteristics of the party system
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from 1975 to 2006 should affect government performance in the more
recent period from 2003 to 2010.
•

The ﬁrst dependent variable, government effectiveness, is conceptualized as comprising the quality of public services, the
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. The values range from −2.5 to +2.5,
with negative scores indicating less effective government and
positive values indicating more effective government.

•

The second dependent variable, control of corruption, is also
scored from −2.5 to +2.5 and reﬂects perceptions of the extent
to which public power is exercised for private gain, including
both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture”
of the state by elites and private interests. In this case, negative
scores indicate less effective control of corruption, whereas
positive scores indicate relatively higher levels of control of
government corruption.

•

The third dependent variable for this study, political stability,
is likewise scored from −2.5 to +2.5, and is conceptualized as
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means,
including politically motivated violence and terrorism. Positive
scores on this measure indicate higher levels of political stability, and negative values mean lower levels of political stability.

Two of the primary independent variables, party systems fragmentation and party systems volatility, are measured by two commonly
employed measures in the literature. The ﬁrst, measuring the extent
to which a party system is fragmented, is the “effective number of
political parties” (ENP) measure. This index proposes the use of the
Hirschman-Herﬁndahl concentration index to measure the fragmentation of a party system based on vote shares in the election or seat shares
in the legislature. Using vote or seat shares in the computation of the
Hirschman-Herﬁndahl index and taking the inverse gives us the ENP.2
I include the average number of effective political parties for a given
number of elections, ranging from a minimum of the ﬁrst three to a
maximum of the ﬁrst ﬁve legislative elections after 1975. This, again, is
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to examine how earlier levels of party fragmentation affect later levels
of good governance.
Second, to measure party systems’ volatility, I use Pedersen’s index
of electoral volatility to calculate legislative volatility. Pedersen’s index
measures the net change in each party’s seat share in the lower house
of the legislature from election to election. It is calculated by summing
the net changes in the percentage of seats won or lost by each of the
parties from election to election and dividing by two (see Kuenzi and
Lambright 2001; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; and Mozaffar, Scarritt,
and Galaich 2003). This is written as
V = Σ |ci,t +1 – ci,t | / Σ ci,t +1 + Σ ci,t ,
where V is volatility, ci,t is the vote share of continuous party i at the ﬁrst
election (t), and ci,t+1 is the vote share of continuous party i at the second
election (t + 1).
The resulting score for each country is an average score across each
of the legislative periods. Again, I use the ﬁrst three to ﬁve elections
after 1975 to examine how earlier levels of party systems’ volatility
affect later levels of effective governance, control of corruption, and
political stability.
Finally, I examine the effects of a dominant party on measures of
governance. For my purposes, I use the deﬁnition of a dominant party
system taken from Van de Walle and Butler (1999), who deﬁne a dominant party as a party that wins at least 60 percent of the seats in the
lower house of the legislature for the ﬁrst three consecutive elections
following the introduction of competitive elections.
In addition to the primary independent variables, I also include
a number of control variables in the analysis that can affect levels of
government effectiveness, control of corruption, and political stability.
These include
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product (GDP) per capita;

•

average growth rate over the posttransition period;

•

a measure of wealth (GDP per capita average over the posttransition period); and
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•

the level of ethnolinguistic fragmentation (ELF), a commonly
used measure of the extent of ethnic heterogeneity in a country.

In addition, I examine whether or not the country had experienced
a civil war (given that such countries often face challenges in terms of
good governance) and a measure of democracy as indicated by the average Polity2 score (a commonly used measure of the level of democracy)
over the entirety of the posttransition period.

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Tables 3.2 through 3.4 provide the results of the analysis. Given the
continuous nature of the dependent variable, I employ a simple ordinary
least squares (OLS) procedure. Coefﬁcient estimates are reported as
well as collinearity diagnostic statistics and the variance inﬂation factor
scores. Table 3.2 reports the results of regressing the dependent variable
of the government effectiveness score against the list of independent
variables.
As indicated in the table, party fragmentation does not affect government effectiveness, which is contrary to what was expected. However,
both the emergence of a dominant party and party system volatility in
earlier years led to less government effectiveness later. In part this may
be due to the transformation of initially very volatile party systems into
dominant party systems later (such as the case of the Russian Federation since the 1990s). Furthermore, this result would call into question
the commonly held sentiment that political systems that exhibit a “ﬁrm
hand” are more effective and efﬁcient. The evidence clearly does not
support this contention.
One interesting thing to note is that post–civil war states are signiﬁcantly less effective (in terms of their effective governance scores) than
other states in the sample. This is not a surprising result, given that civil
wars often undermine state capacity, but it is noteworthy nonetheless.
Table 3.3 regresses the second dependent variable, average control of corruption, against the list of independent variables. The results
demonstrate that none of the primary independent variables are related
to the control of corruption. These results call into question the notion
that dominant party systems tend to promote corruption more than other
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Table 3.2 Coefﬁcient Estimates and Collinearity Statistics. Dependent
Variable: Average Governmental Effectiveness, 2003–2010
Variable
Average effective number of parties over ﬁrst three
elections after 1975
Existence of dominant party over ﬁrst three elections
Party systems’ volatility over ﬁrst three elections
Average GDP per capita growth rate over
posttransition period
Average GDP per capita over posttransition period
Ethnolinguistic fragmentation index
Post–civil war state
Average polity score over posttransition period

Coefﬁcient
−0.025
(0.023)
−0.358**
(0.154)
−0.009**
(0.004)
−0.461
(1.899)
0.0005**
(0.000)
−0.341
(0.301)
−0.280**
(0.140)
0.016
(0.018)

VIF
1.159
1.540
1.077
1.401
1.392
1.193
1.139
1.358

N = 92
Adjusted R-squared = 0.300
NOTE: * signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level; ** signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level; *** signiﬁcant at
the 0.01 level. “VIF” = “variance inﬂation factor”; “GDP” = “gross domestic product.”
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.

types of party systems. This is clearly not indicated by the results reported in Table 3.3.
Furthermore, as in Table 3.2, which shows that post–civil war states
have less government effectiveness, so too in Table 3.3, post–civil war
states are signiﬁcantly less able to control corruption. Again, this is
probably due to the weakened capacity of such states as a result of civil
war.
Finally, Table 3.4 reports the results of regressing the dependent
variable of political stability against the independent variables. Interestingly, none of the primary independent variables (average effective
number of parties over ﬁrst three elections after transition, existence
of dominant party over ﬁrst three elections, and party system volatility
over ﬁrst three elections) has any bearing at all on the level of political
stability later.
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Table 3.3 Coefﬁcient Estimates and Collinearity Statistics. Dependent
Variable: Average Control of Corruption, 2003–2010
Variable
Coefﬁcient
Average effective number of parties over ﬁrst three −0.013
elections after 1975
(0.023)
Existence of dominant party over ﬁrst three
−0.060
elections
(0.172)
Party system’s volatility over ﬁrst three elections
−0.004
(0.004)
Average GDP per capita growth rate over transition 0.045
period
(1.887)
Average GDP per capita over transition period
0.0003**
(0.000)
Ethnolinguistic fragmentation index
−0.115
(0.299)
Post–civil war state
−0.328**
(0.130)
Average polity score over posttransition period
0.011
(0.017)
N = 92
Adjusted R-squared = 0.188

VIF
1.159
1.540
1.077
1.401
1.392
1.193
1.139
1.358

NOTE: * signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level; ** signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level; *** signiﬁcant at
the 0.01 level. “VIF” = “variance inﬂation factor”; “GDP” = “gross domestic product.”
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.

Again, as was the case with government effectiveness and corruption, post–civil war states are inherently less stable than other states. It
should be noted that in all of the models, the variance inﬂation scores
did not exceed 2, so there are no problems indicated with multicollinearity in the analysis.
Thus, in sum, the above ﬁndings do not suggest support for the
initial supposition that party fragmentation would be negatively related to government effectiveness. Indeed, the number of parties (in
cases where there are more than one) is unrelated to the extent to which
governments are effective. However, party system volatility and the
emergence of dominant party systems are negatively related to government effectiveness. Dominant parties are not particularly effective
at government administration, and neither are highly volatile systems
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Table 3.4 Coefﬁcient Estimates and Collinearity Statistics. Dependent
Variable: Average Political Stability Score, 2003–2010
Variable
Coefﬁcient
Average effective number of parties over ﬁrst three −0.012
elections after transition
(0.023)
Existence of dominant party over ﬁrst three elections −0.106
(0.160)
Party system’s volatility over ﬁrst three elections
−0.000
(0.004)
Average GDP per capita growth rate over transition
1.539
period
(1.901)
Average GDP per capita over transition period
0.0005**
(0.000)
Ethnolinguistic fragmentation index
−0.158
(0.301)
Post–civil war state
−0.938***
(0.137)
Average polity score over posttransition period
0.017
(0.017)
N = 92
Adjusted R-squared = 0.486

VIF
1.159
1.540
1.077
1.401
1.392
1.193
1.139
1.358

NOTE: * signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level; ** signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level; *** signiﬁcant at
the 0.01 level. “VIF” = “variance inﬂation factor”; “GDP” = “gross domestic product.”
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.

where there is substantial turnover in the political actors involved in
the game. However, these variables are not related to corruption and
political stability, which might suggest, among other things, that the
relationship between corruption and dominant parties is overstated.

CONCLUSION
This chapter has been essentially a suggestive piece, with the use of
data to illustrate the relationship between party system characteristics
and three aspects of good governance—namely, 1) effective governance,
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2) control of corruption, and 3) political stability. Generally, the results
indicate that either dominant party systems or volatile party systems are
associated with lower levels of effective governance. However, neither
of these party system characteristics are related to the control of corruption and political stability. This would suggest that if one conceives of
“good governance” in terms of effective governance, then promoting a
stable set of competitive political parties is probably a good way to go.
This would add support for programs such as those sponsored by the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which seeks to
promote the development of stable party systems in many new democracies throughout the world.
On the other hand, party system characteristics have little to do with
either the control of corruption or the promotion of political stability.
This would counter some of the existing literature that suggests that
dominant party systems are more corrupt, and that stable party systems
would lead to political stability. As to the former, one can imagine a
situation (as in the case of many competitive party systems in Western
democracies in their earlier periods of development) where competitive
politics bred corruption such as vote rigging, multiple voting, patronage, and the like. Certainly this has been part of the history of political
parties in the United States, as well as in other Western countries, so it
is no wonder that competitive party systems are just as likely to fail to
control corruption as dominant party systems.
It is also not particularly surprising that volatility is unrelated to
political stability (at least as conceived of in terms of the likelihood of
violent overthrow). Indeed, in several cases in the West, most notably in
post–World War II Italy, party system fragmentation and volatility led
to governmental instability but did not threaten the political stability of
the country. In part, this political stability was supported by a continuous group of political leaders. In other words, governments and parties
may have come and gone in Italy, but the leadership elite remained intact, thus contributing to the continuance of political stability (in terms
of absence of violence), albeit not government stability (in terms of
the stability of coalition governments). Thus, at least in Italy, it is not
particularly surprising that party system characteristics are unrelated to
political stability as well.
These main ﬁndings of this chapter are, of course, somewhat tentative. There are a number of areas for improvement in the analysis.
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For instance, perhaps the key variable affecting good governance is not
the party system, but party organization characteristics. In other words,
parties that are more internally democratic may be more effective than
parties that are less internally democratic, for instance. Second, it would
be preferable to use panel data rather than a simple set of cross-sectional
data (albeit with a lagged set of independent variables). Third, there
may be individual country effects that would need to be controlled for
by a ﬁxed-effects model. Finally, in terms of the political stability analysis, a future paper might examine the relationship between political
party systems and state failure—perhaps by using some form of hazard
analysis instead of the World Bank’s measure equating stability with no
violence. Whatever the case, understanding the relationship between
party system characteristics and good governance will remain a fruitful
topic for future research.

Notes
1. Although, historically, there has been debate over the deﬁnition of a political party
in the scholarly literature, we use the classic deﬁnition of the political party as
offered by Anthony Downs (1957, p. 25): a political party is “a team seeking to
control the governing apparatus by gaining ofﬁce in a duly constituted election.”
See also Epstein (1967), Janda (1980), and Sartori (1976). For an alternative and
stricter deﬁnition of party, see LaPalombara and Weiner (1966). For the debate
over the deﬁnition of parties, see Ishiyama and Breuning (1998).
2. ENP = 1/∑pi2, where pi denotes the ith party’s fraction of the seats (or vote shares).
See Laakso and Taagepera (1979) and Taagepera and Shugart (1989); see also
variations of the fragmentation index: Dunleavy and Boucek (2003), Molinar
(1991), and Rae (1967).
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4
Good Governance in
Transition Economies
A Comparative Analysis
Susan J. Linz
Michigan State University

Do transition economies—countries that transformed from socialism to capitalism in the 1990s—exhibit good governance? If so, is the
incidence or degree of good governance the same across these former
socialist economies? Answers to these questions illuminate conditions
that affect a society’s well-being; the quality of a country’s governance
system is an important determinant of sustainable economic and social
development.1 Indeed, some argue that the beneﬁts of promoting good
governance are so important that doing so has become both an objective and a condition of development assistance (Santiso 2001; Weiss
2000). Here, the objective is to document the nature and scope of good
governance among transition economies, and to explore explanations
for variation across these countries.
Why does it matter if formerly socialist economies exhibit good
governance? In transition economies, the process of transforming from
socialism (where planners’ preferences for investing in heavy industry
dominated) to capitalism (where consumer sovereignty rules) involved
a signiﬁcant restructuring of the economy. In many of these countries,
not only was there a need to develop previously unavailable service sectors (ﬁnancial, legal, retail, and repair, for example) but also to engage
in extensive renovation of infrastructure and production facilities.
Moreover, just as the transition process put a relatively large portion of
the population at risk in terms of economic and social well-being, the
dismantling of existing institutions limited the availability of domestic
resources with which to provide an adequate social safety net. Conse-
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quently, transition economies required assistance, and assistance tends
to require that certain conditions be met.2
Transition economies received international ﬁnancial and technical
assistance not only to facilitate the transformation process (decentralizing and liberalizing economic activities), but also to reduce adverse
consequences to households and ﬁrms associated with the socioeconomic changes (macroeconomic stabilization). Many of the conditions upon which transition assistance was contingent were governancerelated (Brӓutigam 2000; Santiso 2001; Weiss 2000). For example,
one of the foundations for establishing a market-oriented economy is
allowing for widespread private-property ownership and, correspondingly, the protection of private-property rights. At the beginning of the
transition process, when property rights were not protected and banking institutions and regulations were not fully developed, these countries were not forthcoming with the investment expenditures needed in
the transition economies to renovate industry or develop new sectors.3
Improved ﬁnancial, economic, and social regulatory quality and rule of
law were necessary to facilitate the type of institutional developments
that promote investment. Indeed, Baniak, Cukrowski, and Herczyñski
(2005); Bevan and Estrin (2004); Bevan, Estrin, and Meyer (2004);
Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer (2000); and others identify an extensive set of
governance-related factors contributing to the receipt of foreign direct
investment (FDI) among transition economies. International assistance
became contingent upon successfully addressing these factors because
they would improve the environment for investment (both domestic and
FDI), which in turn would contribute to the successful completion of
the transition process (Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann 2002).
Promoting or establishing good governance in transition economies
was also important because the ability to distribute assistance to individuals and organizations in need appears to depend upon the “quality”
of a country’s political, economic, and social institutions. In particular, the effectiveness and enforcement of rules that permit participation
and call for accountability, and the absence of corruption in interactions
within and between the government, civil society, and the private sector, not only promote good governance but also act to enhance the transformation to a market-oriented economy. Documenting the transition
process from the governance perspective further illuminates linkages
between governance and development.4
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Finally, because transition economies encompass a relatively large
number of countries and represent a signiﬁcant and growing share of
the international market, promoting good governance in these countries
was linked to promoting global economic security and political stability. Without efforts to promote good governance in transition economies, the initial chaotic and economically devastating impact of the
transformation process could have escalated into a more widespread
and sustained barrier to global efforts to reduce poverty and promote a
better quality of life. For these reasons, evaluating the level and variation in good governance among transition economies enhances understanding of the link between governance and development.
Good Governance as a Process
Introduced in a 1989 World Bank report as an objective (Santiso
2001), good governance is best conceived of as a process. Governance, generally, is the process not only of decision making, but also
of decision implementation—a process that takes place at international,
national, regional/local, and ﬁrm levels, involving both formal and
informal agents and institutions. The governance process encompasses
political, economic, and social dimensions, such as selecting, monitoring, and replacing individuals who hold positions of authority; developing and implementing policies to manage natural, physical, ﬁnancial,
and human resources; and promoting social cohesion, thus enabling
vulnerable individuals and groups to experience inclusion and social
protection (Kaufmann 2005).
Good governance, a normative concept, requires that a number of
conditions are satisﬁed: that is, that the processes of decision making
and implementation are transparent, accountable, participatory, responsive, consensus-oriented, equitable, effective, and follow the rule of
law (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón 1999). Good governance
means that sufﬁcient information is readily available to determine
whether decisions are made and implemented following existing rules
and regulations; that consequences can be imposed on those deciding or
implementing policy; that all individuals have opportunities to express
their opinions or cast their “vote”; that affected individuals’ concerns
or needs are speciﬁcally addressed; that different views of the best
interest of the “community” over an extended time frame are explicitly

Asefa & Huang.indb 53

5/21/2015 10:07:54 AM

54 Linz

considered; that no one individual or group has an inherent advantage
in the process or outcome; that the adopted policies do not preclude
or impede resources (physical, ﬁnancial, human) from going to their
highest-valued use; and that the legal system not only enforces the laws
impartially, but also with an eye toward fully protecting human rights
(United Nations 2013).
Changing Perception of Good Governance
While much of the governance literature focuses on the link between
governance and development, there has clearly been a change in the
perception of good governance since the late 1990s. Before the global
ﬁnancial crisis in 1998, the “Washington consensus” (Williamson 1990)
dominated development thinking. Policymakers were persuaded that a
limited role by the state was most inﬂuential in promoting economic
growth. Indeed, a widespread belief that open trade, deregulation,
privatization, and ﬁscal restraint enhanced development contributed to
the result that these elements became conditions for international aid
(Santiso 2001).
As events unfolded after 1998, however, the governance literature
began to reﬂect a growing understanding that legal, economic, political,
and social institutions that promote participation, strengthen accountability, regulate ﬁnancial markets, enhance the rule of law, and provide
social safety nets are important in the development process (Craig and
Porter 2006). Rather than seeking to limit state intervention, as was
called for by the “Washington consensus,” there emerged in the literature a commitment to strengthening leadership at the national, local,
and ﬁrm levels. As Santiso (2001) points out, the “targets” or conditions
required of aid recipients rose from 10 in the 1980s to more than 25
in the 1990s; Kyrgyzstan faced nearly 100 governance-related conditions in 1999. It is worth noting that conditionality does not eliminate
the situation where promises are made by an aid recipient to undertake
changes and adopt policies consistent with good governance but then
those promises are reneged on by the recipient.
To document the nature and scope of good governance in transition economies and explore explanations for variation across these
countries, the next section, “Governance Measures,” brieﬂy reviews
the issues involved in evaluating good governance and the governance
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measures most widely used. The third section, “Comparing Transition
Economies,” explains why transition economies typically are grouped
into two categories. Section Four, “Good Governance in Transition
Economies: Comparing FSU with CEE Countries,” utilizes multiple
governance measures to illustrate different dimensions of good governance in transition economies. Section Five, “Good Governance in
Transition Economies: Firms’ Perspective and Experience,” focuses on
how ﬁrms view good governance. The ﬁnal section offers a summary
and concluding remarks.

GOVERNANCE MEASURES
How is governance—the process of decision making and decision
implementation in the social, political, and economic realms—measured? Kaufmann and Kraay (2007) provide a straightforward analysis of governance measurement issues. First, focusing on what is measured, they discuss the pros and cons of using inputs or outcomes to
measure the quality of governance. Inputs include rules, regulations,
institutions, and practices that have consequences for the processes of
decision making and implementation. For example, rules-based governance measures such as the Polity IV Project or the two prepared by
the World Bank—1) the Doing Business Project and 2) the Database on
Political Institutions—consider such things as legislation that prohibits
corruption, formal disclosure requirements for public ofﬁcials, participatory elections, political competition, constraints on executive authority, rules for registering property or employing workers, and the like.
While it is relatively easy to count rules, regulations, agencies,
and other inputs, governance measures based on input counts remain
problematic. Little variation in rules-based measures occurs over time
or across countries, which limits their explanatory power in empirical analyses of governance. Moreover, rules-based measures contain
an inherent ambiguity: do a large number of rules or regulations or
agencies signal good governance or simply underscore the likelihood
of conﬂict among them? More importantly, the existence of a range
of inputs does not guarantee their enforcement. Kaufmann and Kraay
(2007) discuss issues associated not only with conﬂicting rules but also
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with the existence of an enforcement gap. They use this discussion as
a way to introduce an alternative measure of governance that uses outcomes (e.g., the Global Integrity Index), focusing on the enforcement
of rules and the lack of corruption. Kaufmann and Kraay (2007), Arndt
and Oman (2006), and others note that, given that perceptions and arbitrary scales are used in compiling these outcome measures, they too
need to be treated and utilized with caution.
In their analysis of governance measurement issues, Kaufmann
and Kraay (2007) next address how governance might be measured.
They discuss the role and relative merits of both perceptions (based on
experts and survey responses) and objective data (counts of regulations,
bribe payments, court cases, and so forth) in how governance measures
are constructed. For example, while gathering information from experts
(lawyers, nongovernmental organization (NGO) ofﬁcers, government
ofﬁcials, executives, and commercial risk rating agencies) is a relatively low-cost endeavor, this method introduces potential biases that
may undermine the quality or accuracy of the governance measure.
That is, assessments necessarily reﬂect experts’ views, and the data they
elect to view informs their perceptions. Moreover, survey data collected
from ﬁrms and individuals, the beneﬁciaries of good governance, may
suffer from inaccurate responses (how does one elicit truthful answers
about illegal activities?) or bias in either the responses themselves or
the interpretation of those responses (how does one code a situation
where a bribe is paid, but the beneﬁt is sufﬁcient relative to cost to
result in the bribe not being perceived as an obstacle?). Yet, given that
both formal and informal rules and institutions inﬂuence political, civil,
economic, and ﬁnancial transactions, perceptions provide more insight
into the practice or process of good governance than simple counts of
administrators, agencies, bribe payments, court cases, regulations, and
the like.
This analysis considers a range of governance measures to more
fully depict the nature and scope of good governance in transition
economies.
The broadest, most comprehensive measure, and one where the requisite data are collected from former socialist economies, Worldwide
Governance Indicators (WGI), is based exclusively on perceptions
(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010). The WGI measure encompasses six dimensions of governance: 1) control of corruption, 2) gov-
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ernment effectiveness, 3) political stability, 4) regulatory quality, 5) rule
of law, and 6) voice and accountability, using 30 indicators collected
from 33 different organizations.5 The data used to construct the six WGI
composite measures reﬂect the perceptions of experts (from both the
public and private sectors and from NGOs) and include survey data collected from thousands of individuals and hundreds of ﬁrms per country.
For country comparison purposes, each of the six WGI composite measures is standardized to have a zero mean and unit standard deviation.
Positive scores reﬂect good governance.
Freedom House, a private nonproﬁt organization established in
the early 1940s by Eleanor Roosevelt and Wendell Willkie, conducts
an annual survey of more than 190 countries to determine how freedom is experienced by people and ﬁrms.6 The country ratings, based
on questions targeting political rights (10 questions) and civil liberties
(15 questions), are constructed by country specialists rather than from
actual experiences of ﬁrms or individuals. The political and civil liberties composite measures are averaged to determine an overall country
status of “free,” “partly free,” or “not free.” Good governance is associated with “free” status.
The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), produced by Transparency
International for the ﬁrst time in 1995, ranks 176 countries (including
former socialist economies) and territories by their perceived level of
public-sector corruption, based on opinion surveys and expert assessments.7 The composite index is constructed from information collected
from at least three sources (for some countries, up to 14 sources) and
aggregated in such a way as to make the CPI composite more reliable
than the individual scores covered in the composite (Saisana and Saltelli
2012). The country mean value is derived from a standardization procedure that puts the composite index score between 10 (no corruption)
and 0 (widespread corruption). Conﬁdence intervals also are reported
to underscore the uncertainty associated with the perceived corruption
measures (Lambsdorff 2007). Good governance is associated with a
high CPI.
The Heritage Foundation, in collaboration with the Wall Street
Journal, annually provides an Index of Economic Freedom (IEF),
which is constructed using 10 components related to private property
rights protection, limited government intervention in economic affairs,
ease of starting and closing a business, worker protection regulations,
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and free trade; each component is averaged into a single score.8 This
measure is used in governance studies because it includes dimensions
that reﬂect the process of making, implementing, and enforcing decisions and policies that affect individuals and ﬁrms. The IEF uses data
compiled by such organizations as the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund, and the Economist Intelligence Unit, generating a
composite score for each country that ranges from 0 to 100, where
100 conveys maximum freedom. The country score and ranking are
designed to reﬂect the degree of economic freedom exhibited in more
than 175 countries (including former socialist economies).9 Thus, good
governance is associated with a high IEF score.
An alternative way to assess good governance is from the perspective of the beneﬁciaries, such as ﬁrms. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), in collaboration with the World
Bank, began in 1999 conducting a Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), which involves, in the most recent
round (2008–2009), some 11,800 ﬁrms in 29 countries.10 The survey is
designed to track changes in the business environment over time and get
information from ﬁrms about the nature and scope of the state’s inﬂuence over private-sector activities. In particular, the survey addresses a
number of factors related to perceptions of the quality of the business
environment, the incidence and magnitude of corruption, and problems
associated with corruption in transition economies. BEEPS data allow
for the assessment of governance quality from the ﬁrm’s perspective.11
For example, the microdata permit analysis of two basic types of corrupt transactions: in one type of transaction, state agents obtain unwarranted beneﬁts from the private sector (“grabbing hand”); in the other
type, private-sector agents obtain unwarranted beneﬁts from the state
(“state capture”) (Frye and Shleifer 1997; Hellman et al. 2000; Shleifer
and Vishny 1998).

COMPARING TRANSITION ECONOMIES
How do transition economies fare with regard to good governance?
Since the primary objective here is to document the nature and scope
of good governance in transition economies, it is useful to consider two
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groups of countries: 1) those that were part of the former Soviet Union
(FSU)12 and 2) those located in central and eastern Europe (CEE).13
The distinction between FSU and CEE countries stems in part from the
duration of the socialist experience and in part from prior experience
with a market economy.
Except for the Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania),
FSU countries had very little experience with market-oriented institutions before the transition began in the early 1990s. Most FSU countries had exhibited a tradition-oriented feudal-type economic structure
before the socialist revolution introduced central planning as a way to
organize production and distribution. Under Soviet socialism, neither
markets nor scarcity prices were used to allocate resources, materials,
labor, or goods. Private property, in the productive sense, was prohibited. Formally, for over seven decades, economic decision making was highly centralized. Transactions were governed by the state,
with no regard for proﬁt motive and little, if any, regard for efﬁciency.
Informally, individuals and ﬁrms often acted in their own self-interest
rather than the state’s interest, and they traded in ways that mimicked
market-oriented outcomes. However, unlike most transactions in market
economies, informal transactions in FSU countries, particularly Russia,
were rarely quid pro quo. Instead, the culture of kinship and reciprocity governed social, political, and economic transactions (Ledeneva
1998; Volkov 2000). This culture, combined with widespread shortages
in the Soviet economy of basic household goods and material inputs
to ﬁrms, created conditions where those who held a monopoly position (from bureaucrats to salespeople) routinely exploited that position
(Shlapentokh 2013).
CEE countries, obliged after World War II to terminate their marketoriented institutions and adopt the Soviet centrally administered structure, experienced a shorter-duration and somewhat different variety of
socialism than FSU countries. Poland, for example, retained private
agriculture rather than impose Soviet-style collectivized agriculture.
Hungary and Czechoslovakia continued to participate in international
markets. In contrast to the highly centralized Soviet model, Yugoslavia introduced greater decision making by worker collectives. When
the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, CEE countries reestablished their marketoriented institutions. Unlike FSU countries, from the very beginning of
the transition process CEE countries were populated with individuals
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experienced not only in working within the legal and ﬁnancial infrastructures that support a market economy, but also within a decentralized social and political environment.
Thus, the duration of the socialist experience and prior experience
with market-oriented institutions provide a simple way to separate transition economies into two groups for good-governance comparison
purposes.

GOOD GOVERNANCE IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES:
COMPARING FSU WITH CEE COUNTRIES
How well do transition economies fare with regard to good governance? How much difference is there over the course of the transition process? Is there a signiﬁcant difference between FSU and CEE
countries in terms of good governance? To address these questions, this
section considers multiple governance measures.
WGI Measures
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) encompass six categories of indicators that reﬂect different dimensions of good governance. Since each of the composite indicators of WGI is standardized
to have a zero mean and unit standard deviation, a positive score reﬂects
good governance, and a negative score reﬂects the opposite. As seen in
Figure 4.1, which captures WGI scores for the six composite measures
for 2011, CEE countries consistently score in the positive range and
FSU countries consistently score in the negative range. The governance
contrast between FSU and CEE countries is the greatest for voice and
accountability,14 with CEE countries scoring relatively high (second
only to regulatory quality), and FSU countries scoring relatively poorly
(worse than in every category except control of corruption). Both FSU
and CEE countries perform relatively poorly on the control of corruption composite measure.15
Because good governance often is linked to anticorruption measures
(Kaufmann 2005), and because corruption (bad governance) is well documented in transition economies (see Abed and Davoodi [2000]; Hamadi,
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Figure 4.1 Worldwide Governance Indicators in Transition Economies
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Rihab, and Lotﬁ [2009]; Hellman et al. [2000]; Shlapentokh [2013];
Steves and Rousso [2003]; and Tonoyan et al. [2010], for example), it
makes sense to provide some discussion of this topic here. Perhaps most
striking is the large literature related to corruption in former socialist
economies: in April 2013, Google Scholar listed over 110,000 entries.
In part, the literature is large because corruption involves a broad set of
activities, varying by purpose16 and the agents or agencies involved.17 In
part, the large corruption literature stems from ongoing efforts to measure and document corruption and estimate the costs it imposes.
Corruption is costly from an opportunity cost perspective because
public resources are not going to their highest-valued use, but instead are
being diverted for personal gain (Mauro 1995). Corruption contributes
to lower tax revenues, which in turn reduce public services provided to
the society as a whole. Social welfare is lower than it otherwise need be;
wealth disparities grow. Corruption weakens formal institutions (legal,
ﬁnancial), which undermines the development process generally and
the pace of economic transformation for these former socialist coun-
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tries. In particular, corruption undermines competition, which is one of
the pillars of a market-oriented economy.
Corruption also imposes direct ﬁnancial costs on ﬁrms and households. For ﬁrms, operational and transactional costs are higher (Aidis
and Adachi 2007; Aidis, Estrin, and Mickiewicz 2008; Johnson et al.
2000). Estimates suggest that small ﬁrms in Russia pay over $500 million in U.S. dollars (USD) monthly on bribes to ofﬁcials, a ﬁgure that
does not include payments made to organized crime; altogether, corruption payments are estimated at $10–$20 billion per year. For households, prices paid for goods and services include the cost of corruption
(kickbacks, bribes, extortion). In Russia, corruption is estimated to add
5–15 percent to prices paid by consumers (Levin and Satarov 2000).
The general pattern of good-governance differences between FSU
and CEE countries evident for the six WGI composite measures illustrated in Figure 4.1 also is evident, albeit on a smaller scale, in Figure
4.2, which focuses on the levels and trends of control of corruption by
country.18 CEE countries (shaded darker but not individually identiﬁed)
tend to score higher as the transition process progresses, although, initially, half of these countries exhibit scores comparable to the majority
of FSU countries (shaded lighter but not identiﬁed).19
One explanation for the relatively small differences in control of
corruption involves the nature and scope of formal and informal institutions in FSU and CEE countries.
Tonoyan et al. (2010) explain how formal institutions contribute to
corruption: too many (and conﬂicting) economic and ﬁnancial regulations create obstacles, which provide opportunities to engage in rentseeking behavior (corruption) as individuals and ﬁrms try to ﬁnd ways
around these barriers. Failure to enforce the multitude of formal rules
further contributes to rent-seeking behavior.
Tradition, customs, and norms contribute to informal institutions
that help to generate an environment in which corrupt behavior thrives.
For example, in societies where kinship and reciprocity are important cultural features, informal institutions tend to be more prevalent.
However, informal institutions themselves need not contribute to corruption. In some instances, informal institutions complement formal
institutions by strengthening efforts to comply with anticorruption
agencies and regulations (Tonoyan et al. 2010). Where informal institutions replace formal procedures, then corrupt behavior thrives. Dyker
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Figure 4.2 Control of Corruption in FSU and CEE Countries
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(2012), Shlapentokh (2013), and others explain why the Soviet legacy
of informal institutions is stronger in Russia and other FSU countries
than in CEE countries. Moreover, the literature suggests that in societies where closed social networks predominate, and thus there is greater
reliance on kinship or reciprocity, there will be a much greater likelihood that corrupt behavior will be sustained. This is particularly true
where social norms are governed by the belief that good ends justify
means (or that whatever works is correct), and widespread (illegal)
behavior is consistent with this belief (Ledeneva 1998; Volkov 2000).
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 illustrate differences in control of corruption for
individual FSU and CEE countries, respectively. As seen in Figure 4.3,
for the majority of FSU countries, there is no real improvement in control of corruption over time; in some instances, performance worsens
on this governance measure. Levin and Satarov (2000) and Tonoyan et
al. (2010) make the “path dependency” case: societies that start with a
high level of corruption will ﬁnd it hard to reduce it.

Asefa & Huang.indb 63

5/21/2015 10:07:58 AM

64 Linz
Figure 4.3 Control of Corruption in FSU Countries
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Figure 4.4 Control of Corruption in CEE Countries
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Why do FSU countries have a high level of corruption? The Soviet
legacy of a seller’s market created conditions that obliged individuals
and ﬁrms to circumvent ofﬁcial channels, which led to the widespread
acceptance of the notion “the ends justify the means,” which further
fueled corrupt (illegal) behavior. Shlapentokh (2013) focuses on the
inﬂuence of feudal tendencies and big money as the driving force for
corruption in FSU countries, particularly Russia. He also describes the
strata of “little bribers” who extort money: medical personnel, educators, inspectors, clerks, trafﬁc ofﬁcers, and the like. The fact that so
many in Russia beneﬁt from corruption contributes to widespread tolerance of corrupt behavior.20
In contrast, several CEE countries (Figure 4.4), likely inﬂuenced by
European Union admission requirements, tended to improve corruption
control as the transition progressed. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000)
develop a theoretical model to explain why some countries are more
susceptible to “state capture”; the characteristics they include coincide
more closely with cultural and other conditions in FSU countries than
in CEE countries.
The ability to exhibit good governance is inﬂuenced by susceptibility to “state capture,” which in turn has consequences for perceptions
of government effectiveness.21 While FSU countries perform relatively
well on this measure in comparison to other WGI measures (see Figure
4.1), it appears to coincide with perceptions of ﬁrms and individuals
that even though the “grabbing hand” of government is expensive, the
beneﬁts associated with informal payments are certain (Millar 1996;
Shlapentokh 2013). As seen in Figure 4.5, with few exceptions, little
change in perceptions of government effectiveness occurs among FSU
countries over the course of the transition. Where perceptions improve
(see Figure 4.6), it is mostly among FSU countries that have a positive
score (exhibit relatively good governance on this dimension). Among
CEE countries, two groups are evident: 1) those where government
effectiveness is viewed relatively positively, and 2) those where the
initial perceptions were negative, but over the course of the transition
these perceptions improved (see Figure 4.7).
The relative performance of FSU and CEE countries on a related
governance dimension, regulatory quality,22 is illustrated in Figure 4.8.
On this dimension, the majority of CEE countries (shaded darker) score
relatively high, and consistently so. Among FSU countries (shaded
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Figure 4.5 Government Effectiveness in FSU and CEE Countries
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Figure 4.6 Government Effectiveness in FSU Countries
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Figure 4.7 Government Effectiveness in CEE Countries
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Figure 4.8 Regulatory Quality in FSU and CEE Countries
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lighter), there appears to be a similar consistency over time for regulatory quality, but the countries fall into three groups in terms of general
score on this measure (see Figure 4.9). CEE countries tend to exhibit an
upward trend over the course of the transition (Figure 4.10).
Figure 4.11 depicts rule of law for FSU and CEE countries. While
there is some dispersion among CEE countries (darker) which contributes to their composite score being relatively low (see Figure 4.1), for
all but three FSU countries (lighter), perceived rule of law is consistently in the negative range. As seen in Figure 4.12, for some FSU countries, the measure declines in value. In contrast, among CEE countries
(Figure 4.13), there appears to be an improvement on this governance
dimension over the course of the transition. Differences between the
two groups of transition economies, and trends in each over time, may
reﬂect differences in the formal legal systems in the countries: even if
the same laws are on the books, they may not be enforced in the same
way (Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard 2003; Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer
2000); judicial institutions may process different types of cases or
with different priorities. For rule of law to prevail, judges, prosecutors,
police, and court functionaries need to act honestly and autonomously
Figure 4.9 Regulatory Quality in FSU Countries
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Figure 4.10 Regulatory Quality in CEE Countries
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Figure 4.11 Rule of Law in FSU and CEE Countries
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Figure 4.12 Rule of Law in FSU Countries
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Figure 4.13 Rule of Law in CEE Countries
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with regard to the state and private-sector agents (EBRD 1999). Differences may also stem from country variation in commitment to supporting the type of individual rights and ﬁduciary responsibilities that
facilitate emergence of a competitive market environment.
Differences over time between FSU and CEE countries on voice
and accountability are depicted in Figure 4.14. A clear pattern of separation is evident. Even among FSU countries, a clear pattern of separation is also evident (see Figure 4.15), with the Baltic republics scoring
consistently higher. For many other FSU countries, the score on this
governance measure tends to decline. A steady improvement over time
among CEE countries is seen in Figure 4.16.
Differences between FSU and CEE countries in the ﬁnal component
of the WGI governance measures are illustrated in Figure 4.17: political
stability.23 In comparison to the other ﬁve governance dimensions, there
is more variability in political stability among CEE and FSU countries
over the course of the transition. As seen in Figure 4.18, there is more
dispersion among FSU countries on this measure as well. Not surprisFigure 4.14 Voice and Accountability in FSU and CEE Countries
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Figure 4.15 Voice and Accountability in FSU Countries
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Figure 4.16 Voice and Accountability in CEE Countries
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Figure 4.17 Political Stability in FSU and CEE Countries
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Figure 4.18 Political Stability in FSU Countries
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ingly, CEE countries exhibit a general improvement in political stability over time (Figure 4.19).
Political Rights and Civil Liberties
Freedom House annually provides two composite governancerelated measures for FSU, CEE, and other countries. As seen in Figure 4.20, CEE countries (darker) scored substantially higher than FSU
countries (lighter) on both the political rights and civil liberties composite measures in 2012. Differences between FSU and CEE countries
might be explained by different levels of commitment to bolstering
democratic institutions, or by differences in the extent to which political leaders (national, regional, local) obtain and retain power. Differences might also be explained by the nature and scope of education and
health care reforms, for example, or by policies targeted at immigration or freedom of the press. Such differences were driven in part by
European Union membership requirements; most CEE countries have
either joined or are candidate countries. Beyond the Baltic states, FSU
countries have not been targeted for admission to the European Union.
Figure 4.19 Political Stability in CEE Countries
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Figure 4.20 Freedom House Composite Scores, FSU and CEE Countries
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Corruption Perceptions Index
Figure 4.21 presents the 2012 CPI scores for individual FSU countries (lighter) and CEE countries (darker). The construction of this index
is explained on page 57. While in both groups only three countries have
a score exceeding 50, among CEE countries there are eight that score
over 40, in comparison to one of the FSU countries. Indeed, the Baltic
republics (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) account for three of the top four
FSU countries.
Index of Economic Freedom
The ﬁnal governance measure considered here is the Index of Economic Freedom. Figure 4.22 presents the 2011 scores for FSU (lighter)
and CEE (darker) countries; the higher the score, the more economic
freedom.
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Figure 4.21 Corruption Perceptions Index, FSU and CEE Countries
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The pattern exhibited between FSU and CEE countries is clear, and
it is invariant to the governance measure considered. Another perspective of the quality of governance in transition economies is provided
by ﬁrm-level data. Such data not only are instrumental in undertaking
empirical analyses of “state capture,” but also to establish the time and
ﬁnancial costs imposed on ﬁrms by “bad” governance.

GOOD GOVERNANCE IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES:
FIRMS’ PERSPECTIVE AND EXPERIENCE
Empirical efforts and measures to assess good governance in transition economies tend to focus on aspects related to reducing or eliminating corruption. Similarly, studies of corruption in transition economies and elsewhere tend to focus on characteristics and policies of the
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Figure 4.22 Index of Economic Freedom, FSU and CEE Countries
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state, with particular attention paid to the extent of state intervention in
economic transactions and the degree of discretionary power wielded
by bureaucrats (the macro perspective). An important source of information about the nature and scope of corruption, and thus the degree
of good governance, comes from ﬁrms (the micro perspective). That
is, the incidence and magnitude of corrupt activities that ﬁrms initiate
(state capture) or are subjected to (grabbing hand), has direct consequences for whether governance is deemed “good” or “bad.” Such data
are invaluable in assessing the link between corporate governance and
national governance (Hellman et al. 2000).
Among transition economies, ﬁrm-level data related to governance
are collected by the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance
Survey (BEEPS) (Brunetti et al. 1997, Hellman et al. 2000). Some of
the questions relate to the efﬁcacy of government institutions and policies,24 while others focus more explicitly on interactions between ﬁrms
and state.25 The objective of this section is to summarize the most recent
governance-related BEEPS data for FSU and CEE countries.
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Hellman et al. (2000) use star charts for each country to report
responses that relate to governance quality—ﬁrms’ evaluation of the
performance of major public institutions (central government, parliament, central bank, customs service, judiciary, police, and military).
They provide similar information for ﬁrms’ evaluation of the overall
quality and efﬁciency of services provide by utilities (telephone, electricity, and water), public health care, education, the post ofﬁce, and
transportation/roads. Generally, ﬁrms in CEE countries tend to have
higher evaluations (perceive better governance) than ﬁrms in FSU
countries.26 Here the focus is more narrow, on perception and experience of corruption among participating ﬁrms.
Figure 4.23 reports the percent of ﬁrms in FSU countries (lighter)
and CEE countries (darker) that report corruption (bad governance) as
the biggest obstacle to doing business,27 while Figure 4.24 illustrates
how big of an obstacle corruption is perceived to be. As seen in the two
ﬁgures, while a greater proportion of FSU ﬁrms than CEE ﬁrms report
Figure 4.23 Percentage of Firms Listing Corruption as Biggest Obstacle,
CEE and FSU Countries
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(BEEPS) data (World Bank 2015).
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Figure 4.24 Percentage of Respondents Who Answered the Question
“How Big of an Obstacle is Corruption?” in Each of Three
Ways, CEE and FSU Countries
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that corruption is a very severe obstacle to doing business, corruption
is less likely to be viewed by FSU ﬁrms as the biggest obstacle. In part
this can be explained by the efﬁcacy of the informal institutions in FSU
countries (particularly Russia) that effectively guarantee the receipt of
designated beneﬁts associated with corrupt transactions. While costly
to the ﬁrm, corruption is sustained by the culture of kinship and reciprocity, which promotes the informal institutions that enforce corrupt
transactions, thereby reducing uncertainty associated with deriving
beneﬁts from such transactions.
Corrupt transactions frequently involve bribe payments. Figures
4.25 to 4.27 illustrate the type, frequency, and magnitude of bribe payments made by ﬁrms in FSU and CEE countries. Over 40 percent of
the ﬁrms in the FSU sample report paying bribes for construction permits (see Figure 4.25), and they report paying, on average, more than
10 percent of the contract value (see Figure 4.27). Generally, a greater
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Figure 4.25 Percentage of Firms That Said Bribes Were Requested/
Expected for Nine Items, CEE and FSU Countries
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percentage of ﬁrms in FSU countries (lighter) report making bribe payments for routine business activities (obtaining an operating license,
utility connections, and the like) (see Figure 4.25), so it is not surprising to discover FSU ﬁrms reporting a higher incidence of interactions
with government ofﬁcials to make bribe payments (Figure 4.26). Nor is
it surprising that a similar amount of time is spent by senior-level management in dealing with regulations (Figure 4.28). To put these ﬁgures
into perspective, Figure 4.29 identiﬁes the number of FSU and CEE
ﬁrms in the respective samples that applied for required permits and
utility connections in the previous two years, with Figure 4.30 illustrating the average number of days required to obtain a particular service.
Similarities between FSU and CEE countries in terms of general
obstacles encountered are evident in Figure 4.31. Tax-related issues
(see also Figure 4.32) and business licensing account for major sources
of obstacles to doing business. The main difference between the two
groups of countries involves labor regulations, which are perceived as
more problematic in CEE countries than in FSU countries.
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Figure 4.26 Bribe Frequency in Interactions with Government, CEE and
FSU Countries (% of ﬁrms reporting)
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Figure 4.27 Magnitude of Bribes and Kickbacks, CEE and FSU
Countries
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Figure 4.28 Time Tax: Percentage of Senior Management Time Spent
Dealing with Regulations, CEE and FSU Countries
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Figure 4.29 Percentage of Firms That Have Applied for One of Six
Things in the Past Two Years, CEE and FSU Countries
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Figure 4.30 Average Number of Days to Obtain One of Six Things, CEE
and FSU Countries
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
Governance involves the processes of decision making and decision implementation, and it takes place at the international, national,
regional/local, and ﬁrm levels. Typically treated as a technical matter
which can be solved by improved skill transfer, reorganizing structures, and providing additional resources, good governance is difﬁcult
to achieve. Good governance tends to emerge where there is bureaucratic competence, transparency, and predictability in the decisionmaking and implementation processes, and when ﬁscal sustainability
and accountability become the norm.
Good governance is not an automatic outcome of democratization and liberalization in transition (former socialist) economies. As
Brӓutigam (2000) points out, good governance has some of the characteristics of public goods: everyone beneﬁts, and since no one can be
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Figure 4.31 Biggest Obstacles Facing Firms, CEE and FSU Countries
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excluded from the beneﬁts, there is little incentive to pay (devote the
resources necessary to promote good governance), and there may easily be obstacles to good governance among those who would lose their
privileged position. Good governance is less frequently exhibited in
FSU countries than in CEE countries. Partly this is explained by the
institutional environment that existed in the countries before the socialist period began. Partly it is explained by the importance of kinship and
reciprocity—i.e., the extensive reliance on social capital for completing
routine transactions. Partly it is explained by initial conditions relating to corruption (bad governance): countries where corruption is high
at the beginning of the transition process ﬁnd it difﬁcult to reduce or
eliminate corruption over time.
International assistance does not guarantee good governance, even
when different aspects of good governance are conditions of receiving aid. In countries where institutions are weak (legal or banking, for
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Figure 4.32 Working Days Spent on One of Four Things, CEE and FSU
Countries
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example), international assistance may even contribute to “bad” governance: aid is diverted and corrupt individuals are not removed, local
initiatives are “crowded out” as project managers and foreign experts
oversee aid use, or countries embark on risky ﬁscal endeavors knowing
that they likely will be bailed out, for instance.
While the contribution of good governance to economic, political,
and social well being has been established, a few issues remain unresolved. How good does good governance need to be; is there a threshold level? At what level does good governance need to be exhibited:
at the ﬁrm level, the local level, the national level, the international
level—or at some combination of these? Resolving such questions will
enable policymakers to more effectively implement good governance.
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Notes
1. Williams and Siddique (2008) cite 85 studies that link governance quality to economic outcomes.
2. While the particular requirements may change over time or across countries, conditionality is necessary in order to document to taxpayers or donors that the money
provided by the aid-granting agency was “well spent.” At the same time, however,
the governance literature points out the paradox that aid conditionality generates:
aid to reduce poverty or promote social well-being requires good governance;
countries where aid is most needed (i.e., where poverty conditions are most
severe) exhibit limited ability to implement policies that promote characteristics
of good governance. In a recent empirical study, Heckelman (2010) demonstrates
that aid to transition economies did have positive consequences for some dimensions of governance (judicial, electoral) but not others (media independence).
3. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) data show that
investment in the early 1990s was between 20 and 50 percent lower than pretransition levels in former socialist economies (EBRD 2010).
4. While the literature is replete with studies that show that governance matters when
it comes to economic performance, empirical studies that document causality provide mixed results (see, for example, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson [2001];
Arndt and Oman [2006]; Glaeser et al. [2004]; and Mauro [1995]).
5. For a detailed description of the measures, see World Bank (2014).
6. For more information, see Freedom House (2012).
7. For more information, see Transparency International (2013).
8. For a detailed description of the methodology used to construct the Index of Economic Freedom, see Heritage Foundation (2012).
9. “Economic freedom” is deﬁned as “the fundamental right of every human to control his or her own labor and property.” See http://www.heritage.org/index/about.
10. For more information, see http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/economics/data/
beeps.shtml.
11. The Life in Transition Survey, conducted by the EBRD, collects information
from individuals in transition economies about their perceptions and experience
with corruption. See http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/publications/special/
transitionII.shtml.
12. Former Soviet Union or “FSU” countries include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Krygyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The Baltic republics (Estonia,
Lavtia, and Lithuania), while grouped here as FSU, are sometimes included with
CEE countries, because they chose not to join the post-Soviet Commonwealth of
Independent States. Data are not always available for all countries in all years;
hence, Figure 4.6 lists only 12 FSU countries, not 15.
13. CEE countries include Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia,
Slovakia, and Slovenia. Data are not always available for all countries in all years;
hence, ﬁgures may show a varying number of CEE countries.
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14. Voice and accountability is designed to capture not only the extent to which individuals are able to express their opinions and ideas before, during, and after governmental decision making and implementation, but also their participation in
making these decisions and the mechanism for imposing consequences associated
with the decisions made.
15. Control of corruption is designed to capture “perceptions of the extent to which
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of
corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests” (taken
from the WGI site http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#faq).
16. In some instances, the objective is to inﬂuence the content of rules/regulations/laws
(public-sector outcomes), and the activity or transaction is initiated by privatesector agents (“state capture”); in other instances, the objective of the activity or
transaction is to use public-sector position for personal/private (ﬁnancial) gain
(“grabbing hand”).
17. Knack (2006) describes a variety of corrupt interactions: between ﬁrms, between
households, between ﬁrms and government individuals/agencies, between households and government individuals/agencies, and so forth.
18. Note that for Figures 4.2 through 4.19, the time intervals along the x axis change
from two years to one year. This is because in 2003 Worldwide Governance Indicators data began to be gathered on a yearly rather than a biennial basis.
19. We note that comparative analyses based on governance measures derived from
perceptions that involve longitudinal data are subject to two types of inﬂuences.
First, differences over time may stem from changes in the composite measure:
components added or subtracted, or new sources of information included. Second,
events may occur at a point in time (election, ﬁnancial crisis, public demonstrations, for example) that causes perceptions to change. Accounting for these two
dimensions, as WGI does, allows for more accurate assessments of change.
20. According to Shlapentokh (2013), “hundreds of thousands of employees in private
companies” receive not only their ofﬁcial salary but also a “salary in an envelope.”
This practice of companies (reporting wages below what was actually paid to
their employees) allows ﬁrms to reduce their tax bill, and it is readily accepted by
employees.
21. The WGI composite measure of government effectiveness is designed to capture “perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service
and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies” (see http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index
.aspx#faq).
22. Regulatory quality captures individuals’ and ﬁrms’ perceptions of government’s
ability to “formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and
promote private-sector development” (see http://info.worldbank.org/governance/
wgi/index.aspx#faq).
23. The political stability composite measure is designed to capture “perceptions of
the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically motivated violence and terrorism”
(see http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/faq.htm ).
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24. Firms are asked to rate the quality of public services provided by central government, the judiciary (legal system), and such local authorities (institutions) as
police and utilities, for example, in order to evaluate whether and which institutions impose obstacles to doing business.
25. Other questions focus on state intervention in ﬁrm operations (inspections, subsidies, bribes, etc.) and on ﬁrms’ efforts to inﬂuence local or federal authorities
(bribes, kickbacks, etc.).
26. Hellman et al. (2000) note issues related to perception bias and the likelihood that
individuals in a particular country might be subject to similar kvetching (complaining) or kvelling (being overly optimistic). The survey design includes questions
that can be veriﬁed or matched up with objective data (exchange rate variability
and telephone infrastructure), thus Hellman et al. are able to undertake analyses to
assess whether and where (which country) perception bias is problematic.
27. Sample selection by country took place in such a way as to generate a representative sample of ﬁrms. For discussion of the sample selection process, and the
characteristics of the participating ﬁrms, see Hellman et al. (2000).
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5
Governance Challenges in
Education and Health Care
in Developing Countries
Seema Jayachandran
Northwestern University

Ensuring that its citizens have access to high-quality schooling and
health care is among a government’s most important roles. Health and
education—which enhance human capital—are widely believed to promote economic growth: schooling and health measures have both been
linked to increased gross domestic product (GDP), and there are wellgrounded reasons to believe that health and education boost worker
productivity and, in turn, income. In addition, bolstering the health and
education of children from poor families is one of the most powerful
ways to break the intergenerational transmission of poverty and allow
families to rise out of poverty. Moreover, health and education are basic
human rights of every citizen, and governments are responsible for
safeguarding these rights (United Nations 1948, Articles 25 and 26).
While there does exist private-sector provision of both health and
education services in developing countries, the government is typically
the main provider in these countries. In part, the government is ﬁlling in
for a poorly developed private market, but there are also several reasons
why governments have a natural role in these spheres, such as disease
prevention or the externalities from having an educated population. Not
only does the government account for a large share of the provision
of services in the education and health care sectors, but education and
health care also make up a large share of government spending. Health
care and education account for over a third of the public-sector workforce in developing countries (Clements et al. 2010).
Unfortunately, governments in developing countries often do a
poor job of delivering health care and education to their citizens. This
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chapter will focus on the ways in which governance challenges reduce
the quality of education and health care provision in developing countries. In particular, I will consider ways in which corruption and poor
oversight of the workforce reduce the efﬁcacy of these sectors. I will
document the causes, different manifestations, and extent of these problems. I will also discuss a range of promising policy solutions that have
been adopted to address the problems, such as ﬁnancial incentives,
leveraging technological advancements to improve monitoring, information sharing through media outlets, and empowering stakeholders to
improve accountability.

HEALTH AND EDUCATION INDICATORS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Despite the aforementioned reasons for governments to invest in
the health of their populations, both health inputs and health outcomes
tend to be much worse in poor countries than in rich countries. The
highest neonatal and under-ﬁve mortality rates are found in developing countries. This ﬁnding is unsurprising, but what is staggering is
the magnitude of the gap between rich and poor countries: under-ﬁve
mortality rates in 2000 range from 241 deaths per 1,000 births to 4
deaths per 1,000 births (World Bank 2014). Health inputs exhibit the
same pattern as health outcomes. For example, the child immunization
rate is highly correlated with a country’s GDP per capita.
Education levels in developing countries are also low. In such
countries, 37 percent of the population aged 25 and over has no schooling, compared to 4 percent in developed countries. A similar pattern is
seen in the percentage of people with a secondary-school education or
higher—27 percent in developing countries compared to 68 percent in
developed countries (Barro and Lee 2001).
The quality of available health and education services and not simply low take-up is at the heart of the problem. For example, those who
do attend school in developing countries often receive a low-quality
education. Schoellman (2012) uses U.S. census data to estimate returns
to schooling for foreign-educated immigrants working in the United
States. By comparing immigrants who were educated in, say, Nigeria
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to those educated in France, he calculates how much money an extra
year of schooling in Nigeria is worth in the U.S. labor market compared
to an extra year of schooling in France. This estimate provides a metric of school quality in the different origin countries. When this proxy
for school quality is compared with GDP per capita, there is a strong
positive relationship between a country’s GDP and school quality.
Schoellman ﬁnds that differences in education quality are as important
as differences in years of schooling when decomposing the variation in
human capital accumulation across countries.
Poor-quality education also negatively affects school enrollment
rates: parents have less of a reason to send their children to a school
where they are not learning, and students have less interest in attending
a school where they are not engaged. An eye-opening report featured
interviews with parents in India about their children’s schooling
(PROBE 1999). In 8 percent of the cases where boys were withdrawn
from school and 18 percent of the cases where girls were withdrawn
from school, parents reported that the reason for their having taken their
child out of school was poor teaching. Poor quality also stops parents
from ever enrolling their children in school in the ﬁrst place for 8 percent of boys and 1 percent of girls. One mother in the state of Madhya
Pradesh explained why she had never sent her daughter, Rukmini, to
school: “If we send the girl to school, we have to pay a labourer to
replace her, and the girl learns nothing. What do we gain? See this other
child who is in class 5. She knows nothing. My son Parkash studied till
class 6—he knows nothing” (ibid., p. 27).
The quality of health care is also often inadequate. One dimension
of quality is the level of effort health care providers exert. A study in
urban India investigated this aspect of quality by comparing providers’
actions in a hypothetical test environment to observed practices in the
clinic (Das and Hammer 2005). The study interviewed and observed a
representative sample of both public and private health care providers.
The health care providers participated in “vignettes” in which trained
research staff acted out various hypothetical health scenarios. Doctors
were scored on the questions they asked the “patients,” diagnosis, and
recommended treatment. Vignette scores were used to assign a competence score to each provider—how much the provider knew. One
month after this exercise, research staff observed providers in their
actual practice for a full working day and scored each patient interac-
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tion based on the amount of time the health care provider spent with
the patient, questions the provider asked the patient, examinations, and
recommendations. These scores were then compared to the vignette
scores to create a measure of provider effort. A main ﬁnding is that
providers’ actual performance was well short of their potential performance: providers knew what to do but did not do it in practice. Among
providers with a medical degree, those in the private sector completed
only 60 percent of the activities they knew to be important, and those
in the public sector completed only 33 percent. Thus, the problem was
particularly acute for public health care providers. Differences in effort
were most salient in poor neighborhoods, where patients appeared to be
better off visiting private providers rather than public providers, despite
the fact that public providers were more qualiﬁed and presumably less
expensive.

GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS IN THE HEALTH AND
EDUCATION SECTORS
As described above, in many cases governments in developing
countries are failing to provide high-quality health care and education.
One important factor is poor governance, which I deﬁne as the inefﬁcient management and use of the available resources, often owing to
malfeasance or shirking by government employees. While governance
does not account for all of the problems in the health care and education sectors—the available ﬁnancial and human resources are often
very limited—it plays a central role. The governance problems run the
gamut, from graft and bribery to absenteeism and indolence among
employees.
Graft
Perhaps the simplest type of governance problem is theft of ﬁnancial
resources. A well-known World Bank study in Uganda “followed the
money” to document the extent of graft by local bureaucrats (Reinikka
and Svensson 2004). The central government in Uganda disbursed education grants to individual schools based on the number of students
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enrolled. By tracking the disbursements and then the amount received
by the schools, the study found that schools received on average only
20 percent of the amount they were entitled to. The median percentage
of the federal grant received was 0 percent! The missing money apparently was captured by local bureaucrats and was not reallocated to other
public uses but rather was stolen for personal use. While this is just one
speciﬁc example, it is representative of what is widely believed to be a
prevalent problem: bureaucrats skim off some of the money that should
be spent to buy supplies, maintain facilities, and pay teachers and health
care workers.
Informal Payments
Government employees can also enrich themselves by demanding
“informal payments” for services that should be rendered for free or
at a speciﬁed rate. Essentially, the government employee is extracting
a bribe in exchange for performing a service that he is contractually
obligated to provide even if this bribe is not paid. Lewis (2007) reviews
the literature on informal payments in the health sector and highlights
the prevalence of the practice across countries for basic services such
as admission to the hospital or receipt of subsidized medications. She
reports on a survey in Bangalore, India, by Gopakumar (1998) that
found that 51 percent of community members surveyed had paid bribes
in government hospitals, while 89 percent had paid bribes in hospitals
in small towns. In one of the more egregious examples cited, individuals reported having to pay bribes to nurses in maternity homes so that
mothers could see their newborns.
A related phenomenon is seen in schooling, though perhaps less
frequently. In crowded classes, teachers sometimes ask parents to pay a
fee so their child can sit in the front of the classroom and get more attention. It is also not unheard of for a teacher to demand payment in order
to advance the student to the next grade or give high marks.
Absenteeism
Worker absenteeism is a major challenge in both the health care
and the education sectors: employees simply do not show up to work.
Banerjee, Deaton, and Duﬂo (2004) document absence rates in health
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care facilities using survey data from public and private medical providers, as well as traditional healers, in a poor, rural district of India. In
the public sector, absence rates were veriﬁed by weekly, in-person visits
(random spot checks) to public health facilities over the course of one
year. Subcenters and aid posts (the lowest-tier health facilities) suffer
from the highest rates of absenteeism: those performing the spot checks
found that 56 percent of facilities were closed during normal working
hours. In contrast, primary and community health centers (PHCs and
CHCs) were closed only 3 percent of the time when the spot checkers
showed up. However, when facilities were open, both subcenters and
PHCs/CHCs were understaffed: the fraction of allocated medical staff
found during a visit averaged 55 percent for subcenters and 64 percent
for PHCs/CHCs. One perilous consequence of this low-quality government care is that it drives patients to private care. In rural India, private
health care providers are often severely underqualiﬁed. In the area studied by Banerjee, Deaton, and Duﬂo, 82 percent of private providers
reported that they had no medical training whatsoever.
This pattern of absenteeism is supported by cross-country data
from Chaudhury et al. (2006). Survey teams in six countries made two
to three in-person visits to a (nearly) nationally representative sample
of primary schools and primary health centers. On average, the education sector suffered from an absence rate of 19 percent, while the health
sector had an absence rate of 35 percent. Absence rates declined as per
capita income increased, especially in the education sector.
Shirking
The absence rates described above may understate the severity of
just how poor the provision of service may be, in that providers who
are present may not actually be working. Chaudhury et al. (2006)
found that in India teachers who were present during spot checks were
actually teaching only 45 percent of the time. Even this statistic may
overestimate effort, as teachers were counted as teaching in instances
where they were only keeping the class in order and not actually teaching. Data from secondary schools in Nepal show a similar, though less
severe, pattern: 18 percent of teachers failed to teach for the entire class
period (Jayachandran 2014).
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Perverse Incentives as a Contributing Factor
Government workers’ lack of effort may merely stem from the lack
of positive incentives to work hard, but in some cases there are perverse incentives that reward teachers or health care workers for poor
performance. Jayachandran (2014) studies the prevalent phenomenon
of after-school tutoring in government schools in which schoolteachers
provide for-proﬁt tutoring to their own students outside of the normal
school day. The possibility of extra income from tutoring may incentivize teachers to teach less material during the normal school day, thereby
increasing the likelihood that their students will need to attend tutoring.
Jayachandran uses data from a national survey in Nepal to investigate
the effect of a secondary school offering tutoring on teacher effort and
student academic achievement. Students in private and public schools
were asked to report whether they received tutoring, whether or not
their teacher taught for the entire class period, and other subjective
information on teacher performance. These data were then linked with
students’ scores on the national secondary-school exam. After-school
tutoring in public schools was found to reduce the likelihood that teachers taught for the entire class period by 7 percentage points, a signiﬁcant
reduction. Less teaching translated into a lower student performance
on the secondary-school exam. This ﬁnding did not carry over to private schools, which is not surprising when one considers that private
schools, unlike public schools, face a ﬁnancial hit if they teach inadequately during the regular school day, since they will lose students and
hence school-fee revenues. The students hurt most by this practice of
“self-dealing” are those whose families are too poor to afford tutoring;
these students are taught less during school than the teacher could have
feasibly covered, but are not able to learn the missed material by taking
the tutoring classes.
Reverse or perverse incentives are also found in the health care sector. Doctors whose wages are linked to the number of medicines, tests,
or procedures they recommend are more likely to prescribe unneeded
treatments. This phenomenon is widespread in China, where the antibiotic prescription rate is almost double that of other countries. Doctors
are incentivized to overprescribe by their hospitals, which make money
from setting higher prices for certain drugs, and also by pharmaceutical companies, which provide doctors with bonuses to increase sales.
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A randomized audit study showed that doctors were signiﬁcantly less
likely to prescribe antibiotics to patients who signaled they had some
knowledge that antibiotics might not be needed to treat their symptoms
(39 percent of such cases received antibiotics) compared to patients
that did not (64 percent of such cases received antibiotics). Patients
who demonstrated knowledge about antibiotics were also less likely to
be prescribed multiple drugs or more expensive drugs (Currie, Lin, and
Zhang 2011).
In both of these examples—tutoring and overprescription of
drugs—the problem is worse than bribery. Not only are government
workers extracting money from citizens, but here, in the pursuit of additional money for themselves, government workers intentionally provide
what they know to be lower-quality service, be it less teaching during
class or unnecessary medicines.
Why Do These Governance Problems Exist?
There are fundamental reasons why governance problems are
severe in developing countries and are pervasive in the health care and
education sectors. Many other government services are based primarily
in cities or towns, but schools and health clinics are located throughout
a country. That geographic spread is one underlying reason that monitoring workers is difﬁcult. Many schools and health posts are located
in remote villages, causing a twofold problem. First, poor-quality roads
and inadequate public transportation make it difﬁcult for government
workers to reach their place of work. Second, these same conditions
also hinder supervisors or auditors from traveling to conduct spot
checks and worker evaluations. Thus, there is often little monitoring of
the performance of government workers.
Another contributing factor is that government workers earn a low
salary by worldwide standards (though they are often well paid relative
to their skill group in their countries). Many health care and education
workers moonlight at other jobs to supplement their income. Workers
with multiple jobs are more likely to be absent if their jobs have conﬂicting schedules, and they may also exert less effort—for example, a
teacher might have less time to prepare a lesson.
A third important factor that exacerbates these issues is that consumers are less able to monitor service provision and enforce high quality
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than they are in wealthier countries. Parents with limited education may
lack the ability to gauge what their child is learning in school or how
their local school’s performance compares to other schools in the region
(Dizon-Ross 2014). Similarly, patients tend to have little knowledge of
whether or not a health care provider is performing the needed tests,
asking the appropriate questions, and making an accurate diagnosis.
Even when stakeholders are aware that services are inadequate, they
may not have sufﬁcient leverage or social standing within the community to hold providers accountable. It is much more likely that a parent
in a developing country has less education and status compared to her
child’s teacher than would be the case in developed countries, simply
because teachers have a higher position in the society-wide distribution of schooling attainment in developing countries than in developed
countries.
Finally, it is often difﬁcult to ﬁre government employees, so governments have few tools to enforce job requirements and punish shirkers
even when they are able to monitor workers adequately and would like
to improve the effort level of the workforce.
Beyond Governance: Limited Resources
It is important to note that there are many factors other than governance challenges that contribute to poor health and education outcomes
in developing countries. The amount of available government revenue is
lower, which means fewer resources for education and health care. This
translates into larger class sizes and inadequate teaching aids or faulty
hospital equipment and lack of medicine. Infrastructure is also poor,
with many facilities lacking water and electricity. These other problems may very well exacerbate the governance challenges described
above. In an analysis of cross-country data, teacher absence rates fall
by 2.7 percentage points with a one standard deviation increase in an
index measuring school infrastructure. A similar pattern is observed in
the health care sector, where the availability of potable water at the
facility signiﬁcantly decreases the absence rates of health care workers
(Chaudhury et al. 2006).
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SOME PROMISING APPROACHES TO ADDRESSING
GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES
Governments are typically ineffective at monitoring workers and
enforcing performance standards. While these are difﬁcult problems
to overcome, there has been progress recently through innovative
approaches by governments to incentivize good performance, monitor
their workers, and empower citizens to monitor government workers.
Incentive Schemes
A basic but powerful idea in economics is that an employer can
align workers’ incentives with the employer’s objectives by means of
pay for performance. Recent pilot programs have shown the beneﬁts
of incentive schemes in improving teacher performance and reducing
absenteeism in schools. A nonproﬁt foundation collaborated with the
state government in Andhra Pradesh, India, to conduct a randomized
evaluation of performance pay for teachers in rural primary schools.
Two schemes were assessed: group bonuses tied to school performance
and individual bonuses tied to teacher performance. The schemes were
evaluated over the course of two years, during which student performance was assessed at the end of each school year (Muralidharan and
Sundararaman 2011). Bonuses were awarded if average test scores
(either for the school or for the individual teacher) increased by at least
5 percent. The researchers evaluating the program conducted unannounced spot checks to measure student and teacher attendance as well.
The program, including both schemes, signiﬁcantly improved student
performance: scores in language increased by 0.17 standard deviations, and math scores increased by 0.27 standard deviations. As judged
against other policy innovations in education, these were impressively
large impacts on student test scores. Muralidharan and Sundararaman
conclude that the improvements in test scores were due to increased
teacher effort rather than improved teacher or student attendance. An
innovative feature of the study is that student performance was measured in subjects such as science and social science, where performance
was not factored into teacher pay. One concern about teacher incentive
pay is that teachers might “teach to the test,” and other types of learn-
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ing might suffer. In this case, performance in all subjects improved,
presumably because the teacher put in more effort across the board,
or because better student learning in math and language had spillover
beneﬁts to other subjects such as science and social science.
Duﬂo, Hanna, and Ryan (2012), whose study is discussed in more
detail below, analyze another incentive program in schools and ﬁnd that
linking incentives for teachers to their attendance improved student test
scores.
Technology
A second potential solution to shortcomings in the health care and
education sectors is to use technology to improve staff monitoring.
High rates of absenteeism may be due, in part, to the fact that there
is no accountability for providers. By leveraging advances in technology, it may be possible to reduce some of the barriers that prevent
governments from actively monitoring attendance and performance.
A nongovernmental organization (NGO) in India attempted to reduce
teacher absences by using cameras to document attendance. Teachers
were given a digital camera with a tamper-proof date and time stamp
and were instructed to have a student take one photograph at the beginning of the school day and one at the end of the school day. To be
considered valid, photographs had to be taken at least ﬁve hours apart,
and both photographs had to have at least eight children pictured with
the teacher. A randomized evaluation assessed the effectiveness of this
program using data from unscheduled spot checks by the survey team,
teacher photos, and student test scores (Duﬂo, Hanna, and Ryan 2012).
The program was found to signiﬁcantly reduce absence rates in camera schools (where the rate fell to 21 percent) compared to noncamera
schools (where the absence rate was 42 percent). Student test scores
in schools with cameras were also signiﬁcantly higher (by 0.17 standard deviations), which led to more students from these schools passing
competency exams to continue their schooling. This positive impact
on student achievement is an important result because it indicates that
teachers did not “game the system” and simply show up to work but not
teach. Rather, the incentive to show up to work increased their teaching
and, in turn, student learning.
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Even more advanced technology is now being leveraged in the
health care sector. The state government in Karnataka, India, recently
launched something known as the Integrated Medical Information and
Disease Surveillance System (IMIDSS), in which biometric devices
record health care worker attendance using thumbprints. Attendance
data is sent in real time to monitors in government headquarters using
cellular or radio networks. This monitoring is linked to both incentives
and penalties for the health care workers. A randomized evaluation of
the effectiveness of this program ﬁnds that it both increases health care
worker attendance and improves patient health outcomes (Dhaliwal and
Hanna 2014).
Citizen Empowerment
Improving citizens’ knowledge can be an important ﬁrst step
toward increasing government accountability. Media outlets offer a
means to increase citizens’ awareness. This approach was used by the
central government in Uganda in response to learning that grants for
schools were being siphoned off by local government ofﬁcials, as discussed above. Prior to the intervention, the average school in the sample
received only 24 percent of the grant money to which it was entitled.
In an attempt to increase accountability, the Ugandan government
launched a newspaper campaign to disseminate information to parents
and teachers about the federal grants their local school was entitled to.
Two public-expenditure tracking surveys administered six years apart,
one pre- and one postintervention, were used to assess the effectiveness
of the campaign. Data indicated that head teachers’ knowledge of the
grant programs signiﬁcantly increased with proximity to a newspaper
outlet, both in terms of the funding rules and the timing of the release
of funds (Reinikka and Svensson 2005).1 Increased knowledge led to
more money reaching schools. With each standard deviation increase
in head teachers’ knowledge of entitlements, the funds received by the
school increased by an average of 44 percent. In addition to reducing
the capture of public funds by larcenous local ofﬁcials, the campaign
had a positive effect on student enrollment: A one-standard-deviation
increase in the school’s share of received funding resulted in an increase
of 297 more students per school.
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While citizens are aware of their personal experiences, there is
often no way for them to measure quality of services in terms of aggregate outcomes in the community. An intervention in Uganda in 2004
aimed to empower citizens by providing such aggregated information
to the community, in this case about health care. Rather than using mass
media, this intervention brought together local government health care
workers and community members to disseminate the information and
discuss how to improve health care provision. The program was found
to have signiﬁcantly improved health care delivery and health outcomes
(Björkman and Svensson 2009). First, researchers surveyed both community members and health care providers to collect data on health
outcomes (veriﬁed by medical records when possible), health facility
characteristics, and provider performance. This information was used
to create a unique report card for each village health care facility, and
the information on the village’s report card was presented at community
meetings by local NGOs. These report cards were used as a conversation starting point for community representatives and providers to
develop action plans for improving service delivery and monitoring.
The randomized evaluation of the intervention found that health care
service delivery and health outcomes improved in several signiﬁcant
ways: Average waiting time decreased by 12 minutes, from 131 to
119 minutes, and there was a 0.56 standard deviation increase in the
index used to measure facility conditions (cleanliness of ﬂoors, walls,
furniture, and so forth). Absence rates among service providers also
declined. Most strikingly, the intervention resulted in several improved
health outcomes such as child weight and child survival.
An important cautionary note is in order, speciﬁcally about community information interventions, but also more broadly about the
universal applicability of any type of solution. While the results of the
Ugandan community intervention are promising, other community
empowerment programs have been found to be less successful. Kremer
and Holla (2009) outline the null ﬁndings of evaluations in two different countries that aimed to empower education stakeholders. One
intervention in India sought to improve the performance of community
monitoring committees for schools, which had been ineffective from the
outset. Survey results showed that few households were aware of these
committees. Tests were also administered to children to assess school
quality. Results indicated that parents had an inaccurate understand-
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ing of how much their children were learning. To solve this problem,
ofﬁcials fashioned an intervention that was aimed at informing the community about the following areas: school performance, state-mandated
school requirements, funding, and the responsibilities of the preexisting monitoring committees. Despite the fact that almost 30 percent of
households attended these meetings, monitoring committees in villages
that received the intervention were no more effective than committees
in villages with no intervention. Teacher and student absences were also
unchanged.
Two programs in Kenya also targeted community monitoring
bodies for schools. Of note, while the majority of teachers in Kenyan
schools are directly employed by the government, schools or monitoring committees sometimes hire contract teachers to work with the
government-employed teachers. The ﬁrst intervention attempted to
empower these committees by providing prizes which committees
could bestow on teachers to incentivize them and by facilitating meetings between parents, committee members, and civil-service teachers.
Results echo those of the empowerment intervention in India—there
was no effect on teacher absence or student achievement.
The second program in Kenya aimed to improve committee monitoring of contract teacher attendance. While the program did not change
attendance among contract teachers (which was already relatively high),
the program did somewhat improve the attendance of civil-service
teachers, though the results were not statistically signiﬁcant. Despite
the fact that there was no signiﬁcant change in teacher attendance, the
program did improve student attendance and performance in the classrooms of civil-service teachers.
Thus, while the approach of citizen empowerment had remarkable
impacts on the health care sector in Uganda, the same approach was
relatively ineffective on the education sector in Kenya and India. One
hopes that policymakers, NGOs, and researchers will go back to the
drawing board and devise other approaches to solve the problem of
poor-quality education in these latter settings where the ﬁrst attempt
failed. These examples serve as a reminder that there is no one-size-ﬁtsall solution, and that the process of improving governance in developing
countries will be laborious and often frustrating.
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CONCLUSION
The majority of funding in the health care and education sectors
is spent on provider salaries. For example, 80 percent of India’s health
care budget is dedicated to provider compensation (Das and Hammer
2005). A similar pattern is observed in education budgets, where, on
average, 75 percent of funding goes toward teacher salaries in developing countries (Kremer and Holla 2009). Thus, improving the quality
of health and education hinges on improving the performance of the
workforce.
There are several basic features of poor countries that create governance challenges in monitoring public workers and incentivizing
them to perform well. Thus, governance problems are pervasive in the
education and health care sectors and act as a barrier to high-quality
education and health care services. The lack of high-quality education
and health care services in turn obstructs educational attainment and
good health outcomes. While no panacea exists, innovative solutions
are being developed and tested: redesigning incentive schemes, using
technology to monitor workers, and empowering citizens with information, often disseminated through mass media. There is still much work
to be done to solve these governance problems, but the problems are
well worth tackling given the importance of human capital for reducing
poverty and promoting economic growth in developing countries.
Notes
I can be reached at the Department of Economics at Northwestern University and
by e-mail at seema@northwestern.edu. I am grateful to Jaye Stapleton for excellent
research assistance.
1. A “head teacher” in Uganda is similar to what in the United States or Great Britain
would be called a “headmaster,” except that a head teacher often has regular teaching duties in addition to part-time administrative ones.
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6
Governance Problems and
Priorities for Local Climate
Adaptation and Poverty Alleviation
Stephen C. Smith
George Washington University

This chapter begins by reviewing the encouraging progress that has
been made against poverty over the past three decades, but then it considers some reasons for concern as to why further progress may be difﬁcult. Two key constraints are environmental stress and poor governance.
Governance failures slow economic growth and often particularly affect
the poor; they may also lead to violent conﬂict, with particular harm to
people living in poverty. Environmental degradation can cause poverty
and indirectly lead to conﬂict. Adaptation on the parts of both government and the private sector is an essential response to climate change,
and people who successfully adapt may also be less vulnerable to violence, as well as less likely to provoke conﬂict. But without good governance, actions people take to try to adapt to climate change may in
themselves trigger conﬂict. Thus, it is essential to improve governance
for adaptation, both in terms of government’s overall planned adaptation
responses and in its facilitation of successful, harmonious, and autonomous adaptation in the private sector and civil society.

PROGRESS AGAINST POVERTY: THE GLASS IS HALF FULL
Clear Progress on Poverty since 1980
Since 1980, the fraction of the world’s population living on less
than $1.25 a day has fallen from over 40 percent down to just over 20
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percent. Indeed, given that some have put forward higher estimates of
the number living in poverty in China in 1980, the global incidence of
extreme poverty in that year may have been closer to 50 percent. The
World Bank reports that its Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
target of halving the fraction of people that were living in poverty in
1990 (about 40 percent that year) by the year 2015 had already been
achieved by 2010 (United Nations 2012). Moreover, 6 of the 10 fastestgrowth economies since 2005 have been in Africa, the region with the
greatest fraction in poverty (World Bank 2013). On the other hand, with
the commodity price declines coinciding with the growth slowdown
in China, the sustainability of this higher growth level is called into
question.
There has also been impressive improvement in most health indicators (Smith 2005). Life expectancy has risen, under-ﬁve mortality has
fallen, and maternal mortality has been reduced. Education enrollments
have also risen, along with basic literacy. While it remains in dispute
as to whether incomes are converging globally, there is little doubt that
there has been convergence in education and health levels in recent
decades, and the international convergence of health and of education
are mutually reinforcing (Sab and Smith 2002; UNDP 2012).
Improved governance is foundational to successful development
(North 1990), and there has been an impressive spread of democracy
and of government transparency (UNDP 2012).
Remaining Poverty Challenges
But some of the important MDG targets—such as halving world
hunger—will not be achieved by the 2015 deadline (World Bank 2011).
There is a growing concentration of poverty in conﬂict-affected
states and regions with deteriorating environments—precisely where
progress is most difﬁcult (World Bank 2010a, 2011; World Resources
Institute et al. 2011).
And environmental decay is proceeding at a pace few had predicted
20 years ago. Among other things, this is posing serious threats to the
natural-resource-based livelihoods that so many of the global poor
depend upon (World Resource Institute et al. 2011).
Thus, much remains to be done—although the glass is half full, it
remains half empty.
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About 1.2 billion people currently subsist on less than $1.25 a day
(the adjusted level, still known as the “dollar a day” level), and about
2.7 billion—nearly two-ﬁfths of the world’s population—live on less
than $2 a day. At least 300 million people live in chronic extreme poverty (Todaro and Smith 2011, Chapter 5).
Unfortunately, sub-Saharan Africa has shown far less progress than
other developing regions. While the fraction living in poverty has gone
down somewhat in the past decade, the head count (number) of individuals living in poverty rose dramatically in the 1981–2010 period, from
about 205 million to about 414 million. The concentration of poverty
may make it more difﬁcult to redress. In most countries, the poverty gap
has gone down along with the poverty head count. But between 1981
and 2010, the average income of the extremely poor hardly increased
in sub-Saharan Africa, remaining near an appalling 70 cents per person
per day (World Bank 2013).
This stagnation is closely connected to the lack of a sustained Green
Revolution in Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa has very little irrigation, a
factor that worsens constraints as climate change accelerates. World
Bank research reveals that in 2007 only about 4 percent of farmland
in sub-Saharan Africa was irrigated. Africa’s risky, rain-fed agriculture
contrasts with 39 percent irrigation incidence in South Asia and 29 percent incidence in East Asia and the Paciﬁc. Moreover, despite progress,
more than three-quarters of cereal-producing farmland in sub-Saharan
Africa uses unimproved seeds, often in unfertilized, depleted ﬁelds,
with yields dependent upon increasingly unreliable rainfall (see World
Bank 2007).
The Multiple Dimensions of Poverty
Global poverty is about more than income, and is not automatically
solved through economic growth. Poverty is characterized by early
death, poor health, denial of education, and indeed the loss of childhood (Smith 2005). Thus, poverty is multidimensional and is characterized by health problems, undernutrition, child labor, illiteracy, underﬁve mortality, degraded environment, disempowerment, and social
exclusion. Nearly 1.7 billion people live in multidimensional poverty,
according to the multidimensional poverty index (MPI) constructed by
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the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2012). In sum,
poverty problems are not readily solved with higher income alone.
Poverty is pervasiveness of early death. Koﬁ Annan said, “This
[extreme poverty] is a poverty that kills” (United Nations 2005, p. 7). In
some countries—Afghanistan, Chad, the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Mali,
Niger, and Sierra Leone—about one-ﬁfth of all children die before age
ﬁve from preventable causes. Life expectancy in sub-Saharan Africa
is just 53. In South Asia, nearly 1 child in 12 dies before age ﬁve. The
under-ﬁve mortality rate is 118 per 1,000 in low-income countries, 51
per 1,000 in middle-income countries, and 7 per 1,000 in high-income
countries (World Bank 2011). Every day, an average of nearly 20,000
children in developing countries die from preventable causes. This
amounted to over seven million in 2012 alone.
Poverty is hunger and poor health. The International Classiﬁcation of Diseases includes “Code Z59.5—extreme poverty” (Smith
2005). About 900 million people are classiﬁed as hungry (undernourished) by the United Nations’ World Food Organization (WFO). There
are many other severe health deprivations. Micronutrient malnutrition
affects nearly two billion; children may face lifelong disabilities (see,
e.g., Alderman, Hoddinott, and Kinsey [2006]). Women with nutritional
deﬁciencies are more likely to deliver smaller babies, who are at risk of
having poor growth and development. In many poor countries, parasites
are widespread. In developing countries, a woman dies during childbirth nearly every minute—very few of these women would have died
if they had lived in a developed country. It has been estimated that as
many as 3,000 children in Africa die from malaria each day.
Poverty is the denial of the right to a basic education. As of 2012,
there were about 776 million illiterate adults in the world (UNESCO
2014). Nearly 40 percent of all adults in South Asia are illiterate. Often,
students go to school only to ﬁnd the teacher is absent: “teacher truancy” is a major scourge in South Asia and is also common in Africa.
A child in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia can expect to receive less
than ﬁve years of schooling. In at least 12 sub-Saharan African countries, a child is more likely to die before the age of ﬁve than to attend
secondary school.
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Poverty is the loss of childhood. According to the International
Labour Organization, there are at least 215 million child laborers (ILO
2010), and 115 million of these children are engaged in what the ILO
classiﬁes as “hazardous work.” Approximately 91 million working children are under 12 years old. Millions of child laborers are trapped in
slavery, trafﬁcking, debt bondage, prostitution, pornography, and other
abhorrent conditions.
Special Challenges for Poverty Reduction
It is well established that growth and development, although they
are not a panacea, can reduce poverty. But the causality appears to run
in both directions: it is also becoming increasingly understood that successful poverty reduction can cause growth. Failure to address poverty
produces constraints on prospects for development, for at least four
reasons:
1) Poor health, nutrition, and education lower the economic productivity of people in poverty, leading directly and indirectly
to slower growth.
2) Higher income for the poor raises demand for locally produced
goods (albeit of lower quality).
3) The poor often lack access to credit, which constrains growth.
In particular, the result can be lost opportunities for entrepreneurship that might beneﬁt society. It can also render the poor
unable to ﬁnance their children’s education, thus limiting the
skilled labor force needed for development.
4) Poverty creates incentives for high fertility as a source of oldage ﬁnancial security; high fertility is associated with a slower
rate of economic growth (Todaro and Smith 2011, Chapter 5).
The Role of Good Governance
Good governance—which, as the editors of this volume point out
in the introductory chapter, is also multidimensional—plays an essential role in achieving multidimensional poverty-reduction goals. The
relationship between economic growth and effective poverty reduction
is not inevitable, but it is possible. Economic growth helps to reduce
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poverty in most places, most of the time. As is well known, good governance—or at least avoidance of actively bad governance—is essential
to increase growth rates and keep them high. Particularly to the extent
that growth is not sufﬁcient to reduce poverty, governance is needed to
design and implement active public policies and effective, accessible
basic services and social programs to attack poverty directly. Good governance plays a critical role in preventing coercion and exploitation of
the poor. It provides for two-way channels of communication between
the poor and both national and local government. A voice for the poor is
essential to bring both longstanding and new problems—such as negative climate change impacts—to government and (more broadly) citizen attention.
Another key function of good governance is the provision of relevant and reliable information. Globally, more than two-thirds of the
poor live in rural areas, and many of them are smallholder farmers
using outmoded and no longer appropriate technology. Poor farmers
can greatly beneﬁt from government-provided agricultural extension
information (such as has beneﬁted farmers in the United States since
the nineteenth century). Government also plays a key role in encouraging the use of improved seed varieties and other Green Revolution
practices, including the expansion of irrigation. Such assistance will be
all the more important as climate change becomes large enough to create conditions outside the range of farmers’ experience.
Again, development itself can be constrained by a high incidence
of poverty, adding to the signiﬁcance of good governance in achieving more narrowly deﬁned economic objectives, as Sisay Asefa and
Wei-Chiao Huang assert in the introduction to this volume.
Why is it so difﬁcult for the poorest of the poor to make further
progress? One reason is the presence of poverty traps, which poor governance often exacerbates.
Addressing poverty traps. Poverty traps occur at both macro
and micro levels. The notion of poverty traps goes back to the early
days of post–World War II development economics. Nobel laureate
Gunnar Myrdal called it a problem of “circular and cumulative causation” (Myrdal 1968, p. 1875). To overcome macro poverty traps, a
“big push” may be needed, a concept pioneered by Paul RosensteinRodan (1943), who ﬁrst raised some of the basic problems that can
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underpin a poverty trap, such as lack of coordination among investors.
High-fertility traps can exist because of a different kind of coordination problem: if all families had lower fertility, all would be better off,
but as long as most other families are having many children, it is too
economically risky for a family to be a “pioneer” in having only two
children (Dasgupta 1993). Population pressures also ﬁgure in classic
Malthusian traps, in which a society cannot escape from subsistence
income because additional resources only go to maintain larger population sizes (Urdal 2005). Many of these concepts have been formalized in more recent years (Todaro and Smith 2011, Chapter 4). Another
coordination failure is at work in the low-skills trap: workers who want
skills that employers can use and employers who want equipment that
workers can use may each be better off waiting for the other parties to
invest ﬁrst—but the result is that there are no modern jobs in a region.
Collier et al. (2003) ﬁnd that countries are prone to civil war when
faced with a combination of low income, slow growth, and dependence
on primary commodity exports. We return to this problem, which the
authors describe as part of a “conﬂict trap,” later in the chapter.
Many of these traps can also be found at a subnational level, or even
at a district scale, including low-skill traps. Others are found primarily
at the micro and even individual levels.
A well-known example is the undernutrition trap, in which workers
are unproductive because they have insufﬁcient energy, and as a result
they earn too little income to purchase sufﬁcient calories and protein to
improve their levels of energy (e.g., Dasgupta [1993]). This trap may
not be common outside of famine conditions, but it may become a more
serious concern if it interlocks with other traps to make the cycle more
vicious. Similar cycles of individual deprivation can be caused by, or
aggravated by, health problems that one is too poor to address, which
may include mental health problems triggered or accentuated by stresses
associated with living in poverty. They may also be caused by poor housing traps, in which bad housing (if not homelessness) prolongs illness,
produces exposure to crime, leads to chronic sleep deprivation, and so
on. Working-capital traps lead small vendors to maintain low inventories, which in turn yield low sales and result in an inability to accumulate
capital to allow for a larger inventory. Microﬁnance has developed in
part to address this problem—almost 200 million people have participated, but that leaves hundreds of millions more who might also beneﬁt.
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Environmental degradation can also ﬁgure into poverty traps. In
common-property resource traps, overuse of resources that lack welldeﬁned property rights or effective community management (Ostrom
2005) can lead to poverty: lakes are overﬁshed, forests are not managed
sustainably, land is overgrazed. Part of the problem is that community
management of common resources has broken down. This is often a
legacy of greedy colonial practices, now all too often imitated by postcolonial regimes. Once it has broken down, responsible use of shared
resources is difﬁcult to restore. Under some conditions, well-regulated
privatization can be beneﬁcial, providing an incentive to a recognized
owner to monitor and maintain the value of these resources.
But in many situations, the result is merely the disenfranchisement
of the poor, and the loss of their access to the natural resources on which
their livelihoods have depended. In many cases, local conditions make
it impossible to privatize common property efﬁciently, let alone equitably. Effective community management of the commons is an important
priority for improved local and community governance with assistance
from regional or national government levels—increasingly so as climate change threatens the productivity of these resources.
Another example is the farm erosion trap, in which the poor face
such urgent need to grow more food that they have to overuse their
land, even though in many cases they are aware that the result will be
reduced soil fertility—hence, reduced productivity in future seasons.
As a result, farmers may be trapped in a downward spiral, in which
productivity gains from learning new techniques are undermined by the
poorer quality of the soil. There is evidence of poverty-trap problems
among farmers in Ethiopia, particularly in the impoverished region that
grows enset (a type of root crop that resembles a small banana tree)
(Kwak and Smith [2013]; see also Deressa [2007]).

TWO RELATED CONSTRAINTS TO ENDING POVERTY:
1) ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND
2) POOR GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICT
Two core problems in ending global poverty (when commentators
speak of “ending” global poverty they generally mean reducing it to
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“frictional” amounts, perhaps 100 to 300 million people) are 1) environmental degradation and 2) severe governance problems (including
overt conﬂict). These dimensions of environmental and governance
breakdowns are increasingly intertwined.
Conﬂict and Threats to Natural Resource–Based Livelihoods
Natural resource–based livelihoods are counted on in most antipoverty strategies as potential “pathways out of poverty” (World Resources
Institute et al. 2005). In low-income countries, there is high dependence
on natural resources: agriculture, animal husbandry, ﬁshing, forestry,
hunting, and foraging. But access to the beneﬁts of resources is often
very inequitable: in some regions, the poor have been losing control of
natural-resource common areas on which they depend. Village common lands may be “spontaneously” privatized (or, to put less of a ﬁne
point on it, stolen). Many of the poor lack even basic capital, including
farmland, forests, cattle, boats, and equipment. Government ofﬁcials
may overlook (or be paid to ignore) companies that log, ﬁsh, and mine
without regard to local inhabitants or traditional rights. Governments
may also designate lands as “protected,” thus banning local people from
earning a livelihood, while corruption remains; the result is that the poor
have no incentive to take part in environmental protection. A solution
to this is the principle of “pro-poor governance,” which simply means
empowerment of people living in poverty. Failure to provide pro-poor
governance can worsen poverty, trigger conﬂict, or both (Todaro and
Smith 2011, Section 14.5).
Consequences of Conﬂict
Violent conﬂict harms well-being in ways both obvious and unexpected, extending well beyond the immediate effects of death, injury,
and destruction. People not involved in violence can be affected almost
immediately, as parents lose their livelihood or become refugees and
children are forced to work. Recovery from the consequences can take
many years. Conﬂict can cause children to miss out on schooling in their
most formative years, harming their well-being over the course of a lifetime (see, e.g., Barron [2010]; Blattman and Annan [2010]; Blattman
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and Miguel [2010]; Bundervoet, Verwimp, and Akresh [2009]; Li and
Wen [2005]; Messer, Cohen, and Marchione [2001]; and Seitz [2004]).
When armed conﬂict ﬁrst breaks out in a country or a region, more
men die than women, primarily as a result of the ﬁghting itself. But over
time, more women die, as they suffer lingering consequences. Maternal
mortality (dying from complications of pregnancy or childbirth) can
reach about 3 percent in conﬂict areas such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The long-term effects of conﬂict fall most heavily
on women, as these effects diminish their access to health, social welfare services, and education (Plümper and Neumayer 2006). Rape is a
weapon of terror used to destroy communities and family bonds. Many
victims die in rape attacks, and many more suffer long-term health consequences, including AIDS and chronic depression. Refugee children
and women are at risk of rape and sexual exploitation. Refugee tent
camps can spread infectious diseases such as diarrhea, measles, acute
respiratory diseases, malaria, and sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS. Refugees die of diseases at high rates—more might
survive with better nourishment and rest. Evidence suggests that each
additional international refugee leads to an extra 1.4 malaria cases in
the host country. Meanwhile, government health spending falls, just
when public health support is most needed.
Development in reverse. Violent conﬂict destroys capital; some
that is not destroyed is diverted from productive to destructive activities (Murdoch and Sandler 2004). Additional wealth is often shipped
abroad. On average, about one-tenth of a country’s wealth is transferred
abroad between the beginning of a conﬂict and its end, largely because
of capital ﬂight (Collier et al. 2003).
Countries consumed by conﬂict have an estimated average annual
growth of −3.3 percent, constituting what is known as “development
in reverse.” Incomes following a civil war average 15 percent lower
than before the war. This translates to approximately 30 percent more
people living in extreme poverty. The loss of human capital is substantial: when children lose out on their education, it has permanent
effects in many cases, even though some students later return to school.
Spending on education falls during conﬂicts, severely exacerbating the
problems. The torn social fabric is, in itself, destructive to development
opportunities.
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Theories of the causes of conﬂict vary, including the presence of
horizontal inequalities (Stewart 2000, 2008), severe scarcity of basic
resources, as in some interpretations of the Darfur conﬂicts (UNEP
2007), commitment problems between government and (potential) rebels (Powell 2006), and the struggle to control valuable natural resources
for export (Collier 2007).
Climate Stressors as a Trigger for Conﬂict
Evidence is emerging that climate stressors are also important triggers for conﬂict. In particular, although climate change may be neither a
necessary nor a sufﬁcient cause for conﬂict, climate can be a contributing and triggering stressor, acting in concert with other political, social,
or economic variables. This is of growing concern, given the range of
dire consequences for Africa and some other regions of the developing world predicted under most climate-change scenarios (Cline 2007;
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007; NOAA 2010;
Parry et al. 2007; World Bank 2010a), including prolonged droughts,
expanded desertiﬁcation, increased severity of storms, higher temperatures and more severe heat waves, deteriorated water resources, and
reduced crop yields.
Climate change may endanger livelihoods, intensify conﬂicts over
resources, and induce greater migration within, and across, national
boundaries. In countries with weak governments and institutions, these
added stresses may lead to greater instability. Countries with greater
societal resilience are likely to withstand these stresses better, as well
as to build greater resilience to climate change. Moreover, a growing
literature documents a link between rainfall levels and violence, as well
as between high temperatures and violence or civil conﬂict (Burke et al.
2009; Miguel 2013).
Adaptation Responses and Their Impacts on Conﬂict Risk
Most discussion about climate change has been focused on
approaches to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. But most low-income
countries emit relatively small amounts of greenhouse gases (although
the burning involved in deforestation and the resulting decrease in
carbon dioxide absorption are signiﬁcant contributors). And for lowincome developing countries, climate change impacts are already arriv-
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ing and must be responded to. Thus, the central focus in these countries
is on adaptation to current and anticipated adverse climate change (see,
e.g., Adger et al. [2007]; Dinar et al. [2008]; Malik and Smith [2012];
Mendelsohn [2012]; World Bank [2010b]; and World Resources Institute et al. [2011]).
There are two basic approaches to adaptation. Planned (or policydriven) adaptation is undertaken by governments. In contrast, autonomous adaptation is undertaken by individuals, families, and communities; Malik and Smith (2012) give some key examples, including altering
crop or livestock varieties, changing livelihoods, increasing exploitation
of common pool resources, moving locally (such as to higher ground),
and migrating temporarily or permanently, either within a country or
internationally. Almost certainly, autonomous adaptation will be the predominant form of adaptation. Good governance acts as a complement
for autonomous adaptation (and, at least, avoids thwarting beneﬁcial
responses). But governments have little experience with this role, and in
some cases their incentives may lie in implementing policies that have
the effect of undermining otherwise constructive adaptation measures in
poor communities, such as removing control of natural resources from
communities and placing it in the hands of ofﬁcials who mismanage or
misuse that control.

PERSPECTIVES ON GOOD GOVERNANCE
FOR ADAPTATION
General Considerations
Policy effectiveness, economic efﬁciency, and equity may be
improved to the extent that seven conditions are in place. Policymakers
want to ensure that
1) a ﬂexible, well-designed approach to interaction is implemented between adaptation policy and the autonomous adaptation setting;
2) they gain an improved understanding of how agents adapt
in the absence of planned adaptation, and how adaptation is
likely to change in response to planned adaption policies;
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3) the moral hazard of agents in response to planned adaptation is
addressed;
4) those autonomously adapting have a voice in adaptation policies that affect them;
5) planned adaptation does not reduce opportunity for autonomous adaptation, and that planned adaptation accounts for
indirect impacts (for example, the diversion of water resources
from areas with traditional rights to cities or irrigated districts
with political clout, and an accounting for the impacts of government restrictions on development in low-lying areas);
6) negative externalities of autonomous adaptation are addressed
effectively—e.g., lowered water tables, salination, and worsened sanitation in neighboring areas; and
7) positive externalities of autonomous adaptation, such as learning across neighboring communities, are effectively encouraged and augmented.
Climate Change Adaptation through Migration
Threats to natural resource–based livelihoods are expected to
increase the rate of rural-to-urban migration (see, e.g., Hatton and
Williamson [2003]; Marchiori, Maystadt, and Schumacher 2011;
McLeman and Smit [2006]; Naudé [2010]; and Warner et al. [2009]).
Lower productivity increases the wedge (or gap) separating urban and
rural incomes, spurring migration that may eventually include hundreds
of millions of people. Migration on such a scale would result in competition for resources and employment that would heighten the potential
for conﬂict and instability. A case in point is reported from Bangladesh,
where economic competition between “climate migrants” and residents
of destination areas has led in some cases to violence. Among the causes
of tension between the two groups was a drop in wages—especially
wages in the informal sector—that was due to the inﬂux of migrants. In
another case in point, this one from Sudan, environmental and farming
changes led to changed seasonal migration routes, worsening tensions
among pastoralists (those who raise and herd livestock) and between
pastoralists and farmers.
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Governance challenges of heightened competition for resources.
The absence of established institutions for managing natural resources
in areas newly settled by different ethnic groups has led to environmental degradation; in turn, the resulting degradation has exacerbated
resource scarcity, fueled tensions, and led to violent conﬂict (see, e.g.,
Barnett and Adger [2007]; Bronkhorst [2011]; Hsiang, Meng, and Cane
[2011]; Sayne [2011]; Stark, Mataya, and Lubovich [2009]; Theisen
[2008]; and UNEP [2007]). Conﬂict is more likely to emerge in the
absence of a well-deﬁned or well-enforced system of property rights:
traditional inhabitants of an area may stake customary claims to land
that formally may be (has been declared to be) open-access public
land. Good-quality formal governance must at least take traditional
governance into account in planning and policy. As a case in point
from Nigeria, feed and water shortages caused partly by drought and
desertiﬁcation induced pastoralists to move south, outside their traditional seasonal grazing patterns. In turn, sedentary farmers responded to
weather-related changes by cultivating more land. This left pastoralists
with little uncontested land on which to graze and water their animals,
leading to violent conﬂicts between identity groups ﬁnding themselves
in contested territory, such as farmers and herdsmen (pastoralists). As a
second case in point, in Kenya, increased drought induced pastoralists
to adopt more sedentary livelihoods, settling near water sources that
farmers also relied upon and that were already at risk.
A related challenge is that in the process of both autonomous and
planned adaptation to climate change, traditional access to natural
resources can be restricted, and the result can heighten tensions. Without effective formal or traditional institutions to deal with these consequences, autonomous adaptation can increase the risk of conﬂict. A case
in point comes from coastal Bangladesh, where water from tube wells
became more prone to saltwater contamination, which in turn induced
inhabitants of affected areas to draw water from unaffected wells in
neighboring areas. This, of course, fueled tensions—and led to episodes
of violent conﬂict—with the inhabitants of these areas.
Planned adaptation, government policies, and conﬂict. Planned
adaptation (and, more generally, government policy) can increase the
risk of conﬂict when it acts to restrict feasible autonomous adaptation
(Malik and Smith 2012). For example, policies to vacate densely popu-
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lated areas that have become subject to inundation increase pressures
on adjacent land; this can clearly give rise to conﬂict. In contrast, constructing barriers such as ﬂoodgates to protect vulnerable land might, in
some circumstances, avoid conﬂict risk. But building such barriers may
also have unintended consequences, such as harming the livelihoods of
others by eroding coastlines and reducing ﬁshing opportunities along
adjoining areas of the coast.
To cite another example, policies restricting migration within
or across countries could avoid tensions and reduce the risk of conﬂict. But restrictions could also increase the risk because migration is
a safety valve that itself represents an important form of autonomous
adaptation.
Government inﬂuence in preventing communal conﬂicts depends
on two key factors.
First, it depends on whether government is strong enough to protect
people and communities from external threats—i.e., strong enough to
enforce property rights and impose needed regulations on communities.
If government is weak, property rights cannot be protected, and effective planned adaptation is infeasible; hence, the possibility of conﬂict
between the two communities cannot be avoided.
Second, while government must have sufﬁcient authority and
strength to enforce the peace, the poor may be subjected to equal or
greater harm when government is unduly coercive, biased, or unwilling to decentralize authority. The quality of governance relationships
between the central government and local communities (or regions)
is of critical importance. At one extreme, government repression may
trigger conﬂict. However, if national or regional government neglects
a community, this may also trigger conﬂict when the community perceives the government to be ineffective, if not hostile. Poor governance responses to climate change can hinder autonomous adaptation
rather than complement it, also resulting in conﬂict. The situation can
be aggravated if government is seen as siding with one community
over another. For example, conﬂict may result if government prevents
migration from a severely climate-affected community to an area less
affected that may be perceived as unfairly privileged. International peer
review of governments can play an important role in improving individual country governance practices; a good example is the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), an activity of the African
Union (see http://www.nepad.org/).
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In these ways, good governance plays a central role in poverty
reduction in general, and particularly in response to looming development problems caused by climate change. By anticipating and constructively responding to these problems, good governance can lessen the
harmful effects of climate change on a government’s people.

Note
This chapter is based on a Sichel Lecture of a similar title in the series on the Political Economy of Good Governance, which was delivered on the campus of Western
Michigan University on April 10, 2013. The presentation drew on joint work with Arun
Malik, with input from Elizabeth Chacko, Marie Price, and Jonathan Rothbaum; these
contributions greatly beneﬁted the preparation of this chapter. I would also like to thank
participants of the Sichel Lecture for excellent discussions, particularly Sisay Asefa and
Wei-Chiao Huang. Research assistance from the Institute for International Economic
Policy at George Washington University is gratefully acknowledged. Any errors are
my own.
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Cases from Africa and China
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Western Michigan University

UNDERSTANDING AND MEASURING GOOD GOVERNANCE
FOR SUSTAINABLE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
The World Governance Indicators (WGI) project, which can be
found at www.govindicators.org, deﬁnes “governance” as consisting of
“the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised” (World Bank 2014, p. 1). This includes how governments are
selected, monitored, and replaced, including their capacity to formulate
and implement sound policies, provide public services, and earn the
respect of citizens and institutions that determine economic and social
interactions (Kaufmann 2010). WGI identiﬁes the following six core
governance components: 1) voice and accountability, 2) political stability and the absence of violence, 3) government effectiveness, 4) regulatory quality, 5) rule of law, and 6) control of corruption.
Based on these measures, Nordic states in Europe such as Sweden,
Denmark, and Norway have a high standard of governance.
Good governance is rare in Africa, but it exists in a few countries
such as Botswana, Mauritius, Senegal, and Ghana. From a development
perspective, good governance is a major means for promoting sustainable development, reducing poverty, and maintaining peace. Countries
with good governance are efﬁcient in delivery of public services, follow
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the rule of law, and have inclusive institutions responsive to the needs
of citizens. They are transparent and promote participation as well as
show respect for citizens and allow for a free press and for overall freedom of expression. Some typical characteristics of good governance are
listed in the diagram shown in Figure 7.1. Autocratic and dysfunctional
governments are unable to meet all or some of these commitments.
Good governance also reduces poverty, which can be measured in at
least two ways. The income approach is simply based on the number of
people below global poverty standards, deﬁned as $1.25 a day in U.S.
dollars. Another, more comprehensive recent innovation in measuring
poverty is the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), which disaggregates three components of human development: 1) health, 2) education,
and 3) standard of living, as described below:
• Health (measured by two indicators with equal one-sixth weight
on the MPI scale): whether any child has died in the household,
and whether any adult or child in the family is malnourished.
• Education (measured by two indicators with equal one-sixth
weight on the MPI scale): whether no household member completed ﬁve years of schooling, and whether any school-aged
child is out of school for grades one through eight.
Figure 7.1 A Simple Model of Good Governance

Consensus
oriented
Participatory
Follows the
rule of law

Accountable
Transparent

GOOD
GOVERNANCE

Effective and
efﬁcient

Responsive
Equitable and
inclusive

SOURCE: Based on Collier (2007).
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• Standard of Living (measured by six indicators with equal oneeighteenth weight on the MPI scale): These deprivations include
the lack of electricity; insufﬁciently safe drinking water; inadequate sanitation; inadequate ﬂooring; unimproved cooking
fuel; and the lack of more than one of the following assets—telephone, radio, TV, bicycle, and motorbike.
Table 7.1 compares MPI and income poverty for select countries,
including the African nations of Ethiopia, Angola, the Congo, Ghana,
Kenya, Niger, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, along with other developing
countries in Asia and Latin America. By MPI ranking, Ethiopia’s score
of 103 is at the bottom, just above Niger’s 104, with 90 percent of its
population considered to be multidimensionally poor.

GOVERNANCE, DEVELOPMENT, AND MULTIDIMENSIONAL
POVERTY INDEX (MPI) RELATIONSHIPS
Governance, human development, and MPI indicators are linked.
Poor governance leads to low MPI; low Human Development Index
(HDI), which measures achievement in terms of having a long and
healthy life, being knowledgeable, and having a decent standard of living; and high corruption, as measured by the Corruption Perceptions
Index (CPI). The following table shows the level and relationships of
human development, governance, and the Ibrahim Index of African
Governance (IIAG), along with two measures of poverty—1) income
and 2) MPI. The measurement ranges are as follows: HDI: 0–1 (0 being
the lowest); IIAG: 1–100 (1 being the lowest, 100 the best); and CPI:
10–1 (10 being the lowest, 1 the best) (Table 7.2).
For the African countries listed, Botswana has the best governance
ranking (No. 3 by the IIAG measure), while Somalia has the worst governance, with a rank of 52. Using MPI, Ethiopia is multidimensionally
the poorest. The HDI for Ethiopia is just above that of Eritrea, 0.36 to
0.35. This means that claims of rapid growth in Ethiopia have not translated into human development and poverty reduction.
IIAG is a comprehensive measure of governance focused on African
states based on 57 variables categorized into ﬁve indices that include
1) safety and human security; 2) rule of law, transparency, and corrup-
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Country
Kazakhstan
Thailand
Ecuador
Mexico
Brazil
Colombia
Dominican
Republic
China
Vietnam
Indonesia
Ghana
Zimbabwe
Bolivia
Nicaragua
Laos
Pakistan
Yemen
Bangladesh

Year MPI value
2006
0.002
2005
0.006
2003
0.009
2006
0.015
2003
0.039
2005
0.041
2000
0.048
2003
2002
2007
2008
2006
2003
2001
2006
2007
2006
2007

0.056
0.075
0.095
0.140
0.174
0.175
0.211
0.267
0.275
0.283
0.291

Income poverty
Multidimensional poverty
$1.25 a day
$2 a day
A (average
(proportion of poor) (proportion of poor)
MPI
HM (proportion
intensity of
rank
of poor)
deprivations)
Value
Rank
Value
Rank
7
0.006
0.369
0.031
23
0.172
29
16
0.016
0.385
0.020
1
0.115
20
24
0.022
0.416
0.047
26
0.128
23
29
0.040
0.389
0.020
1
0.048
16
39
0.085
0.460
0.052
29
0.127
21
40
0.092
0.441
0.160
42
0.279
35
42
0.111
0.433
0.050
28
0.151
27
44
50
53
57
60
61
64
68
70
71
73

0.125
0.143
0.208
0.301
0.385
0.363
0.407
0.472
0.510
0.525
0.578

0.449
0.525
0.459
0.464
0.452
0.483
0.519
0.565
0.540
0.539
0.504

0.159
0.215
0.075
0.300

41
50
31
57

0.363
0.484
0.490
0.536

41
51
52
56

0.196
0.158
0.440
0.226
0.175
0.496

46
40
46
53
43
71

0.303
0.318
0.768
0.603
0.466
0.813

38
40
73
59
49
80
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India
Kenya
Haiti
Côte d’Ivoire
Nepal
Tanzania
D.R. Congo
Madagascar
Angola
Ethiopia
Niger

2005
2003
2006
2005
2006
2008
2007
2004
2001
2005
2006

0.296
0.302
0.306
0.320
0.350
0.367
0.393
0.413
0.452
0.582
0.642

74
76
77
78
82
84
88
91
93
103
104

0.554
0.604
0.573
0.522
0.647
0.653
0.732
0.705
0.774
0.900
0.927

0.535
0.500
0.533
0.614
0.540
0.563
0.537
0.585
0.584
0.647
0.693

0.416
0.197
0.549
0.233
0.551
0.885
0.592
0.678
0.543
0.390
0.659

64
47
76
55
77
93
79
86
89
62
85

0.756
0.399
0.721
0.468
0.776
0.966
0.795
0.896
0.900
0.775
0.856

70
43
67
50
76
93
77
87
88
75
85

NOTE: “MPI” = Multidimensional Poverty Index.
SOURCE: World Bank (2014).
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Table 7.2 Comparative Measures of Governance and Poverty for
Selected African States
Income poverty
Country
HDI
CPI
IIAG (%)
(MPI) (%)
Ethiopia
0.36
2.7
33 (47)
40 (89)
Eritrea
0.35
2.5
49 (33)
—
Sudan
0.41
1.6
48 (33)
—
Somalia
—
1.0
52 (7)
—
Djibouti
0.43
3.0
49 (49)
19 (29)
Ghana
0.54
3.9
7 (15)
30 (31)
Kenya
0.51
2.2
24 (53)
20 (49)
Botswana
0.63
6.1
3 (78)
30 (—)
Tanzania
0.47
3.0
58 (59)
33 (65)
Nigeria
0.46
2.4
43 (42)
55 (55)
Uganda
0.44
2.4
55 (19)
29 (72)
NOTE: “HDI” stands for “Human Development Index.” “CPI” stands for “Corruption Perceptions Index.” “IIAG” stands for “Ibrahim Index of African Governance.”
“MPI” stands for “Multidimensional Poverty Index.” — = data not available.
SOURCE: World Bank (2014).

tion; 3) sustainable economic development; 4) participation and human
rights; and 5) human development (education, health, and income).
Table 7.3 provides a ranking of scores that are assigned grades based
on groups of countries in terms of quality of governance in percentages
(ranging from 10 to 100).

THE ROLE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE IN SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT AND POVERTY REDUCTION
Good governance plays an essential role in achieving multidimensional poverty-reduction goals. Economic growth helps to reduce poverty only in good governance states in most cases. Rapid and narrow
growth driven by foreign aid can create misery and repression under
autocratic governance. Promoting rapid growth cannot reduce poverty unless there is good governance present to design and implement
inclusive development policies and social programs to attack poverty
directly. Economic development involves economic growth plus struc-
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Table 7.3 2006 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) Scores for
African States
Scores: 100–66

Scores: 65–58

Scores: 57–51

Good: grade A

Above average:
grade B
Malawi 63.9
Lesotho 63.3
Benin 62.5

Average: grade C Poor: grade D

Mauritius 85.1
Seychelles 79.8
Cape Verde 74.7

Botswana 74.1
Comoros 61.9
South Africa 71.5 Tanzania 61.6
Namibia 70.9
Madagascar
60.4
Ghana 70.1
Kenya 59.1
Gabon 69.4
São Tomé and
Principé 68.3
Senegal 66.1

Rwanda 59.1
Uganda 58.3
Burkina Faso
58.3
Zambia 58.3

Scores: 50–47

Scores: 46–18

Failed/rogue:
grade F
Mozambique 57.1 Ethiopia 50.9
Eritrea 46.5
Mali 55.9
Mauritania 50.8 Gabon 45.6
Niger 55.5
Zimbabwe 50.4 Central African
Rep. 43.6
Cameroon 55.4
Swaziland 50.2 Angola 43.3
Djibouti 55.2
Burundi 50.0
Sudan 34.2
Gambia 55.2
Equatorial
Chad 33.9
Guinea 49.2
Congo 53.3
Sierra Leone
Congo 29.8
49.1
Togo 53.0
Liberia 48.7
Somalia 18.9
Guinea-Bissau
Nigeria 48.5
51.9
Guinea 47.8

SOURCE: Rotberg and Gisselquist (2007).

tural change toward diversiﬁcation and a broader participation of citizens in the growth process, including integrated market development.
Taking steps away from permanent dependence on subsistence agriculture requires good governance policies such as land reform that secures
land ownership for citizens and farmers as well as providing necessary extension services such as farmer education, credit, and improved
farming inputs. Positive economic transformation is impossible until
a transformation occurs in which political leaders and citizens support
socioeconomic and political transformation by cooperation.

ADDRESSING POVERTY TRAPS AND DEVELOPMENT
COORDINATION FAILURE WITH GOOD GOVERNANCE
A cross-cutting primary reason for the persistence of poverty and
food insecurity traps in Ethiopia and Africa is poor governance at both
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the macro and micro levels. The idea of poverty traps goes back to postwar development economics. Swedish Nobel laureate Gunnar Myrdal
(1968) called it a problem of “circular and cumulative causation.” A
country can ﬁnd itself in a high fertility trap with rapid population
growth that adds to problems of poverty. Population pressures lead to
a Malthusian trap, in which a society cannot escape from a subsistence
economy because of lack of additional resources necessary to maintain larger population sizes. For example, Ethiopia is the second-largest
populated country in Africa; it has more than 90 million people and is
growing at an annual rate of 3 percent (Todaro and Smith 2014, p. 4),
yet it has a very low ranking on poverty scales. Low-quality expansion of education at all levels creates a low-skills trap that prevents
employers from ﬁnding skilled workers. Good governance promotes
employment by focusing on high-quality education and by creating
effective partnerships between employers and universities and colleges
through programs such as training internships. Furthermore, requiring
better pay for lecturers and teachers helps to retain high-quality teachers, which can transform the quality of education at all levels.

POOR GOVERNANCE AS THE DRIVER OF CONFLICT AND
POVERTY TRAPS
The conﬂict trap, analyzed by Collier (2007), shows how certain
economic conditions make a country prone to civil war and to the ensuing cycle of violence, from which it is difﬁcult to escape. His study
found that countries are prone to civil war when faced with a combination of low income, dependence on primary commodity exports, and
poor governance that is not inclusive, along with high income inequality. A study conducted by the Oslo Peace Research Institute projected
peace and conﬂict patterns globally until 2050. The estimates show a
decrease in worldwide violence in general, except in a few countries,
which include African states such as Ethiopia and Nigeria. Ethiopia is
considered vulnerable on the basis of security, ideological, socioeconomic, religious and ethnic conﬂicts and how the state responds to these
conﬂicts. Good governance in Africa and Ethiopia can proactively prevent future conﬂicts and wars. Nigeria suffers from religious-based
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extremism waged through violent acts perpetrated by a group called
Boko Haram. Its edicts call for no western education for Nigerians,
especially women, and the group wants to turn Nigeria, by far the largest country of Africa with a population of 170 million, into an Islamic
state. Recently Boko Haram captured 250 girls from a school to sell as
modern slaves. Nigeria is rich in petroleum and other natural resources
and just surpassed South Africa in terms of gross national product
(GNP), but it is one of the most corrupt African states; it cannot even
protect its citizens from this violent extremist group, and its survival as
a state is in doubt (Gates 2014).
Another development trap is the hunger and health trap, where
workers are unproductive because they have insufﬁcient energy, and
they earn too little income to purchase sufﬁcient calories and protein to
improve their levels of energy and productivity. These traps also lead
to hunger and famine, which become more severe if they interlock with
other traps to make the cycle more vicious. Cycles of human deprivation
can be caused by health problems that the poor cannot address, including mental health problems triggered by stresses associated with living in absolute poverty, hunger, and inadequate housing, which causes
exposure to crime. Lack of working capital and credit access traps small
business vendors and farmers. This is also a major problem, given that
70 percent of Africans make their living in agriculture. In states such
as Ethiopia, the percentage can reach as high as 85. This leads to low
sales and income and an inability to acquire ﬁnancial capital and credit
because of the lack of effective microﬁnancing necessary to address
this problem. Still other forms of traps can be caused by community or
citizen powerlessness, driven by repressive and autocratic governance
(Todaro and Smith 2014).
Environmental and natural resource depletion, including soil and
land degradation, also contribute to poverty and conﬂict traps. In the
case of common property resources, overuse of resources because of
a lack of secured ownership of property and land rights for farmers
and a lack of effective community management of common resources
can produce poverty and conﬂict (Ostrom 1990). Lakes and rivers may
be overﬁshed, forests may be destroyed, and pasture land overgrazed.
Traditional community management of common resources can break
down if foreign private investors are driven by or aligned with dictatorial regimes. The land or soil erosion and deforestation trap is one that
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the poor encounter because of an urgent need to grow more food, and it
may lead to overuse of the land or the soil, even though they are aware
that the result will be reduced soil fertility, hence a decrease in productivity in future seasons. Thus, farmers may be trapped into a cycle of
low productivity, which is exacerbated by the lack of appropriate sustainable technology. This results in a practice called “soil mining,” in
which they have no choice but to deplete that resource.
Government support for improved technology and research could
ameliorate this dilemma. For example, there is evidence of a poverty
trap among farmers in Ethiopia, particularly in the banana-growing
region and the densely populated highlands, and to a lesser extent even
in the pastoral communities of the lowlands. It is vital that research continue to uncover a pattern of natural land degradation and deforestation
that has taken place since the widespread conﬁscation of land in 1975
by a military junta.

LACK OF GOOD GOVERNANCE AS A DRIVER OF
CORRUPTION TRAPS
Promoting good governance that is accountable, transparent, honest, and participatory, that guarantees economic freedom—i.e., the right
of citizens to freely exchange goods and contract with each other in
business—and that is based on secured property rights, including land
rights, is crucial for the progress of Ethiopia and for all of Africa. This is
only possible by moving forward with constitutional reforms that place
limits on government ofﬁcials to prevent the abuse of power, guarantee economic freedoms, and control the negative incentives that drive
corruption. A clear legal delineation and separation of public political activities from private economic activities is necessary to reduce
corruption.
Corruption can be deﬁned as postconstitutional opportunism aimed
at getting beneﬁts for individuals or a group at the expense of society. Once a constitution is adopted, there is an incentive on the part of
groups to beneﬁt through capture of the state’s redistributive power.
One form of corruption, called “rent seeking,” occurs when individuals and groups expend resources to negatively affect the distributional
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outcome. Effective control of corruption must be based on institutional
and constitutional reforms to constrain the ability of the state actors to
intervene in private and market transactions. Tackling the problem of
corruption, or the abuse of public trust for private gain, is not possible
by simply jailing corrupt individuals without changing the incentives
for corruption. It is imperative to create a constitution with checks and
balances and rule of law. Where corruption exists, the effects typically
fall disproportionately on the poor, since the cost of bribes is felt more
severely by the poor than by the rich, and on small ﬁrms, since they feel
the pinch more than large ﬁrms do (Figure 7.2).
Overall, the reasons that states with poor governance fail stem from
many factors. Failing states may be more rigid in decision making,
and they may lack the capability to administer detailed plans. Bureaucratic obstacles may block private-sector initiatives and innovation. It
is hard to replicate a private-market incentive system within a governFigure 7.2 Disproportionate Effects of Corruption on Small vs. Large
Firms and on Poor vs. High-Income Households
10
Bribe cost as a share
of firms’ revenue

9

Bribe cost as a share
of households’ income

8
7

%

6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Micro
(˂ 11)

Small and
medium-size
(11–99)

Large
(> 99)

Firm size (number of employees)

Low-income Middle-income High-income
(˂ $110)
($110–$329)
(> $329)
Household status (monthly income)

SOURCE: Kaufmann, Zoido-Lobatón, and Lee (2000).
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ment. Branches of government may also be poorly coordinated and lack
effective oversight. Excessive state controls may cause black markets
to expand through increased incentives for rent seeking and corruption.
Development planning may be manipulated by small, privileged
groups for their own beneﬁt. Combinations of the above factors make it
very difﬁcult for a state to function effectively and to maintain a sense
of societal order.

BUILDING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE
Effective and inclusive institutions provide “rules of the political
and economic game” of human interaction. They provide foundations
of a market economy, including secured property and land rights, contract enforcement, economic coordination, restriction of coercive or
fraudulent behavior, and provision of access to opportunities for the
broad participation of citizens. They do this by constraining the opportunist power of elites through the use of checks and balances. Successful governance includes managing conﬂict, providing social insurance,
and fostering predictable macroeconomic stability. The conditions of
well-functioning, inclusive market institutions for good governance
include the following: clear and secured property rights, effective laws
and courts, freedom to establish businesses, a stable currency, public
supervision of natural monopolies to manage externalities (i.e., positive
or negative spillover effects), transparent provision of credible public
information to citizens, stable monetary and ﬁscal policy instruments,
and social safety nets for those on the street, such as the homeless and
beggars.
Political parties are necessary but not sufﬁcient for good governance. No society can expect stability and democracy in a place where
autocratic government derives its power through ethnically, racially, or
religiously exclusive membership motivated by divide-and-rule politics. The historic experiences of countries and societies who have ruled
by such groupings make this clear. A case in point in Africa was a racial
or ethnic minority-rule system known as “apartheid,” which collapsed
in South Africa in 1994 after having created serious socioeconomic
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inequality in wealth and education. South Africa today is struggling to
be a multiethnic democratic state and to overcome that legacy of divideand-rule. Although the majority-black South Africans may have political power because of free elections, the legacy of income and wealth
inequality persists and contributes to serious property-related crimes,
such as violent robbery and murder along racial and ethnic lines.
Social science studies show that the best way to manage a potential
ethnic conﬂict is through a representative civic-based democracy, one
that is open to inclusive participation of citizens in politics. In such an
open democratic society, Barack Obama, a man with roots in Africa,
has risen to become president of the most powerful democratic nation
in the world, in a place where much wealth was created through African
enslavement.
In Eastern Europe, the former Soviet state of Yugoslavia collapsed
amid ethnic and political conﬂict. Yugoslavia, under former president
Josip Broz Tito, was a viable and progressive Eastern European state
before its own collapse and the collapse of the former Soviet Union in
1991. But when ethnic and religious identity politics were unleashed
after the fall of Tito, a vicious ethnic civil war took place, in which the
Serbs engaged in ethnic cleansing against Muslims. This was eventually
stopped only by the intervention of European powers, led by the United
States. Nevertheless, the damaging politics of ethnic and religious identity took their toll. “Revolutionary democracy” is a term that has sometimes been applied to the Balkan conﬂict, as well as to unrest in Egypt
and Ethiopia, but there is no such thing as “revolutionary democracy”
in practice, since democracy by its very nature is evolutionary. Democracy is a result of civilized compromise among responsible citizens and
politicians over key policies and issues of human development at both
the national and local levels. Social democracy, such as the governing
system in Sweden, requires a highly educated population with highly
developed human capital and takes a long time to achieve. It is unlikely
to work in an income-poor country with no middle class or a weak
private sector and civil society, and where ethnic and religious conﬂicts are unsettled. Liberal democracy, adapted to local culture, has the
best chance of giving political choices to citizens if two things happen.
First, it must be promoted from the bottom up. Second, a middle class
economy must grow up to support a strong civic society and private
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sector. A country in Africa that has effectively adopted liberal democracy is Botswana.
Botswana today has the best-rated governance on the continent,
with the best-managed economy and minimal corruption, resulting in
the top per-capita income and Human Development Index in Africa.
There are others, such as Ghana, Tanzania, Mozambique, Malawi,
Benin, and Senegal, that are moving forward along this line. Multiethnic developing countries such as India, Malaysia, and South Africa
have opened to democratic majority rule. Ethiopia must learn from these
large multiethnic countries. A model for Ethiopia may be India, a large
multiethnic Asian country that achieved democratic unity under ethnic
and religious diversity, and whose political leaders are freely elected in
competitive national and local elections. India’s democracy, given its
ethnic and religious diversity, has allowed the country to become an
emerging economic giant that may compete with China, where political
freedom is comparatively less.
Most African rulers oppose liberal democracy for self-serving reasons, since this form of democracy erodes their monopolistic power and
forces them to compete and compromise, provided there are checks and
balances provided by democratic institutions. “Democratic institutions”
are legal and constitutional entities that provide checks on power, such
as a free press, an independent judiciary, and competing parties loyal to
the nation or its people, with term limits on key power holders. Amartya
K. Sen, the Indian Nobel laureate in development economics, was correct when he wrote that “no famine has historically taken place in a
country with a free press” (Sen 2006, p. 34).
There are few countries that practice liberal democracy in Africa.
As mentioned above, a rare example is Botswana, which is the most
economically developed and well-governed country on the continent,
with the highest per-capita income, at $8,000 a year, and the highest
human development index (HDI) in Africa. HDI is a composite index
of quality of human life that includes income, education, and health.
Botswana today is the beneﬁciary of hundreds of medical and health
professionals from Ethiopia and other African countries because of its
democratic good governance. Botswana used wealth from diamonds to
enhance human development and avoided the “resource curse” problem
(the tendency for the ﬁnding of rich deposits of mineral resources in a
country governed badly or by a dictator to lead to strife and corrup-
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tion in that country over control of the resource), whereas other African countries, such as Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Sudan, Liberia, and the
Congo, have suffered from conﬂicts fought over natural resources.
Botswana stands tall next to neighboring Zimbabwe, which is in
shambles because of the abuse of power. Its president, Robert Mugabe,
is a 91-year-old dictator who refuses to yield power by accepting defeat
by the opposition in the last election, and who has held onto rule for 28
years. Zimbabwe is one of the saddest cases of abuse of power by longterm, one-man rule in Africa. Mugabe continues to blame the country’s one-time British colonial masters in the former Rhodesia for what
is actually damage inﬂicted by his own government on the people of
Zimbabwe. Mugabe could have used his power to make early political
and economic reforms, such as land reform. However, in 1988, shortly
after taking ofﬁce, he abolished the main opposition party, headed by
former independence ﬁghter Joshua Nokomo, and formed a monopoly,
his Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) party.
The British colonial rulers departed from Zimbabwe in 1980, leaving the country with a modern infrastructure of standards close to those
of Europe, including a vibrant agricultural economy that produced surplus food crops such as maize. The agriculture was based on modern
farms and gave food aid to Ethiopia during the famine of 1984–1985.
But after Mugabe and his associates took power in 1987, their policies
wreaked havoc on Zimbabwe’s agricultural economy and its human
capital assets. Today, Zimbabwe’s economy is destroyed and its currency is worthless; the country has abandoned its national currency and
is now using U.S. dollars. Millions of citizens are exiled as refugees to
border countries such as Botswana and South Africa.
In general, ethnic-, clan-, and religious-based political parties are
not viable in promoting democracy or good governance. They are likely
to create both intraethnic and interethnic political conﬂicts. They cannot be democratic by the very nature of their formation, since they are
exclusive and prone to conﬂict, both within themselves and with other
ethnic parties. For example, each ethnic party in Ethiopia today is split
into two or more antagonistic groups, which are variously either aligned
with the ruling party, exiled, or in rebellion. In contrast, enlightened
political leaders can provide effective leadership in cooperation with
other multiethnic nationals.
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Political groups that continue to exploit the divisions that emerge
with the breakup of large African states are likely to create massive
destruction. Doing so could risk all that has been built up through the
centuries by the successful historic evolution into a nation state. One
example is the state of Ethiopia, with its ancient civilization. Ethiopia
was the only African country never colonized by European powers. For
politicians and leaders, the challenge is to bridge these deep historical
and cultural connections for the beneﬁt of all. To act in the narrow interests of one’s party can lead to failure. Consider what occurred in Egypt,
for example, where the recently elected government of the Islamic
Brotherhood, led by President Mohamed Morsi, was overthrown by
the combined forces of the military and the citizenry. One reason for
his party’s failure is that it was not perceived as being inclusive of all
Egyptians, such as women, based on its name. Indeed, the very name
connotes religious afﬁliation, which may have caused Egyptians to fear
that Morsi would turn Egypt into an Iranian Islamic–style theocracy.
Regardless of policy, parties based on religious, ethnic, or clan afﬁliations will fail in any nonhomogeneous society by creating a divisive
environment. Political parties must be inclusive of all citizens in order
to succeed.
Elections are a necessary but not a sufﬁcient condition for good
governance. Today, the overwhelming majority of Africans strive for
better education and health, and they yearn to be free from top-down
rule by the political elite. In Ethiopia, there was the experiment of ethnic federalism imposed from the top; this system uses the institutions of
the former totalitarian state of the military dictator Col. Mengistu Haile
Mariam, which collapsed in 1991 (Mariam 2011).
Ethnic federalism is a form of federalism based on dividing a country along ethnic and linguistic lines. It retards market integration and
communication among citizens that share a common culture and heritage. There are powerful pan-Ethiopian traits among the 80-some ethnic groups in Ethiopia, but these traits have been compromised since
the 1991 collapse of rule of the military junta. The vast majority of
Ethiopians, about 85 percent, make their livelihood in agriculture and
want security of land so they can engage in land transactions and use
land as collateral to get credits or loans. They desire to be real owners
of their landholdings and to get necessary improved inputs, training,
credit, agricultural extension, marketing, and technology to improve
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agricultural and food productivity. However, they cannot get credit,
since they do not meet the legal requirement of land ownership, which
would allow them to use land as collateral to get loans. In other developing countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and India, private
ownership of farmland and ﬂexible free land transactions, including
tenancy, have been properly regulated under the rule of law and have
created agricultural revolutions. This has transformed agriculture not
only by attracting capital and technology but by optimizing farm sizes
through ﬂexible markets that promote equity and agricultural productivity and protect natural resource degradation.

GOOD GOVERNANCE FOR EFFECTIVE GLOBAL
ENGAGEMENT, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, AID, AND TRADE
All African states, including Ethiopia, can beneﬁt from the kind of
good governance that fosters effective regional and global engagement
and cooperation. The second-most populated African state, Ethiopia is
home to the African Union, the Economic Community of Africa, and
a large diplomatic community of national embassies and international
organizations such as United Nations ofﬁces, as well as nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs. Using good governance, Ethiopia can
improve relations with other regional powers, particularly countries in
Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Good governance in Ethiopia and
attempts to reach out to these other powers will help prevent conﬂict driven by dictatorships, assuming the partners also practice good
governance.
Since it is landlocked because of the breakaway by Eritrea in 1993,
Ethiopia could beneﬁt by promoting good trade relations and crossborder movement of people, commodities, and investment, as well as
promoting the regional public good through human security.
For instance, a positive relationship and trade with Somalia would
open up the coastline of Africa all along the Indian Ocean for the beneﬁt
of both Eritrea and Ethiopia and the entire Horn of Africa.
Furthermore, Ethiopia and other African states can use their large
diaspora population of skilled individuals, who can constructively
engage their homeland through remittances, investment, and transfer-
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ring knowledge and skills through creative academic and business partnership programs. If the diaspora can be enlisted in this way, a major
source of human capital will be created that can inject investment and
knowledge into all sectors of the economy. Moreover, the diaspora
should be encouraged to invest beyond just bonds, into areas such as
dam construction, banks, insurance companies, and other sectors like
industry, tourism, information technology, and agriculture.
Since around 1991, with the end of the Cold War, some African
states, including Ethiopia, opened up to the West and Asia, including
the Middle East, North America, and Europe. This reestablished the
strong historic U.S.-Ethiopia tie that had been interrupted during the
rule of the Soviet-inﬂuenced military junta between 1974 and 1991.
It is important to remember that, until the time of the junta, the U.S.Ethiopia partnership was strongly beneﬁcial for both countries from its
beginning in 1903, during the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, through
the next 70 years. Strong national organizations, such as Ethiopian Airlines and the defense forces, including the air force and the navy, beneﬁted from this partnership, which included a large Peace Corps contingent and student exchange programs from which Ethiopians of that
generation beneﬁted in terms of a high-quality education. Ethiopia was
respected in Africa and throughout the world. The nation was relatively
peaceful and united until 1974, when Ethiopia fell under the sway of
Soviet Cold War geopolitics and was taken over by a military junta.
This junta collapsed in 1991, the same year that the Soviet Union did. It
may be possible to reestablish that former U.S. partnership through creative exchanges between Americans and Ethiopians with genuine leadership on both sides. Current and future U.S. governments should invest
more in helping to build good governance, institutions for democracy,
education, peace, and conﬂict resolution in Ethiopia, as well as highquality education and improvements in human rights. Ethiopian academics from the diaspora can transform education and health if allowed
an opportunity to do so under creative partnerships.
In terms of the relationship between economic development and
foreign aid, there are three main perspectives scholars have expressed
on the way foreign aid affects development. The ﬁrst is that foreign aid
has an overall positive impact on economic development, with some
exceptions. The second is that aid has little or no effect on development, and in some cases may actually be a hindrance. For example,
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the effect of food aid lowers domestic food prices and displaces local
food production. The third perspective sees the effect of foreign aid
as conditional on the level of good governance. For instance, aid has
been beneﬁcial to countries like Botswana, where good governance is
high. However, Table 7.4 shows that African countries attract by far the
largest amount of global aid, both in dollar amount and in percentage
of GDP, and yet that aid has not translated into economic progress. For
example, food aid creates dependency by reducing local food production. In particular, the food aid accepted by Ethiopia has impaired that
country’s local agriculture and food production; consequently, it stands
to reason that accepting such aid should be avoided unless there is an
emergency.
Ethiopia ranks just above Zimbabwe and below Liberia in the 2012
Legatum Index, a comprehensive measure of governance that includes
eight broad indicators of human progress: 1) economy, 2) entrepreneurship opportunity, 3) governance, 4) education, 5) health, 6) safety, 7)
personal freedom, and 8) social capital. The complex contributors to
low investment and entrepreneurship include corruption, low human
capital, ﬁscal instability, bad infrastructure, low levels of domestic savings, and poor coordination. By enabling entrepreneurship, good governance helps to overcome the lack of productivity from the low investment trap.
Table 7.4 Global and Regional Foreign Aid Distribution
Millions
Percent
of US$
of GDP
Sub-Saharan Africa
24,144
6.0
South Asia
6,169
0.8
East Asia and Paciﬁc
7,140
0.4
Europe and Central Asia
10,465
0.8
Middle East and North Africa
7,628
1.0
Latin America and Caribbean
6,153
0.4
Low income
32,135
3.0
Lower-middle income
21,775
0.5
Upper-middle income
3,778
0.2
High income
1,273
0.0

Dollars
per person
34
4
4
22
24
12
14
8
11
1

World Bank (2014).
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THE CASE OF CHINA—EXCEPTION TO THE RULE?
In the past three decades China has made impressive economic
progress, exhibiting stellar economic growth rates coupled with a signiﬁcant reduction in poverty and rapid advances in many human development dimensions. On the surface, it seems that China has achieved
good governance outcomes even while defying those criteria or indices
of good governance mentioned in our earlier analysis and delineated by
the World Bank and other organizations. Especially in the areas of voice
and accountability and the rule of law, it does seem that China does
not meet the criteria of good governance. In addition, the China case
appears to counter the common prescriptions that development scholars recommend to developing countries for successful governance and
for avoiding potential ethnic conﬂict and instability—namely, to pursue
a liberal democratic institution that is representative and open to the
inclusive participation of citizens in politics.
Indeed, China is ruled by an authoritarian regime governed by a single party (the Chinese Communist Party, or CCP) that restricts and suppresses civic participation and elections, political freedom of expression and assembly, and freedom of the press.
However, if we examine the case of China more carefully, we ﬁnd
the principle of voice and accountability actually exists, and that of the
rule of law as well, only in different forms rooted in Chinese culture and
its long history and civilization. Zhang Weiwei, director of the Center
for China Development Model Research, Fudan University, and director of the Institute of China Studies, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, argues that China practices economic accountability. Government in China, at all levels, is held accountable for promoting economic
growth and job creation, Weiwei (2014) contends, since an ofﬁcial cannot be promoted unless the area under his governance performs well
economically.
There is also political and legal accountability (and, to the extent of
such accountability, rule of law) because the ofﬁcials are held accountable and demoted or punished for accidents, such as ﬁres that could
have been averted by following proper precautions and regulations.
Other crimes, disasters, missteps, policy mistakes, and corruption cases
are routinely being exposed.
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Weiwei also points out that China’s neodemocratic centralism may
have some advantage over a collective decision-making process in
terms of governing effectiveness. China has institutionalized a procedural accountability for its democratic centralism. Under such a system,
a major decision like determining the nation’s ﬁve-year plan for development takes well over a year of extensive and interactive consultations
at various levels of the Chinese state and society. This decision-making
process receives inputs from thousands of think tanks, government
agencies, universities, prominent scholars, and professionals. The
recently adopted decision by the Third Plenum on deepening reforms
is a good example in this regard. China’s socioeconomic plan-drafting
group, chaired by President Xi Jinping himself, solicited opinions from
well over 100 institutions across the country and received 2,500 suggestions over a period of six months. About half of these suggestions were
accepted. During the consultation process, all of the nation’s seven top
leaders travel to different regions and provinces of China to make investigations in preparation for the deliberations on the ﬁnal decision and
to learn the opinions of local people. As a result, the decision reﬂects
the broad consensus of Chinese society on many issues such as public
health reform, adjustment of the one-child policy, deferred retirement
age, banking sector reform, and education reform. China’s system of
accountability performs better than that of most states around the world,
and it achieves this in a country that is rapidly moving toward becoming
the world’s largest economy in the twenty-ﬁrst century.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Good governance for sustainable human development is a multidimensional process involving socioeconomic and political transformation of societies; it is aimed at enhancing human progress in all its
dimensions, including freedom of political and economic choice. A
program of good governance, along with education on how to achieve
peaceful transformation and conﬂict resolution, should be instituted
across schools, universities, and colleges to teach citizenship, the qualities of a civil society, and responsible ethical conduct.
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In their book Why Nations Fail, mentioned in the introduction, the
leading institutional economists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, examine the stark contrast in living conditions between the two Koreas, North and South, and
also delve into the reasons why Botswana has risen while its neighbor,
Zimbabwe, is sinking. Beyond that, Acemoglu and Robinson (2011),
looking toward the future, give suggestions for ways in which larger
nations like the United States and China can build more sustainable and
egalitarian political and economic institutions.
While the issues involved in bringing about positive changes in
countries are complex, positive economic development does not in fact
have a secret formula. Simply put, successful development requires
good governance. Positive instances can be found in East Asia, Europe,
North America, and elsewhere. Unfortunately, Botswana is one of the
few examples of development through good governance in Africa. The
question remains: why have African countries lagged behind other
developing nations, such as those of Asia? It is not for lack of natural
resources, good climate, or a hard-working people. Most African states
plagued by poverty suffer because of government repression. These
leaders rely on the instruments of fear and coercion to prevent honest
dialogue and freedom of expression. They have, by and large, failed
to learn the lessons of the past, both from their own history and from
that of successful nations. We hope political leaders will make a different, positive choice, one of building inclusive economic, political, and
social institutions in the twenty-ﬁrst century. The single comprehensive
factor that can take Africa as well as states in Asia, the Middle East, and
Latin America out of poverty and conﬂict is democratic good governance, which will positively affect all sectors of the economy.
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Bribery, 7–8, 62, 88n25
as business and household problem,
141, 141f
in CEE compared to FSU countries,
79–80, 80f, 81ff
as education and health care
governance problems, 96, 97
Britain, African colonization by, 12, 145
Bulgaria
as a CEE country, 7, 86n13
corruption in, 64f, 76f
governance measures in, 67f, 69f, 70f,
72f, 74f, 77f
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Bureaucracy, time taxes in, 7, 80, 82f
Burkina Faso, IIAG scores for, 136, 137t
Burundi, IIAG scores for, 136, 137t
Business Environment and Enterprise
Performance Survey (BEEPS)
as governance measurement, 6, 58,
86n10
summary of, data in transition
economies, 77–80, 78f, 79f, 80f,
81ff, 82ff, 83f
Business ﬁrms, 16, 149
corruption’s cost to, 62, 79–80, 141,
141f
perspective of, on transitional
economies, 6, 7
Cameroon, IIAG scores for, 136, 137t
Cape Verde, IIAG scores for, 136, 137t
Capital, credit for, 10, 117–118, 119,
139, 147
CCP (Chinese Communist Party), 150
CEE countries. See Central and Eastern
European countries
Central African Republic, IIAG scores
for, 136, 137t
Central and Eastern European (CEE)
countries
control of corruption in, 61f, 62–65,
63f, 64f, 87nn18–19
transition economies in, 6–7, 59–60,
86nn12–13
WGI scores in, 60, 61f, 87nn14–15
See also names of individual states,
e.g., Albania; Poland
Central and Eastern European (CEE)
countries, compared to FSU
countries
bribery in, 79–80, 80f, 81ff
corruption as obstacle in, 78–80, 78f,
79f, 83f
CPI in, 75, 76f
Freedom House governance measures
in, 74, 75f
government effectiveness in, 65, 66f
IEF in, 75–76, 77f
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Central and Eastern European (CEE)
countries, compared to FSU
countries, cont.
obstacles facing ﬁrms in, 84f
permit applications in, 78, 80, 82f,
83f, 85f
political stability in, 71, 73f, 74
regulatory quality in, 65, 67f, 68
rule of law in, 68, 69f, 71
tax regulation in, 80, 82f
voice and accountability in, 60, 61f,
71, 71f
WGI scores in, 60, 61f, 63f, 66f, 67f,
69f, 71f, 73f
Chad
IIAG scores for, 136, 137t
preventable mortality in, 10, 114
Child welfare systems, 2, 28
unintended consequences of marketbased incentives for, 21–22
Children, 26, 151
as laborers or slaves, 115, 139
mortality of, as health measurement,
10, 114, 132
as refugees, 120
China, 112, 134t, 144, 152
governance in, as exception to rule,
150–151
health care providers and perverse
incentives in, 99–100
outcomes of one-party state in, 4, 12,
150
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), as
authoritarian regime, 150
Citizenry, 11
empowerment of, 104–106, 119
hierarchical relationships of, 20, 24
human rights of, 6, 133
interaction of, fostered by good
governance, 1, 6, 53, 136
needs of, and responsive institutions,
132, 151
objectives of, 2, 15, 20
Civil liberties, 150
Freedom House survey of, 57, 74
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as governance measurement, 6, 75f,
132
Civil wars
drivers of, 117, 121, 138, 143
government effectiveness and, 42, 43,
43t, 44, 44t, 45t
Cleveland, Harlan, 15, 30n1
Climate change, 113, 116
adapting to, and conﬂict risk, 121–
122, 123–125
importance of addressing, with good
governance, 13, 123–126
poverty reduction and, 8–10
Colombia, MPI and income poverty for,
134t
Comoros, IIAG scores for, 136, 137t
CompStat/CitiStat model, performance
management data and, 29–30
Conﬂict, 151
capital development destroyed by,
120–121
consequences of, 119–120
drivers of, 11, 121, 125, 138–140,
142–143, 147
poverty and, 111, 112, 152
risk of, and climate change
adaptations, 121–122, 123–125
trap of, 117, 138
Congo, Democratic Republic of, 10, 120,
145
IIAG scores (grades C and F) for,
136, 137t
MPI and income poverty for, 133, 135t
Corruption
business ﬁrm’s perspective on, 7, 77–
78, 86n11, 87nn16–17, 88nn24–26
control measurements for, 5, 40, 56,
60, 61f, 76–77, 87n15
control of, as aspect of good
governance, 1, 6, 46, 63f, 64ff, 140
developing countries and, 7–8, 60–65,
140–142
as IIAG component, 133, 136
as obstacle in CEE compared to FSU
countries, 78–80, 78f, 79f, 88n27
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Corruption, cont.
political parties and, 4–5, 35, 46
poor governance as driver of, traps,
11, 140–142
post–civil war states and, 43, 44
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)
in CEE compared to FSU countries,
75, 76f
compared to HDI, IIAG, MPI for
selected African countries, 133,
136t
as governance measurement, 6, 7, 57,
86n7
Côte d’Ivoire, MPI and income poverty
for, 135t
CPI. See Corruption Perceptions Index
Croatia
as a CEE country, 7, 86n13
corruption in, 64f, 76f
governance measures in, 67f, 69f, 70f,
72f, 74f, 77f
Cultural factors
governance shaped by, 150–151
kinship and reciprocity as, and
institutional corruption, 59, 62–63,
84
Czech Republic, 59
as a CEE country, 7, 86n13
corruption in, 64f, 76f
governance measures in, 67f, 69f, 70f,
72f, 74f, 77f
Darfur, causes of conﬂict in, 121
Democracies
conﬂict management in, 142, 143
decision making in, 12, 53–54, 144,
151
designing performance management
in, 2, 16
good governance and, 6, 13, 42, 142,
145, 150
political parties’ inﬂuence in, 4–6, 35
types of, 12, 143, 150–151
Denmark, high standard of governance
in, 131
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Developing countries, 8
education and health care in (see
Education in developing countries;
Health care in developing
countries)
good governance and leadership
challenges in, 10–13, 122, 131–
152
impacts of climate change on, 121–
122
international aid to, 46, 52, 86n2
mortality rates in, 10, 114
political parties’ inﬂuence on
democracy in, 4–6, 35–47
Digital technology, performance
management and, 26, 104
Djibouti, 136, 136t, 137t
Dominican Republic, MPI and income
poverty for, 134t
Downs, Anthony, 47n1
Dropout rates, U.S. education and, 3–4
Duncan, U.S. Sec. of Educ. Arne, 19
Dynamics of Performance Management,
The (Moynihan), 15–16
Economic accountability, China and, 150
Economic Community of Africa, 147
Economic development
components of, 136–137
corruption’s effect on, 61–62
foreign aid and, 148–149
good governance required for, 12–13,
51, 86n1, 112
Economic freedom, 151
index of, 57–58, 86nn8–9
Economic growth, 54, 112, 150
in Asia contrasted with Africa, 12, 152
government failure and, 111, 115
promoted by education and health,
93, 107
transitional governments and, 6, 41,
43t, 44t, 45t
Economist Intelligence Unit
(organization), 58
Ecuador, MPI and income poverty for,
134t
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Education
as component of human development
indexes, 136, 149
foreign, of U.S. immigrants and dollar
value, 94–95
importance of, to good governance,
13, 100–101
MPI measurements of, 114, 132
service deliveries for, and public
sector agencies, 21, 22–24
Education in developing countries
economic growth and, 93, 107
governance challenges and, 93–101
indicators of, 94–95, 112
money for, 7–8, 93, 96–97, 107
problems addressed, 94, 102–103,
104, 105–106
problems encountered, 96–97, 98–99,
100–101, 107
quality issues, 94–95, 96, 100–101,
105, 106, 107, 138
Education reform
factors in failure of, 3–4, 8, 23–25
NCLB and, 19, 25–26
proposals for, 11, 26–27, 151
Egypt, political unrest in, 5, 143, 146
Elementary and Secondary Education
Act (ESEA, 2002), 24, 25
Entrepreneurial opportunity, 149
Environment (business). See Business
Environment and Performance
Survey (BEEPS)
Environment (geophysical), 28
degradation or stress on, as poverty
cause/trap, 111, 118, 139–140
federal agencies on, 30–31n2
impact of climate change in, on
poverty reduction, 8–10
See also Natural resources
EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency), 30–31n2
Equatorial Guinea, IIAG scores for, 136,
137t
Equity, as aspect of good governance,
6, 53
Eritrea, 147
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governance and poverty in, 133, 136t
IIAG scores for, 136, 137t
ESEA (Elementary and Secondary
Education Act, 2002), 24, 25
Estonia, 74
corruption in, 64f, 75, 76f
as either a CEE or FSU country, 7,
86n12
governance measures in, 66f, 68f, 70f,
71, 72f, 73f, 77f
Ethics, 18, 151
complexity of values and goals in
agency theory, 2–3, 20, 30–31n2
Ethiopia
conﬂict vulnerability in, 138, 143
famine in, and food aid, 145, 149
farm traps and poverty in, 118, 137–
138, 139
governance and poverty measures
compared for selected African
countries, 133, 136t
IIAG scores for, 136, 137t
MPI and income poverty for, 133,
135t
political models for, 144, 146–147
property rights in, 140, 146
regional cooperatives and, 147–149
Ethiopian Airlines, 148
Ethnicity
as driver of conﬂict, 138–139, 142–
143, 145
as nonviable basis for promoting
good governance, 145, 146
in studied transitional economies, 42,
43t, 44t, 45t
Europe
regional recipients of foreign aid in,
149t
See also Central and Eastern
European (CEE) countries;
European Union (EU); names of
individual states, e.g. France
European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD)
BEEPS a collaboration from, 58,
86nn10–11
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European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD), cont.
data from, and investment
expectations, 52, 86n3
European Union (EU), inﬂuence of
admission requirements, 65, 74
Fertility, poverty traps and, 10, 115, 117,
138
FHI. See Freedom House Index
Foreign aid. See International assistance
Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries
control of corruption in, 61f, 62–65,
63f, 64f, 87nn18–20
transitional economies in, 6–7, 59,
86n12, 143
WGI scores in, 60, 61f, 87nn14–15
See also names of individual states,
e.g., Armenia; Russia
Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries,
compared to CEE countries
bribery in, 79–80, 80f, 81ff
corruption seen as obstacle in, 78–80,
78f, 79f, 83f
CPI in, 75, 76f
Freedom House governance measures
in, 74, 75f
government effectiveness in, 65, 66f
IEF in, 75–76, 77f
permit applications in, 78, 80, 82f,
83f, 85f
political stability in, 71, 73f, 74
regulatory quality in, 65, 67f, 68
rule of law in, 68, 69f, 71
tax regulation in, 80, 82f
voice and accountability in, 60, 61f,
71, 71f
WGI scores in, 60, 61f, 63f, 66f, 67f,
69f, 71f, 73f
France, 12, 94–95
Freedom aspects, 149
civil liberties, 6, 57, 74, 75f, 132, 150
economic, 57–58, 86nn8–9, 151
political, 144, 150, 151
Freedom House, annual scores for CEE
and FSU countries, 74, 75f
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Freedom House Index (FHI)
founders of, organization, 57, 86n6
governance measurements as, 6, 7
FSU countries. See Former Soviet Union
countries
Gabon, IIAG scores (grades “A” and “F”)
for, 136, 137t
Gambia, IIAG scores for, 136, 137t
GDP (gross domestic product), 149t
Georgia
as an FSU country, 7, 86n12
corruption in, 64f, 76f
governance measures in, 66f, 68f, 70f,
72f, 73f, 77f
Ghana
good governance in, 131, 144
governance and poverty measures
compared for, 136, 136t, 137t
MPI and income poverty for, 133,
134t
Global Integrity Index, 56
GNP (gross national product), 139
Gorsuch, Anne, sought to change agency
priorities, 30–31n2
Governance, 1, 15, 119, 131
challenges of, 7–8, 10–13, 93–107,
111–122, 131–152
economic development dependent on,
12, 112
good, and aspects of, 1, 6, 27–30, 53,
83–85, 115–116, 122–126, 132f,
151
(see also under Transition economies)
logic of, model and hierarchical
relationships, 20, 24
measurement systems for, 6, 39–40,
55–58, 131, 149
poor, 11, 13, 76, 125, 133
relationships of, to development and
MPI, 10–11
Government, 4
effectiveness of, as aspect of good
governance, 1, 5, 6, 16, 29–30,
40, 42, 44, 46, 56–57, 65, 66f,
87n21, 131, 151
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Government, cont.
efﬁciency of, as aspect of good
governance, 6, 12, 16, 17
overthrowing, by unconstitutional
means, 5, 46, 146
reinventing, by performance
management, 15–16, 29
roles of, 93, 101, 122
types of, 6, 12, 145–146
Graduation rates, U.S. vs. other
countries, 23
Graft, as governance problem, 96–97
Grants-in-aid
accountability and, 104, 107n1
prerequisites for, 52, 86nn2–4
Green Revolution, 113, 116
Gridlock, political parties and, 4
Gross domestic product (GDP),
percentage of, 149t
Gross national product (GNP), highest
in Africa, 139
Guinea, IIAG scores for, 136, 137t
Guinea-Bissau
IIAG scores for, 136, 137t
preventable mortality in, 10, 114
Haiti, MPI and income poverty for, 135t
HDI (Human Development Index), 133,
136t, 144
Health, 13, 136
measurements of, 132, 149
poor, as poverty trap, 10, 114, 115,
117, 139
Health care
apply lessons in performance
management to, 28, 30
service deliveries for, 2, 21, 120
Health care in developing countries
governance challenges and, 93–101
indicators of, 94–96, 112
money for, 7–8, 93, 96–97, 107, 120
mortality rates and, 10, 94, 114, 120
problems addressed, 94, 103, 104–
106
problems encountered, 96–101, 107
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quality issues, 94, 95–96, 98, 100–101,
105, 106, 107
Health care reform, 2, 8, 20–21, 151
Heritage Foundation, as IEF provider,
57–58, 86n8
Hirschman-Herﬁndahl index, political
party systems and, 40
Housing, inadequate, 10, 117
Human capital
development potential of, 12–13,
132–133
diaspora populations and, 147–148
impact of governance on, in
developing countries, 7–8, 131–
133, 149
Human development, 136
good governance as means to
promote, 131, 147–148, 151–152
measurement and understanding of,
10, 131–133
progress on, 149, 150
Human Development Index (HDI)
compared to CPI, IIAG, MPI for
selected African countries, 133,
136t
quality of governance and, 133, 144
Human rights, 6, 133
Hungary, 59
as a CEE country, 7, 86n13
corruption in, 64f, 76f
governance measures in, 67f, 69f, 70f,
72f, 74f, 77f
Hunger, 112
as dimension of poverty, 114, 139
food aid and, 145, 149
Ibrahim Index of African Governance
(IIAG)
compared to CPI, HDI, MPI for
selected countries, 133, 136t
core components of, 133, 136
IEF (Index of Economic Freedom),
57–58, 86nn8–9
IIAG (Ibrahim Index of African
Governance), 133, 136, 136t
Illiteracy, 10, 114
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ILO (International Labour Organization),
115
IMIDSS (Integrated Medical Information
and Disease Surveillance System),
India, 104
Inclusiveness, as democratic aspect of
good governance, 6, 42, 142, 145,
150
Income, 136, 149t
inequality of, and violence, 138, 143
MPI and, compared by country,
134t–135t
MPI as alternative poverty
measurement, 113–115
as poverty measurement, 9, 111, 132
Index of Economic Freedom (IEF)
annual, from Heritage Foundation and
Wall Street Journal, 57–58, 86n8
in CEE compared to FSU countries,
75–76, 77f
India, 106, 144, 147
education quality in, 94–95, 102–103
health care money in, 8, 97
health providers’ absenteeism and
training in, 97–98, 104
MPI and income poverty for, 135t
Indonesia, MPI and income poverty for,
134t
Institutions, 46, 146
building effective, for good
governance, 142–147, 151–152
corruption in, and cultural factors, 59,
62–63, 84
responsive, and needs of citizenry,
132, 151
Integrated Medical Information and
Disease Surveillance System
(IMIDSS), biometric monitoring,
104
International assistance
economic development and, 148–149,
149t
prerequisites for, 52, 54, 86n2, 149
quality of governance and, 84–85, 145
International Classiﬁcation of Diseases,
Code Z59.5 in, 114

Asefa & Huang.indb 164

International Labour Organization (ILO),
child laborers tracked by, 115
International Monetary Fund, IEF and,
58
Investment, 139
diaspora populations and, 147–148
redevelopment of transition
economies and, 52, 86nn3–4
uncoordinated, and poverty traps,
116–117, 149
Iran, unrest in, 5, 146
Italy, political stability in, 46
Japan, property rights in, 147
Jinping, Pres. Xi, China, 151
Job creation, economic accountability
and, 150
Job skills
diaspora populations and, 147–148
underpinned by uncoordinated
investment, 117, 138
Kazakhstan, 134t
as an FSU country, 7, 86n12
corruption in, 64f, 76f
governance measures in, 66f, 68f, 70f,
72f, 73f, 77f
Kenya, 124
education in, 8, 106
governance and poverty measures
compared for, 133, 135t, 136,
136t, 137t
Kickbacks. See Corruption
Korean peoples, governance of, 11, 152
Kosovo, 7, 76f, 86n13
Kyrgyz Republic, IEF in, 77f
Kyrgyzstan, 54
as an FSU country, 7, 86n12
corruption in, 64f, 76f
governance measures in, 66f, 68f, 70f,
72f, 73f
Laos, MPI and income poverty for, 134t
Latin America, 149t, 152
See also names of individual states,
e.g., Bolivia
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Latvia, 74
corruption in, 64f, 75, 76f
Latvia,
as either a CEE or FSU country, 7,
86n12
governance measures in, 66f, 68f, 70f,
71, 72f, 73f, 77f
LEA (Local educational agencies), 24, 25
Leadership challenges in developing
countries, 10–13, 137, 152
Ethiopia in particular, 12, 145–147, 148
Legatum Index, core components of, 149
Legislators, hierarchical relationships in
governance model and, 20, 24
Lesotho, IIAG scores for, 136, 137t
Liberal democracy, 143–144
Liberia, 145, 149
IIAG scores for, 136, 137t
Life in Transition Survey, corruption
experiences reported in, 86n11
Light, Paul, 16
Lithuania, 74
corruption in, 64f, 75, 76f
as either a CEE or FSU country, 7,
86n12
governance measures in, 66f, 68f, 70f,
71, 72f, 73f, 77f
Local educational agencies (LEA), public
education and, 24, 25
Los Angeles, California, value-added
teacher performance measures in,
26–27
Macedonia
as a CEE country, 7, 86n13
corruption in, 64f, 76f
governance measures in, 67f, 69f, 70f,
72f, 74f, 77f
Madagascar, governance and poverty
scores for, 135t, 136, 137t
Malawi, governance in, 136, 137t, 144
Malaysia, multiethnicity and majority
rule in, 144
Mali
IIAG scores for, 136, 137t
preventable mortality in, 10, 114
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Malthusian traps, fertility and, 117, 138
Mariam, Col. Mengistu Haile, 146
Mauritania, IIAG scores for, 136, 137t
Mauritius, governance in, 131, 136, 137t
MDGs (Millennium Development
Goals), 9, 112
Measurement systems, 5, 10, 132
accountability, with CPI and FHI, 6, 7
governance and, 6, 39–40, 55–58,
131, 149
lessons in effectiveness improvements
of, 17, 27–30
poverty, 11, 113–115, 132
student progress, 25, 28, 99, 102–103
value-added, for teacher performance,
26–27
Mexico, MPI and income poverty for,
134t
Middle East, 149t, 152
See also names of individual
countries, e.g., Iran
Migration
climate migrants, 123, 125
foreign education of immigrants,
94–95
human development migrants, 144,
147–148
Military juntas, 140, 148
Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs), as U.N. outline, 9, 112
Moldova
as an FSU country, 7, 86n12
corruption in, 64f, 76f
governance measures in, 66f, 68f, 70f,
72f, 73f, 77f
Montenegro, 76f, 77f
as a CEE country, 7, 86n13
Moral hazard, agency theory and, 18
Morsi, Pres. Mohamed, Egypt, 5, 146
Mortality rates, in developing countries,
10, 94, 114
Moynihan, Donald, 15–16
Mozambique, governance in, 136, 137t,
144
MPI. See Multidimensional Poverty
Index
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Mubarak, Pres. Hosni, Egypt, 5
Mugabe, Robert, 145
Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI),
11, 133–136
characteristics tracked by, 113–115
compared to CPI, HDI, IIAG for
selected African countries, 133,
136t
income and, compared by country,
134t–135t
Myrdal, Gunnar, 116, 138
Namibia, IIAG scores for, 136, 137t
“Nation at Risk, A” (report), U.S.
education in, 3–4, 23
Natural resources
conﬂicts over, 124, 145
depletion of, and poverty, 9, 10, 118,
119, 139–140
development potential of, 12–13, 144,
147
effect of climate change on, 121, 124
NCLB. See No Child Left Behind Act
(2001)
NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s
Development), 125
Nepal, 98–99, 135t
New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD),
governance improvement of
individual countries and, 125
New York (City), Dept. of Education,
26, 28
New York (State), regional educationservice centers in, 23–24
NGOs (Nongovernmental organizations),
56, 147
Nicaragua, MPI and income poverty for,
134t
Niger
IIAG scores for, 136, 137t
MPI and income poverty for, 133, 135t
preventable mortality in, 10, 114
Nigeria, 136t
conﬂict vulnerability in, 138–139
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conﬂicts over natural resources in,
124, 145
education in, vs. France and dollar
value, 94–95
IIAG scores for, 136, 137t
No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB,
2001), 24
linear improvement expectations of,
18–19, 19f
standardized testing in, and
educational success, 3, 22, 25–26
Nokomo, Joshua, 145
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
ofﬁces of, 56, 147
Nordic states. See Denmark; Norway;
Sweden
North Korea, governance of, 11, 152
Norway, high standard of governance
in, 131
Nutrition
mal-, as poverty trap, 10, 114, 132
under-, and workforce energy, 113,
117, 139
Obama, Pres. Barack, U.S., 4, 143
Obamacare. See Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (2010)
Ohio, regional education-service centers
in, 23–24
Organizational authority, hierarchical
relationships in governance model
and, 20–21, 24
Oslo Peace Research Institute, cyclic
projections by, 138
Ottoman Empire, collapse of, 11
Pahlavi, Shah Mohammad Reza, Iran, 5
Pakistan, MPI and income poverty for,
134t
Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (2010), multiple goals and
conﬂicting objectives of, 2, 20–21
Peace, 131, 138, 151
Pedersen’s Index, electoral volatility
and, 41
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Performance-based contracts, 17
complexities in establishment of, 18,
21
market-based incentives in, 21–22
service delivery with, and agency
theory, 2–3
Performance management, 8
blunt application of, in public sector,
17, 23–27
complexities of, in public sector,
20–22
diagnostic tools for, 3, 27, 29
lessons in effectiveness improvements
of, 17, 27–30
origins of, 16, 17–19, 25–26
public education and, 3–4, 18
role of, in good governance, 2–3,
15–17
unintended consequences of, 21–22,
27
Poland, 59
as a CEE country, 7, 86n13
corruption in, 64f, 76f
governance measures in, 67f, 69f, 70f,
72f, 74f, 77f
Political authority, governance and, 1,
6, 7
Political freedom, 150, 151
Political inﬂuence, public vs. private
sector and, 22, 26
Political parties
corruption and, 4, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40,
45
deﬁnitions of, 41, 47n1
fragmentation (number) of, 37–41,
43t, 44, 44t, 45t, 47n2, 145
functions performed by, 35–36, 36t
inﬂuence of, on democracy in
developing countries, 4–6, 35–37
institutionalized aspects of, 37–38,
40, 142
one-party dominance, 4, 37, 38, 39,
41, 43t, 44, 44t, 45t, 145, 146, 150
study of good governance with,
39–47, 145
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study results and conclusion about,
42–47
volatility of, 38, 40–41, 43t, 44, 44t,
45t
Political rights, 144
Freedom House survey of, 57, 74
as governance measurement, 6, 75f
Political stability, 7
as aspect of good governance, 1, 5, 6,
46–47, 57, 87n23, 131
in CEE compared to FSU countries,
71, 73f, 74
as dependent study variable, 40, 41,
43
post–civil war states, 44, 45t
Poverty
addressing, traps, 10, 11, 116–118,
137–138
addressing, with good governance,
13, 115–116, 119
environmental degradation and, 111,
112, 118
multiple dimensions of, 11, 113–115
natural resources depletion and, 9, 10,
112
poor governance as driver of, 11,
138–140
U.N. and, 9–10
Poverty reduction, 150
35 years of recent progress toward,
111–112
challenges and constraints on, 111,
115, 118–122
climate change and, 8–10
good governance and, 4, 115–116,
125–126, 131, 136, 152
Private sector, 111
corrupt “state capture” in, 5, 58, 65,
76, 87nn16–17
Property rights, 124
land ownership and reform, 138, 140,
146–147
rules for, from effective and inclusive
institutions, 142, 147
Public education, 26, 30
chaotic governing structures in, 23–25
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Public education, cont.
gaming the system, 18, 22, 27, 103
quality of, and economic progress,
3–4
students ill-served by, 19, 25
Public policy, 7
aligning employment goals with, 3,
150
implementation of, and governance,
1, 85, 122–126
planned adaptation in, 122–125
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